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RACE

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RACE

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THE STUDENT OF RACE PROBLEMS CAN SAY . . . . *

MARGARET MEAD

Is Our Scientific Knowledge of Race Differences Improving?

One way of assaying improvement in any part of life is to look back a few years, and then take a second look at the present. The article which is quoted in full here was written in the early winter of 1940, right after the beginning of World War II, before the entry of the United States into the war, and published in April 1940 in a journal called *Frontiers of Democracy* in an issue devoted to a variety of minority problems, problems of Negro Americans, Jewish Americans, Catholic Americans, female Americans, with a little essay on 'What is Living and What is Dead in Marxism'. My article, which was called 'The Student of Race Problems can Say . . .' was written for an American audience and is far more parochial than a similar article would be today. Many things have happened in the world since that spring of 1940: the emergence of the many new nations of Africa and Asia, the establishment of Israel as a state, the Supreme Court Decision on desegregation in the United States, the election for the first time in American history of a President who is a Roman Catholic. Many other things have happened also—the growth of articulate anti-European, anti-American and anti-white race sentiment, apartheid in the Union of South Africa, the massacres in Angola, the massive resistance against integration in the South-eastern United States, the feeling in London against West Indian immigrants.

The important issue remains: how much has our scientific knowledge of the significance of race differences become a matter of the ordinary intellectual equipment of the educated and responsible citizen? The admonition to treat all men as brothers, uttered so many centuries ago by the great religious leaders of the past, has received new impetus from our scientific understanding that all the races of men on this planet belong to one species. But how well are these findings of anthropology understood?

For the last quarter of a century the fight against race prejudice, particularly as it applies to minority groups in Europe and America, has been characterised by devotion and zeal and a singular lack of success. Anthropologists have painstakingly documented the essential meaninglessness of the concept of *race*, as applied to European sub-groups; they have shown how tremendous is the over-lapping of traits between the alleged European sub-races, the 'Nordic' and 'Alpine' and 'Mediterranean' types, so that it is possible to find Italians with blond hair and blue eyes and Swedes

* Reprinted by kind permission of *Frontiers of Democracy* (a publication of the Progressive Education Association continuing *The Social Frontier*), 15 April 1940.

with black hair and black eyes. The history of western Europe has been invoked to show how heterogeneous is the composition of every European sub-group, and how much of their ancestry the different family lines in different countries have in common. When these unreal distinctions between European groups were claimed to be upheld in the performance of different groups on the Army Alpha and Beta tests during the war (where the 'Nordics' made scores conspicuously higher than the 'Mediterraneans', etc.), these results have been painstakingly examined; it has been shown how the determining factors in this poorer score are degree of linguistic and cultural assimilation and economic status. The relationship of I.Q. to factors such as these and also to the tradition of the group has been shown, so that it is a fair hypothesis that a minority group of one tradition, e.g. the immigrant Russian Jews' tradition of upward mobility through the use of verbal skills, will react to a minority status by putting forth greater efforts, while another group, e.g. Sicilian peasants with an expectation of upward mobility through a shift from agriculture to factory labour, will have no such premium upon verbal skills and not make a comparable attempt to master the language of the new country. At every turn it has been possible to muster careful documented studies to support the position that no fixed abilities can be assigned to any of these groups in terms of their biologically inherited constitutions, that in fact it is incorrect to think of inheritance in group terms at all.

Each sub-group must be regarded as a collection of different family lines, in each of which definite potentialities are inherited. The similarities between the members of different family lines can be laid partly to inter-marriage in recent generations, partly to a large percentage of common ancestry, and to some selection for physical type, so that in one group the blond and in another the brunette is the preferred type with the best marital chances. But most of all to similarities in culture, to a common character structure which results in a similar response to similar conditions, such as immigration to a new country or economic discrimination couched in terms of a theory of racial inferiority.

When it is a question, not of these sub-groups which can lay no claim to being considered as separate races possessing non-overlapping traits, but of members of the different major divisions of mankind, Negroes and American Indians as compared with Caucasians, again scientific research has documented the absence of any proof of reliable differences in intelligence and emotional make-up; differences, that is, which are impervious to the forces of cultural change. It has been shown that the intelligence scores of Northern Negro children are superior to the scores of Southern underprivileged white children, that Indians approach white norms in definite ratio to their experience of white culture forms. Years of patient research and careful development of investigatory techniques

have gone into the demonstration, by students of the problem, that we have no evidence for attributing any biologically hereditary differences to members of these different races beyond those of physical characteristics, differences in pigmentation and hairiness, etc., which were the basis of the original classification. From the research materials vivid bits with propaganda value have been selected such as the fact that the Negro has the most *human*, i.e. unapelike, lips or that members of the Mongolian Race lead the march away from the ape, in being the least hairy of peoples.

Students of those primitive peoples, who add to their differences in physical form and their membership in other than Caucasian races conspicuous differences in level of civilisation, have maintained over and over again, on the basis of their intimate study of these peoples, that primitive peoples do not differ in innate capacity from their more socially advanced conquerors. They have claimed that a Samoan or an Eskimo or a Baganda baby, reared without prejudice and with full opportunities offered by modern civilisation, would show no differences which could be attributed to his biological inheritance as a member of his group. He would merely be intelligent or stupid, quick or slow, within the normal limits of human variability, depending upon his own immediate inheritance from well endowed or poorly endowed ancestors.

Persistent experimental investigation of the problem has yielded no reliable evidence of the possibility of inheriting acquired characters so we have no reason to believe that because one hundred generations of Eskimos have lived at a low cultural level, any biological trace of this low level will appear in the members of the next generation. On the other hand, every hour that an Eskimo baby spends with his parents will make him more of an Eskimo, more of a specialised sort of human being, well adapted to his parents' form of culture and less able to adapt to any other cultural form.

Yet, in the face of all this documentation, all this research and exposition, the belief in race differences remains a part of the ordinary attitudinal equipment of the man in the street.

The white man continues to insist upon the inferiority of the Negro and the special character of the Mongolian; the typical Nordic continues to preen himself at the expense of the darker complexioned members of the group; the Negro continues to accord more respect to the quadroon than the mulatto and to the mulatto than to the full blood; the South Sea Islander washes his baby with the white man's soap so that it will be fairer than its parents; the Melbourne business man, worsted by the superior application of refugee competitors, insists that the Jews must be dishonest because no one could *honestly* learn to speak a strange language in three months, *he* couldn't. All of this diversified behaviour goes back to the same roots: the belief that intellectual, emotional and moral differences are ineradicably associated with

distinguishing physical traits, whenever those traits characterise the members of an identifiable social group.

Here it is fruitful to compare the attribution of special abilities to members of *groups* who differ physically from ourselves with the tendency to attribute special traits to *individuals* who differ markedly from the norm: who are dwarfed or albinoid or giantesque. Here we find a remarkable scatter of attitudes. Some peoples will regard a dwarf as specially gifted or blessed, another as defective or accursed, but there is no 'race' of dwarfs about which a consistent social judgment can be built up which they themselves can share with their detractors. The difference in position between the group which differs from another group, and the individuals in the disapproved minority group who vary in physique in the direction of the approved group from the individual physical deviant, was sharply pointed up by the discovery of the White Indians of Mount Darian; these proved to be Albino Indians who had been segregated from their tribe and reproduced themselves until they formed a group with a definite culture of their own, about which definite social attitudes could form.

The psychologists who try to explain race hatred on the basis of the fear of the stranger or the strange, ignore this essential ingredient of genuine racial intolerance: the need for there to be a *group* of people towards whom disapproval or approval, contempt or slavish emulation, is felt. In fact, genuine racial or sub-racial intolerance only comes into existence when there are enough members of the minority group to become familiar objects about whom standard social attitudes can form. Members of a minority group may of course become familiar objects through their continual appearance in literature or upon the stage; it is not necessary to have a resident minority group in a community for the members of that community to display well-organised attitudes of prejudice and intolerance. This circumstance again demonstrates that it is not spontaneous fear of a stranger but organised attitudes towards a group of people with common and identifiable physical characteristics which are responsible for race prejudice. Children may cry spontaneously when confronted with a giant, but for every child in a given group to have a standard attitude on the subject of skin colour, there must be a group of predominantly lighter and a group of predominantly darker people who can pass on their attitudes to their children, as a part of their *social* inheritance. The solitary albino may be disapproved and left aside, he or she may never marry and die an unhappy outcast, but when the next albino appears, two generations hence, attitudes towards him will have to be developed all over again.

There are two other scientific findings which are worth considering in this discussion. One is the record Professor Linton brought back from Madagascar of two neighbouring tribes. The members of one tribe were much darker in skin colour than the members

of the neighbouring tribe; the darker tribe valued its deeper pigmentation as much as the lighter tribe valued its lighter skin colour. In each tribe infants whose skin colour varied too far away from the norm were killed; too dark infants were put to death in the lighter tribe and too light ones in the dark tribe. But both peoples gave the same rationalisation for their behaviour, that a child whose physical appearance varied too markedly would grow up to be a social misfit, a sorcerer, a thief, a leper or one who committed incest. This instance is illuminating because it so rarely happens that two groups which differ physically can come in contact with one another without a differential premium being set, by *both* groups, upon one variation as compared with the other. In speaking of race prejudice there is always a tendency to distort the issue by assuming that the invidious comparisons are made *only* by the disapproving group, that they are a sort of attitudinal ammunition directed *at* the disapproved group. The Madagascar instance illustrates clearly that if actually only one of the two groups felt the premium upon the observed difference, preference for their own type which could be handled constructively and socially would be the result, instead of the hostility and overbearingness on the one hand and inferiority feelings and resentment on the other which characterise most contacts between groups which differ physically and socially from each other. Dr. E. J. Lindgren has reported an instance of Cossacks and Tungus who live side by side, each respecting the other's difference, without putting any premium upon that difference. But these instances where difference from others is regarded as a simple positive value, neither enhancing nor diminishing the desirability of the own group's physical traits are so rare that they merely point up the almost universal occurrence of the other point of view.

A second relevant finding was that of Dr. Moreno in his experiments in the behaviour of mixed groups of Negro and white girls in a reform school environment. If he placed one Negro girl in a group of white girls, she was treated well, made a pet of, and her difference in colour was rather an asset than a liability, although both the white girls and the Negro girl shared of course the American attitude that a white skin is superior to a black skin. But when a second Negro girl was introduced into such a group the situation changed; the two Negroes clung together and became a minority, and the existence of an invidious distinction based on skin colour sharpened the distinction between the minority of two and the majority of ten or fifteen; a situation comparable to the usual minority one grew up. Moreno also found that girls who had been accustomed to having active and engrossing love affairs with boys and who missed these contacts when they were shut up, tended to develop crushes on Negro girls, to write them notes and court their devotion. Difference in race was substituted for difference in sex, and could be substituted for it easily because both difference in race

and difference in sex, in our society, are differences which are expected to carry with them marked contrasts in behaviour and attitude. Both of these findings point up the fact that we, in common with most but not all human cultures, tend to attach special significance to consistent differences in physical type.

So we have, on the one hand, the dispassionate findings of a large number of investigators to show that there is no evidence for differences in biologically inherited capacity being associated with differences in the types of physical traits upon which our racial classifications are based; on the other hand, we have habits of mind which persistently do associate such differences in physique with inevitable differences in behaviour, and continue to attribute to any group of people who are different in physique other traits which are usually regarded as either *more* desirable or *less* desirable than the traits of the group with whom they are compared. Through the years the findings of the scientist have had remarkably small effect upon the attitudes of the members of either the majority or the minority group. So little effect have they had that some anthropologists have been inclined to give the matter up as a bad job, and to say that social attitudes will never be affected by scientific findings, that social attitudes are essentially irrational, that it is useless to try to influence them by any presentation of determined facts. This pessimism is amply justified by the history of the campaign against race prejudice, but it ignores one persistent distortion which has been introduced into the propagandic use of scientific materials.

The anthropologist says: There is no proof that different races or different sub-racial groups differ in *potential* capacity. The man in the street says: The members of this or that group are inferior or superior in achievement to me. Both are quite sure of their ground, both have evidence to support their positions. But the opponent of race prejudice takes the findings of the scientist and directs them against the man in the street only after adding a falsification. He says not, 'There is no physical *inherited* basis for the observed differences in achievement level between groups', but 'There ARE no differences'. The propagandist treats what is as if it were what might be, and the man in the street goes away firmly convinced that the scientist has tried to prove that the average adult American Negro in 1940 has an equal capacity to succeed in performing the skills which win approval in American society. The man in the street knows that this is not true, just as the opponent of women's suffrage and equal rights for women knew that women *weren't* equal to men, if one considered adult women brought up as men's inferiors.

If the propagandist would shift his ground and deal more realistically with the problem of changing social attitudes, he might have much more effect. If his propaganda consisted in the effect of membership in a minority group on the development of feelings of inferiority, if he documented the slow rot of hopelessness which

creeps over the minds of Indian and Negro children as they approach adolescence and come to realise how long the odds are against them, perhaps this would be material to which the man in the street would listen. For the man in the street has been carefully trained to think in matter-of-fact terms. He is amenable to any statement of social costs provided it is stated clearly enough in terms of money costs. He can be roused to the problem of the mental defective or the schizophrenic or even to the problem of the gifted child in the public schools if he is told that the present method of ignoring defects and special abilities is not only socially expensive but expensive in the only terms he knows: dollars and cents.

Just as race prejudice rages most fiercely in those areas of society where economic competition is strongest and in those periods of depression when economic anxiety is deepest, the prejudiced propaganda hits at an audience of practical men who have been told that their economic security is being endangered by minority groups. Such an audience has neither time nor tolerance for detached intellectual statements in favour of tolerance for groups who would be as skilled or as ambitious, as aggressive or as unaggressive as themselves if only they were given a fair chance. But they might be reached by a statement of human waste and its cost to the citizen tax-payer if the propagandist faced frankly that a minority group, the members of which share the majority belief that they are inferior or conspicuously and undesirably different from the majority, will undoubtedly display just those traits which are attributed to them. Let the propagandist stress that the criminality records will be highest from the minorities which we brand as natural law breakers; the breakdown records will be highest from the groups which we regard as emotionally unstable; the costs for hospitalising paresis will be high from the groups which we regard as immoral and therefore do not attempt to educate in the prevention of syphilis; the costs of schooling will be raised among the groups where birth control propaganda is regarded as useless, society and its respectable members will be swindled by those we regard as natural swindlers.

To the man in the street who is a citizen and a taxpayer, the scientist student of race can say, ' To the extent that you label any human being in terms of the colour of his skin or the shape of his head or the language he speaks or the name he bears, as socially undesirable, you *make* him so.' Of course minority groups display endless undesirable traits varying from an unwillingness to make the necessary effort to learn which resembles mental defect, to a willingness to use any method to attain success which looks like hereditary dishonesty. Any group labelled as inferior in such a way that no member of that group can escape the stigma, will be inferior, generation after generation, until the man in the street stops assisting in the expensive habit of manufacturing social misfits.

DUSKY VENUS, BLACK APOLLO*

ROGER BASTIDE

Racial conflict is one of those total social phenomena defined by Mauss, where economic, structural, religious and sexual aspects are inextricably linked. In this article however we shall consider only the sexual aspect of the conflict. Not that this has been entirely neglected. Quite the reverse, in fact, for psychoanalysis has given rise to a whole series of investigations into the sexual roots of racialism—which may have been controversial in their findings but which have nevertheless made valid contributions towards a deeper understanding of the prejudices and facts of discrimination.[1] We should note however that these sexual roots, at least in the field of relations between black and white, have been observed for the most part in countries where the colour bar is at its strictest, like the Southern States of North America, or South Africa. But there are other countries like those of Latin America where miscegenation is the rule, and this mingling of races has in fact been held up as proof of a 'racial democracy' which distinguishes the Latin countries from the fiercely endogamous Anglo-Saxons. But is this really so? A striking feature of our two enquiries made at the request of Unesco, one in São Paolo, Brazil, into racial relations between black and white, the other in Paris, into the growth of an African *élite* in French universities, was that in the course of a great number of interviews the question 'race' always provoked the answer 'sex'. This hiatus between question and answer reveals the problem, the confusion between racial and sexual competition in countries where prejudices are not institutionalised. The vindication of the Dusky Venus in the states of Latin America, and the inverse phenomenon found in Europe, the vindication of the Black Apollo, bringing the sexes together across the barriers of colour, are not, as is often suggested,[2] a proof that prejudice does not exist, but another manifestation of such prejudice, sometimes masked, but sometimes revealed in a harsher light.

For in the love-making of partners of different colour, in the courting which went before, in those privileged instants which seem to destroy race and rediscover the unity of the human species, we find this paradox: the insinuation of racialism in its most savage, most withering forms. In these bodies finding each other, fusing, there are two races at each other's throats. But in order to understand this strange phenomenon which produces the maximum

* Translated by Michael Wood.

[1] We considered the contribution of psychoanalysis to the problem of racial relations between black and white in *Sociologie et Psychanalyse* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 235–47. May we then leave this question for the present?

[2] For example by Gilberto Freyre, in his two classic works, *Casa Grande e Senzata* (translated into English as *Masters and Slaves*) and *Sobrados e Mucambos*.

prejudice where all prejudice seems to be abolished, we must, of course, since we have defined racial conflict as a 'total phenomenon', replace sexuality in its total social context—and by total social context we mean not only the present situation but also all the heritage of the past, of that more or less distant past which has sketched the pattern for the present, for human beings joined in the sexual act are not only bodies, but persons in a society, social beings, and endowed each of them with what Halbwachs called a 'collective memory'.

* * *

Miscegenation in America arose within the framework of slavery, and remains profoundly marked by it. Broadly speaking, the black woman was the property of her white master, who might use her freely to satisfy his desire, and leave her when he had had enough —and on the other hand the black woman realised that her sexual attraction was a weapon to help her rise in a society based on force: to improve her condition as a slave, moving from work in the fields to domestic service, and to improve the lot of her children, who would be freed, educated, by the white father, and who, being lighter-skinned than she, would the more easily be admitted into the white man's world. Sexual relationships in multiracial societies today are still conditioned by these former characteristics.

Now if miscegenation were to take place in the form of marriage, and thus in mutual respect and equality between the sexes, it would indeed show an absence of racial prejudice. But as it is practised it effectively reduces a whole race to the level of prostitutes. For just as the middle classes of Europe created prostitution in order to shield their daughters from the lubricity of the male, so the whites spare their own women by channelling their desire towards the condemned race. So that behind miscegenation is exactly what was behind the institution of prostitution in the West: the defence of one group considered as superior, and therefore untouchable, to the detriment of another racial or social group.

The coloured woman is considered not as a woman but simply as an object of pleasure, an easy prey for the white male. A whole series of preconceived ideas are in play here. First of all the idea of the more unbridled sexuality of the black woman, in comparison with the white: the black woman will make love at any time, and with anyone. Secondly, the idea that making love to a coloured woman does not mean anything, will have no consequences, for 'the blacks don't marry, they just pair off' (*O preto nao se casa, junto-se*), as a Brazilian proverb has it. So that underlying sexual relationships between different colours is this most terrifying of prejudices, which sentences a whole race to immorality in order to preserve the virginity of the women of the other race. But there are still other forms of prejudice at work, even within the operation of sexual selection. In the choice of a partner, the mulatto is preferred to the really dark-skinned woman. This means that in

making love to a black woman, the desire was not for a Negress but simply for a woman as an object of pleasure, since the woman most desired will be the one who most resembles the white woman. Broadly then, as in the time of slavery, the really black woman is seen as ordained for the sexual initiation of adolescents, still shy and needing the easy conquest; the mulatto is seen as the companion of adult frolics, or those of husbands anxious to escape the constraints of the marital bed. There is the story of the family who took on a little black housemaid as a very young girl, so as to be able to watch over her puberty and be certain of her health, thinking to offer her to their son, who would thus learn the practice of sex without any risk of venereal diseases, and, since she was only a servant, without any risk of a possible mesalliance.

The black woman accepts all this, and we find here the second characteristic of slavery which has persisted into modern society. For in a society controlled and directed by whites, it is obvious that the people who will rise most easily in the social scale will be those who come closest to being white—or are most closely connected with the white man's society. We may consider two aspects of this phenomenon. There is first the idea of the progressive 'whitening' of the blacks by the mingling of blood. This is accepted by the black mother wishing her children to have a better life than herself —she calls it 'purifying her blood' (limpar o sangue). 'Look at my children,' a coloured woman said to me. 'They're white already. What's the use of fighting, forming leagues for the defence of the Negro, and all that?' She had grasped that the best means of getting on in society lay not in political and racial resistance, which will only put the white man's back up, but in producing a line of little mulattos. The counterpart of what this mother says is in the words of a mulatto refusing his consent to the marriage of his children with people darker-skinned than themselves: 'Aren't you ashamed to think of marrying Negroes?' The other aspects of the phenomenon is its 'appropriation' not so much by the black man as by the white, who defines miscegenation not as 'love knoweth no race, it bloweth where it listeth', but as a policy, the conscious and deliberate policy of progressively eliminating the black race by dissolving its African blood in the mass of the population. There is a name for this policy: it has been called the 'progressive aryanisation of Brazil'. Now in these two aspects, prejudice is very clearly to be seen. The term 'aryanisation' is itself explicit enough: the dark taint is shameful, it must be erased; or even if it is not shameful, the black is certainly inferior to the white. But what is even more serious is that the coloured woman, as a mother wanting a better lot for her children, is forced to accept this ideology, and is thus made to lose her pride in her colour, her sense of the dignity of her race, is brought to treachery, to denial.

If miscegenation is practised chiefly within concubinage, this does not mean that marriage between different colours does not

exist. But such marriages are not between opposite colours, but between neighbouring shades. We shall return to this shortly.

Our intention was first to show that the cult of the Dusky Venus does not mean an absence of prejudice. Now we must show that it is because the prejudice of white superiority is here seen in its most clear-cut form that this cult must inflame rather than temper the racial struggle, translating it into terms of the bitterest sexual competition.

This can be observed at all levels of society—even among prostitutes. A survey conducted in the Negro dance-halls, called '*gafieiras*', clearly showed this element of combat. The black males questioned were certain of their superiority over the white: 'The white man has a quick orgasm. The black woman prefers to go to bed with a black man. If she takes a white, it is out of pride, or for money, she prefers the Negro in bed.' The replies of the black women did not contradict those of the males but underlined another point of view: 'If I sleep with a Negro, he gives me no peace all night and in the morning he wants his coffee and roll and butter, and on top of that, I have to give him some money for his bus. Look, black women choose Negroes to dance with, but afterwards they always go to bed with a white.' The battle of the sexes here assumes its most vulgar form. The black refuses to pay for his companion for a night, the white is the one who has to pay.

Let us now in contrast move to the highest level, that of the mixed marriages mentioned a moment ago. These take the form of hyper- (or hypo-) gamy,[3] where the husband, darker-skinned, offers a superior position (money, social standing, etc.) and the wife a lighter colour of skin, which will lead to the whitening of the children. 'The black man, in his eagerness to marry a white woman, will take anyone he can find.' He has no choice, the only women he can find to marry him are gold-diggers, white prostitutes, housemaids, or little mulatto working-girls longing to escape from poverty-stricken lives.

In multiracial societies then, the choice of a partner, whether for marriage or for a night of pleasure, is a form of racial combat. 'The black male doesn't appreciate Negresses,' a coloured woman once complained to me. 'He's always chasing white women.' And in fact the black man's ideology is the reverse of that of the white, is a vindication of the 'White Venus'. But in this vindication the dominating factor is less an attraction than a sense of revenge for slavery, the will to possess, to *have*, the white woman who was 'taboo', 'forbidden', to steal her from the white man—and on the other hand, since the white man chases black women, to avenge their honour in bringing about the 'fall' of the white woman in her turn. This idea of revenge is clearly seen in the history of inter-racial relations. In the 'Balaio' War, which was a revolt of black

[3] A similar phenomenon is seen in the United States, cf. Warner, Junker and Adams, *Color and Human Nature* (Washington, 1941).

groups armed by a political party ousted from power, the black leader, on taking a town, slept with all the most handsome girls, and forced the Catholic priests to marry the rest to his soldiers.[4] The Governor of São Paolo, in 1809, noted in his annual report that freed slaves were assaulting white women, and slaves violating their own mistresses.[5] The black folklore of 'Father John' is full of white girls giving secret rendezvous to young slaves, or of white women slipping into the hammocks of their Negroes while their husbands are away.[6] And this folklore is by no means dead; it appears today in various forms. We found one story both in Brazil and in the French West Indies, but not told as a story; each time it was offered as an account of fact. It tells of a white woman climbing a ladder, ostensibly to hang some curtains at her window, and asking her black chauffeur to hold the ladder for her; the chauffeur is at a loss, caught between the temptation of those white legs brushing deliberately against him, those secret parts half-glimpsed, offered even, and the respect he owes his mistress. All the Negroes we questioned affirmed without exception their superior masculinity, claiming that white women preferred them to whites. 'But they don't give in to us because of the pressure of society, the collective control which stops them.'

Which means that in the end the Negro has to make do with the coloured woman. But there he has to face the often successful competition of the white. As we said, the black woman prefers the white man, she sees herself as escaping in this way from the atmosphere of her racial milieu, from encystment in her colour, she lives in a kind of dream for a moment, she is courted, flattered, by a white man who, by definition, is 'distinguished' (*branco fino*, *branco distinto*), she has broken the barrier. But in the end she will be abandoned, perhaps left pregnant, and, in spite of laws offering theoretical protection to the woman, she will be able to do nothing. Her mother will get no satisfaction from the police, who will always say: 'What do you think we can do? Can we force her lover to marry her? She should have been more careful.' So that this black woman, no longer a virgin, even if she has had no children from her relations with the white man, will find herself rejected by the black males, who in their struggle against the white man have erected a 'virginity taboo' for their future wives: 'We're not in the old days now, when the Master used to deflower his slaves and then pass them on to his Negroes as their lawful wives. The Negro today has his honour as a man.' He will no longer accept girls of his race who before marriage have passed through the hands of a white man.

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[4] Viriato Correa, *A. Balaiada* (São Paolo, no date).

[5] F. Nardy, Junior, 'Receio Infundado', *Estado de São Paolo*, 15 September 1940.

[6] Lindolfo Gomes, *Contos Populares* (São Paolo, no date). For examples, cf. this Negro song collected by Jose A. Teixeira (São Paolo, Folclore Goiano, 1941):

'The white women all go crazy
Whenever I come near.'

Conflict between the colours in Brazil then appears more strongly in sexual than in professional competition. A taste for the Dusky Venus on the part of the white has its counterpart in the pursuit of the white woman by the black man—so that each race surrounds its women with a maximum of interdictions, checks, defensive bulwarks: 'No white woman, not even a prostitute, will dance with these scruffy Negroes'; *a fortiori*, then, no 'decent' white woman either. And the black for his part will refuse to marry a Negress who has been with white men; the Negress must remain a virgin to her wedding-day.

* * *

In France the phenomenon which strikes observers is the reverse of the one found in Brazil, and, since in the former slave countries we speak of the Dusky Venus, we may perhaps call the inverse phenomenon that of the Black Apollo.

This phenomenon has as yet been little studied from the sociological standpoint. Fanon has something on the question, but he adopts the psycho-pathological standpoint: desire on the part of the Negro to whiten himself, desire for rape on the part of the white woman, the orgasm springing much more from the idea of a black man's embrace than from the actual physical contact.[7] We have no wish to question Fanon's affirmations; but we would like to make certain reservations. First, Fanon is a West Indian, not an African. This desire that he writes of to whiten oneself is no doubt valid for West Indians, since it is a result of slavery, which forms in the Negro the ideal of the white man; but it is not valid for Africans. As for the desire for rape, it is probably found more often among intellectuals than in the lower classes of society (where hypergamy offers a more convincing explanation) and we should compare it with, for example, its male counterpart in Baudelaire's erotic images for his Dusky Venus: our civilisation has associated the colour black with the devil, so that we may find in the arms of a partner of this colour a subtle refinement of the sense of sin. But this refinement can exist only for persons of a certain cultural level. Fanon's psycho-pathological explanation, if it is accurate, confines us to certain social groups, to the West Indian group on the one hand, to intellectuals on the other. Sex can be properly understood only in its social context. We shall therefore restrict ourselves to the analysis of this social context.

What are the motives most often suggested to explain the attraction of the Black Apollo for the white woman? The people interviewed all agreed on this point. The Frenchmen pointed out that since the white woman is taboo in Africa she becomes an object of desire for the Africans. Then the Africans said: 'When we got here the first thing we wanted, partly out of curiosity, partly out of a desire for vengeance, was to go with white women. Sometimes

[7] F. Fanon, *Peau Noire—Masques Blancs* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1952).

we were disgusted with ourselves, but we carried on, saying that this was a way of avenging our African sisters.' And certainly the curiosity is there; the discovery of French 'femininity' (a term borrowed from black students) played an important part; so many young Africans told me that African women 'behave like men', and that they were very susceptible to 'charm', to 'coquetterie', and all the other novelties of sex which they found with Frenchwomen.[8] But for our purpose let us retain only the second argument. It is the undisguised admission that closer relationships between the colours (relationships in any case described as 'disgusting') are only another form of racial struggle, and not elimination of racialism. Another fact confirms the virulence of this. The basic reason for any miscegenation is the lack of balance between the sexes in the various racial groups in a country. The African arriving in France could have only white women, and very occasionally a black girl. At first he went with the black girls, had children by them, and never thought of marriage. Although such a situation was no catastrophe, since Africans love children more than anything in the world, and the parents soon forgave their daughters, the black students themselves, as they gradually assimilated the puritan values of the Europeans, began to feel remorse. This remorse they themselves have significantly characterised as a 'feeling of incest', which they say is the feeling of those who have had pre-nuptial relations with African girls who are being educated and will tomorrow constitute the female *élite* of their countries. Hence the redirection of their desire exclusively towards white women.

The ideal that they seek is a double one. Aesthetically, she will be the Nordic type with blonde hair and blue eyes—which means that German or Scandinavian girls will do as well as, or better than, Frenchwomen[9]; and socially, she must be a girl from a good family. Here the expression of revenge will be more clearly defined. But the French girl is not an easy conquest, the Africans say; they complain of her prejudices, her repugnance, the demands she makes. And in fact, dances become a kind of battlefield where the girls are divided into two groups—those who will dance only with whites, and the others, called 'Negro-chasers' by jealous white males. Healthy relationships between the sexes and the colours are thus very difficult to establish. It is understandable in these conditions

[8] This feeling, as against the feeling of vengeance, has given rise to mixed marriages. It is well expressed in Zankou-Lango's interview, which provoked such violent argument (*Afrique Nouvelle*, No. 380, 7 November 1954, and No. 382, 12 January 1955).

[9] It is clear that, in spite of appearances, there can be no confusion between cases which at first sight seem identical: those where the black male pursues the white woman, something common to both Americas and to Europe. The American Negro, who in the South is refused even by white prostitutes, because their market-price would be lowered (J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, Yale University Press, 1937) will on his arrival in the North look for a 'white chick' as a symbol of his liberation (C. McKay, *Harlem Shadows*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1922). The Brazilian Negro is looking for a symbol of his rise in the social scale, his victory over the regime of slavery. The African in Europe, out of duty rather than love, is inflicting a humiliation on the woman.

that white students react violently to this sexual competition; and they do this in two ways: (a) by attributing ulterior motives either to the Africans or to the French girls: the black student who is not on a grant is after his pocket-money, or free digs if he lives with his girl, and the French girl is after a rich student who will shower her with presents. 'The Frenchman is mean, but an African who feels flattered to be seen out with a beautiful blonde girl is especially kind and considerate to her'; and (b) by using scurrilous epithets to 'devalue' girls who go out with black students—and this 'devaluation' has certainly had its effect, creating as it has in certain girls, as we found in the course of our survey, a sense of guilt which expresses itself as an aggressive superiority complex. These girls are full of praise for the African's virility, combined with his gentleness in sexual play, but this is more than anything praise of these qualities *against the whites*, at least against certain categories of whites who have not, they say, the carefree, simple nature, the generosity of the African. Then, moving to the attack, they profess their desire to revolt against the conformity of European society, to rise above 'stupid prejudice'. The psychoanalyst would not be slow to see behind this rather peevish anti-racialism a revolt against the family and the discipline of childhood.

We have already said that miscegenation would show an absence of racial prejudice only if it took place legally in marriage. And even then the marriage would have to be between partners of equal standing. Now mixed marriages exist in France too. A few years ago they were quite widespread; they are becoming rarer today. And when they occur, they are for the most part made necessary by the arrival of a child. They do not express the general wish of the African, which is: 'I don't want to marry a white woman; but if I were to have a child by one, I would claim my rights as a father, and I would even make the thing legal to ensure control over the child; on no account would I give up the child.' 'Making the thing legal', then, is a last resort. Sexual relationships are accepted only as between lover and mistress, or in brief affairs; they aggravate the prejudice rather than diminish it. As for the mixed marriages, the number of which is becoming steadily smaller, they are, as in Latin America, again a kind of hypergamy. Since members of 'castes' in Africa (smiths, *griots*, or their descendants) can marry only within their own group, they see in a mixed marriage a chance to break the closed circle which fettered their free choice, and consequently a form of hypergamy. The white girl mostly marries above the class of her own family: a nurse of peasant stock, or a factory worker, will marry a medical student, a doctor-to-be; a post-office clerk will marry an African student who in his holidays works at the Post Office (sorting letters) to earn some money, but who will return to his studies in law, in the arts, or in engineering. Our survey did not cover the question of mixed couples. But—at least in some cases that we could find out about—it seems that

the African, who knows very well that his wife will never get used to his African family, and that in any case she would be looked down on by the white 'colony', finds himself forced to remain in France. And the sense of piercing regret at having left Africa can poison marital relations, even where there is sincere love on both sides. An African student who had beaten his wife felt that he had added to his stature by this gesture, of which he proudly told his black friends. But how can the wife, accustomed to the 'gentleness' of her lover, understand the drama that lies behind this change in his behaviour? We know of one such wife who found suicide the only solution.

It seems then, in conclusion, that contrary to a widely-held opinion, closer relationships between the colours, whether in marriage or in simple sexual pleasure, are not a sign of absence of prejudice: the Dusky Venus hides the debasement of the black woman as a prostitute; and the Black Apollo is seeking revenge on the white man. It is not so much that love breaks down barriers and unites human beings as that racial ideologies extend their conflicts even into love's embraces.

THE TREATMENT OF PREJUDICE IN CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION

JAMES L. HENDERSON

The title of this article is intended to convey the meaning that three topics will be discussed: first, and quite briefly, the prevalence of prejudice and society's disquiet about it; secondly a thesis to the effect that the roots of prejudice, as distinct from its fruits, are legitimate, and thirdly the educational conclusions which follow from acceptance of such a thesis.

The Problem of Prejudice

The word prejudice is here understood to mean any negative attitude towards another person or group, whether racial, political, religious or sexual, which is irrationally adopted and sustained by strong, often unconscious, emotional forces. In its simplest form the problem presents itself as a realisation on the part of educationists throughout the world that prejudice is rife among most sections of the population and that it constitutes a positive stumbling-block in the path of progress towards international understanding and the settlement of disputes without recourse to violence and war. These educationists properly believe that they have a special vocational responsibility to help remove that obstacle from the way of the rising generation. Yet they are themselves ruefully aware of some at least of their own prejudices and anxiously conscious too of those extra-educational influences which seek all the time to aggravate and augment them. That is why they look expectantly in the direction of such organisations as seek to diminish and eventually to eradicate prejudice. A glance will suffice to underline the nobility and value of the activities of such bodies, even though their scope is restricted: it also reveals the inadequacy of their efforts in the face of massive hostility or supine indifference from society in general.

Organised religious bodies, whatever their past record, now usually preach against prejudice, although history to date does not suggest that their admonitions have had much effect. The admirable work of the Council of Christians and Jews, which is based on persistently charitable and patient explanation of the plague of anti-Semitism, would seem to imply that more hope lies in understanding than in exhortation. Unesco makes a number of useful contributions to the solving of the problem of prejudice: for example there have been since 1956 its great East-West project and previously an excellent publication entitled *History Textbooks and International Understanding*.[1] Parents and teachers have readily available two

[1] (1) Georges Fradier, *East and West. Towards Mutual Understanding* (Unesco, 1959).
(2) J. A. Lauwerys, *History Textbooks and International Understanding* (Unesco, 1953).

books discussing historical and biological prejudice, *History the Betrayer* and *Race, Prejudice and Education*.[2] The World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession has demonstrated concern about this problem: the *Times Educational Supplement* of 8 January 1960 contained a trenchant article on 'Hating One's Neighbour': educational research has not neglected the subject, as is evidenced by books like *The Nature of Prejudice* and *The Teacher was Black*.[3]

Yet recent instances of racial and ideological prejudice from many different corners of the world create an uneasy impression that in spite of the increase in both the activity and effectiveness of informed minority opinion on these matters, the majority of men and women entertain just as many prejudices as before, with maybe some fresh ones added as a consequence of mass media of communication. In the words of Dr. Rees, Director of the World Federation of Mental Health: 'Prejudice, like Malaria, is an anti-social and killing disease; it comes in epidemics. Six million died of it in Germany; two million in Pakistan.'[4] The following quotation provides comment of a sufficiently challenging kind to warrant deeper probing into the nature of such a lethal menace to human well-being:

> Those of us who have tried to counter racial intolerance at the adult level have usually been forced to recognise at some point that prejudice of this kind, based as it usually is on deep-seated and unconscious emotional factors, is not amenable to reason. The emotional pattern has its origin in childhood experience, whether in a repressive environment which fosters guilt and aggression, or in the wrong sort of 'conditioning' by adults, who are themselves ridden by racial prejudice; once it has hardened, it is virtually impossible to change it.[5]

The Role of Prejudice

In seeking to expose the legitimate root of prejudice before going on to consider whether its fruit must necessarily be illegitimate, use will be made of a hypothesis derived from Analytical Psychology. This is to the effect that normal development from infancy to adulthood involves the gradual emergence in each personality of a conscious Ego. This Ego, just like the physical body in which it is housed, inevitably casts a shadow that must fall somewhere on someone or something. That is where the Ego first sees itself and in so doing receives confirmation of its own Ego existence. Naturally the Ego tends to dissociate its shadow from itself and to identify it with the object on which it rests. This is an inevitable projective

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[2] E. H. Dance, *History the Betrayer* (London, Hutchinson, 1960).
Cyril Bibby, *Race, Prejudice and Education* (London, Heinemann, 1959).
[3] G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954).
H. E. O. James and Cora Tenen, *The Teacher Was Black* (London, Heinemann, 1953).
[4] Quoted verbatim from a report of a Conference organised by the Council of Christians and Jews.
[5] *Journal of the National Union of Teachers*, Vol. CLXXVII, 2639, p. 483.

mechanism of growth, centred in the paradox that only by becoming aware of the shadow, so apparently alien to it, can the Ego be assured of its own reality. In so far as it recognises it, the Ego adopts a negative attitude towards this shadow phenomenon, but far more commonly it fails to recognise it for what it largely is and confuses it instead with the object on which it has fallen—the 'enemy over there', 'the school cad', 'the alien', with the rider that he is there either to be denied or annihilated. This is because in our shadows are contained our so-called 'inferior functions', our shadier, seamy sides which for a long time we try to pretend are not really us. The classic example of this mechanism at work was of course the Hitler anti-Semitic phenomenon, which, as Baynes frankly reminded us, will not let us go until we have absorbed its messianic quality.[6] By this is meant that there is always gold in the shadow, that when in right relationship to it the Ego can learn from it of its own real nature: the acceptance by the individual and the collectivity of their own 'inferior functions' is the crucial experience leading to personal and group adulthood and maturity. Neither Germany nor Israel, for example, can expect to achieve national self-respect except in so far as each manages to absorb the 'messianic element' contained in Jews and Nazis respectively. Growing self-consciousness whether of the individual or the group can only occur in so far as they have thrown and then acknowledged their single or collective shadow. The Danegeld of consciousness, which the human species has to pay, is the projection of its own inferior functions. In other words, as long as there is a dominant Ego there must be a shadow, and because the shadow, necessarily appears as the contradiction and opposite of the Ego, it is the object of the Ego's prejudice.

Yet because without an Ego the baby cannot become the child and later the adolescent (little Mary says 'I like Jane' as an advance on 'Mary likes Jane'), it has to be admitted that the root of prejudice as just explained is itself legitimate.

The final stage of the hypothesis consists in the assertion that only if out of Ego-development there evolves in the personality that which is non-Ego, can there be promise without prejudice. According to the teachings of Analytical Psychology the constellation of such an entity, sometimes called the Self, constitutes the whole purpose of existence: it is the achievement of that 'midpoint of the personality' where the forces of the conscious and the unconscious find their point of balance.[7] In Quaker language it is the 'Inner Light'; in Buddhist terms it is the 'Jewel in the Lotus', in Hindu ones the 'Atman'; Shelley labelled it 'the white radiance of

[6] 'The Hitler problem will not let us go until we have assimilated that quality, or value, which gave Hitler his Messianic appeal.' H. G. Baynes, *Germany Possessed* (London, Cape, 1941), p. 301.

[7] 'The development of a psychic wholeness, in which the consciousness of every individual is creatively allied with the contents of the unconscious, is the depth psychologist's pedagogical ideal for the future.' Erich Neumann, *The Great Mother* (New York, Pantheon, 1955), p. XLII.

eternity'. But whatever words are used to describe it and however variously it has been interpreted according to prevailing secular or religious fashions, one element is constant, namely the fact that this ultimate is shadowless, and so incapable of generating prejudice. Our hypothesis concludes with the statement that the root of prejudice is legitimate and that its fruit is condemned to be illegitimate to the extent to which individuals and societies fail to transcend their Egos and fall short of 'fulfilling their hypotheses' by realising their Selves.

This has always been the tragic truth of the human predicament, made endurable until now by hopes of consolation for it in some kind of after-life or by the fact that there have been 'out-groups' somewhere on this planet which could be forced to take the projection of the 'in-group's' shadow. The drama of the contemporary scene is that, unless and until space-travel can provide other hooks for men's shadows, there is no room left for 'out-groups' on the earth—they are all 'in'. So either we do transfer the projection of our inescapable human shadows to other planets or come to terms with them here by learning, in suffering them, how to transcend them. The alternative is to be devoured by them. Unless the shadow is redeemed, sooner or later it will destroy the Ego: mankind will be destroyed by its own prejudices which have failed to fulfil their promise.

A brief anecdote may serve to indicate the depth of the educational challenge inherent in this conception of the development of personality. An American Negro, speaking of colour prejudice and his own involvement in it, once remarked: 'It took me a long time to learn how to feel hurt without resentment.' He could only do so when he had become able to live from the 'midpoint of his personality', when there was no longer a dominant Ego casting its dark shadow of resentment, but where instead there existed a Self to which it had become subservient and which, by definition, cast no shadow. It is to the educational implications of this psychospiritual law that we must now turn.

The Promise of Education

The first condition of success in dealing with the problem of prejudice as postulated needs to be satisfied in earliest infancy, in the nursery and during the primary school years. It consists in providing outlets for legitimate prejudice or in a more orthodoxly technical phrase, for permitting the growing child to experience in timely fashion the ambivalence of his feelings of love and hate towards his parents and other adults. This concept is already well understood in the more progressive homes and schools and finds practical expression in the notion of play. This word must be understood not only or even chiefly in its recreative sense but in the sense of a playing tension between the two opposite ends of a rope. That piece of rope may be taken as a symbol of the creative

relationship, which exists between the instinctual unconscious drives and their spiritual, conscious complements. It stands in fact for the essence of psychological weaning, which, if improperly handled, is the prime cause of much later developmental difficulty. Just as the young baby must not be expected to be 'clean' in its bodily habits too early, so it must not be expected to be 'good' too soon. In both cases premature, superficial conformity to the conventions of adult patterns of living invites regression at a later stage. The eventual transcendence of prejudice depends greatly on how a child has been helped to cope with his own naughtiness and feelings of guilt.

There is a second condition of success, which requires more elaborate exposition, as it is the one hardest to achieve in our sophisticated, twentieth-century society. It consists in learning how to deal with the shadow of the growing Ego, particularly as this attains maximum inflation, during the years of adolescence. In passing it may be recalled that in all primitive societies and in civilisations still vigorously imbued with religious faith this process is well understood and catered for. Any truly Christian system of education for example has a device for initiating young people into the role of evil in human affairs—that theological term for what Jung calls man's 'Saurian tail'. In most modern education however the assumption seems to have crept in, largely as a legacy of misunderstood theories of evolution, that the child is somehow 'naturally good' and that, by means of sweet reasonableness and the removal of most traditional inhibitory pressures, he can be brought to maturity with a minimum of suffering and the avoidance of what has conventionally been known as the forces of evil and may now be more fittingly described as the powers of the unbridled, because unrecognised and uncatered for, libido. Two World Wars within fifty years, concentration camps, the increase in juvenile delinquency and the threat of nuclear annihilation now cause this assumption to be questioned. Left unquestioned, it is the most virulent breeder of prejudice.

What is required is a firm grasp of the distinction, previously the prerogative of theologians, between perfection and completion. As Jung has written: 'One could hardly call the things that have happened, and still happen, in concentration camps of the dictator states an accidental lack of perfection . . . it would sound like mockery.'[8]

The service which Analytical Psychology has rendered is in enabling us to grasp in psychological terms what to many has become incomprehensible in theological terms, namely that the human personality drives towards completion; the Ego has to have its complementary shadow, Faust his Mephistopheles, each idea its archetype, while an unrealistic idealism, which tends particularly to haunt the seats of the educational mighty, has attempted

[8] C. G. Jung, *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self.* Collected Works, Vol. 9, Part II (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 53.

to substitute for this relentless law of completion, a romantic, pseudo-religious and unattainable goal of perfection—that travesty of human nature, the man without a shadow, the head-prefect, the Nordic type—the flawless Commissar! In Jungian terms, 'The Christ-image is as good as perfect (at least it is meant to be so) while the archetype (so far as known) denotes completeness but is far from being perfect.'[9] Even more succinctly stated, 'No one is whole without negative qualities.'[10]

> 'Alas for him who seeks salvation in good only!
> Balanced on God's strong shoulders, Good and Evil flap
> together like two mighty wings and lift him high.'
> (Kazantzakis: *The Odyssey, A Modern Sequel*, p. 248)

The implications of this insight should be enormous for educationists: it should enable them to perceive that their pedagogical aim is completion, not perfection, that their principles of education have to embrace the concept of completion through failure as well as through success and the bitter truth that there never can be room at the top for all. If this truth could once be mastered and applied to the education of the adolescent as he encounters for the first time that 'network of contradictions'[11] which real life thrusts on him as he steps over the threshold of childhood, many contemporary problems of individual neurosis and social disease would come nearer solution. Instead of this, just the reverse occurs. Because the majority of adults have themselves not been able to come to terms with the law of completion, they make do with the fallacy of pseudo-perfectionism, and they do their best to prevent their children from ever having to face up to their own inevitable internal division: hence the need for palliatives. These take the form of mass libido-containers such as racial or ideological scapegoats, or large-scale entertainment of the 'bread and circuses' kind, provided by a variety of 'Big Brothers': 'When the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of his inner contradictions, the world must perforce act out the conflict and be torn into opposite halves.'[12] That is a clinically precise description of prevalent prejudices, whether about the 'Reds', the 'Yanks', the 'Yids' or the 'Limeys'.

The third condition of success requires the emergence of an increasing number of teachers, trained to recognise their own need for education for completion rather than perfection, and so able to communicate this law to their pupils. 'For we cannot correct in a child a fault which we ourselves still commit.'[13] Whence can we and they derive the validity of such a law, if it can no longer be accepted *ex cathedra* as laid down by a traditional, divine authority?

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[9] C. G. Jung, *op cit.*, p. 68.
[10] C. G. Jung, verbally reported remark.
[11] D. T. Suzuki, *Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1957).
[12] C. G. Jung, *Aion*, p. 70–7.
[13] C. G. Jung, *The Development of the Personality* (New York, Pantheon, 1954), p. 177.

Only through the experiencing of its truth on our own pulses. How this is to happen is really part of the fourth condition of success, namely the provision of an appropriate initiation into evil through heart and head.

There is therefore the need to provide means by which the child develops into adolescence and beyond and comes to terms with his own inferior functions, both as these are inwardly experienced and outwardly constellated on to the object on which the projection of them can most conveniently hang. This was traditionally accomplished through various rituals of penance and absolution and through the actual content of the school curriculum. As it is a weakness on both these scores, which requires to be remedied if the legitimate roots of prejudice are to send forth fruits of charity, two correctives respectively may be recommended.

Young people customarily gain their emancipation from that on which they previously depended by means of ritual and ceremony. In most societies today, there is a deplorable poverty of such ritual in recognised and legitimate form; hence the many illegitimate forms, which may and do appear as compensations. Teachers and parents would do well to ask themselves what version of the Indian 'Guardian Spirit' technique can be made available to those of their own children to whom for example, Christian Confirmation, Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, or compulsory games no longer appeal. The answer may well lie in their being trained to endure the conflict imposed by those two tremendous enemies of the world's civilisation, food shortages and uncontrolled population growth; for example an international youth service dedicated to war on want might well emerge from the current world-wide campaign. Teaching becomes effective in so far as it helps the adolescent to make the journey from 'mother's darling' to independent person. The way is hard and not to be trodden except by those who have at last begun to see the point of the resistances which hurt and seemingly hinder them. To the children themselves this will be a daily, a familiar, if often resented experience—conflict among their peers—the other gang—the other set—conflict with the parents (the indignant 'surely I'm old enough now?'), conflict with teachers ('Sir, it isn't fair'), and above all conflict within themselves. By this last is meant the heroic, often foolhardy and pathetic assertion of the Ego versus the conventional demands of society. The diet of initiation, both generally and in the curriculum, must therefore consist of the dark to balance the light, the dragon to challenge St. George, evil to give countenance to good. It must consist of evidence to convince boys and girls that, as Simone Weil expressed it, 'Evil is the shadow of good. All real good, endowed with solidity and density, projects evil. It is only imaginary good, which does not project evil.'[14] This should be the children's basic introduction to the stubborn fact of their destiny, namely that in tossing

[14] Simone Weil, *The Notebooks* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), Vol. II, p. 414.

up the coin of life, whether they call heads or tails, they cannot take away the one side without the other.

The curriculum can then be so constructed as to offer examples in graded complexity according to the age and aptitude of the children of the law of conflict in human affairs; for instance in the stories of Moses, Odysseus, Arthur, Siegfried, Cromwell, Napoleon, Lenin or Lincoln, they may recognise objectively the opposites with which these heroes had to struggle and subjectively they may experience them as the very problems of their own Egos involved in a 'network of contradictions'. The adolescent will have learnt from the story of each one of these heroes the tragic truth that no human Ego can escape destruction sooner or later, whether at the hands of friend or foe or time. To achieve such a result the teacher must himself have perceived the limitations of the Ego and realised that its justification lies in the transcendence of itself. It will be the endeavour of the teacher, having shown for example how Napoleon was apparently a saviour to Frenchmen and a devil to Englishmen, to steer his pupils' studies in conflict to a crisis, archetypally portrayed in the legend of Orestes and corresponding to the actuality of the developmental psychology of every individual:—

In truth slayer and slain are one, but upon the stage on which creation is played out, they are enemies, and the slayer has committed a sin, it is such a sin as the heroes of Greek drama commit—one that could not be avoided, and yet for which atonement is required.[15]

In brief this is the predicament of the hero, who has discovered his Ego and then become caught by its demands and identified with them: he has become the victim of his own prejudice. This is the typical problem of the 'juvenile delinquency of the modern nation state', of the permanently arrested adolescent, refusing or incapable of an advance into adulthood and therefore the most common proliferator of prejudice.

This perennial human predicament can be accepted, even welcomed, by means of the discovery and recognition of a redemptive third agent, present at the heart of every tragic strife. The reaching of a relationship to that redemptive third element can alone constitute an enduring safeguard against prejudice. For those leaving school at 15 or 16 this experienced realisation must remain an incomplete but potential one, confined almost exclusively to the field of human love and friendship, as this will be their developmental capacity for knowing the 'other'. For those who remain at school until 18 or 19, this relationship can become a far more explicit one, an introduction in fact to that 'midpoint of the personality' which Jung has called the Self. Two examples should help to clarify the point. A study of the love stories of the world, Paris and Helen,

[15] Gai Eaton, *The Richest Vein, Eastern Tradition and Modern Thought* (London, Faber, 1949), p. 58–9.

Abelard and Heloïse, Rudolf of Habsburg and Marie Vetsera, will have revealed to the younger age-group the perpetual predicament of relationship to a human 'other', namely the need for the presence of a redemptive third if two meeting Egos are to transcend themselves and so endure instead of destroying each other. It is the acknowledgment of their share in a common deep source—a mutual experience of wholeness.

As regards the older age-group, they need to be introduced to five strands of man's past and present spiritual consciousness: these are the origins of religion in primitive man's awareness of the 'numinous', the triple legacy of Western culture, Graeco-Roman, Judaic and Christian, the legacy of Eastern wisdom, the contributions of mysticism and lastly some examples, aesthetic and scientific, of 'modern man in search of a soul'. They must be brought to an encounter with that which concerns them ultimately—Tillich's actual definition of religion.

Thus in both phases of these adolescent years children will have been shown the necessary signposts and provided with the essential equipment to enable them to accept the 'network of contradictions' in which their daily lives seem more and more to be engulfed and which, without such training, merely imprisons them in their prejudice. The treatment of prejudice educationally consists in providing the wherewithal by means of which the children can take hold of something that overrides the contradictions. That wherewithal is the shadowless Self. The meeting of Egos or collectives of Egos can only protract and increase prejudice, the meeting of Selves dissolves it. An illustration of this would be the contrast between a meeting of the Society of Friends and, under present circumstances, an international conference of politicians, both discussing the same problem of disarmament. Only when we have come to our Selves can we really understand one another to the extent that disagreement born of prejudice disappears. When the genuine meeting of Selves occurs, it is marked by a certain quality of joyous wisdom, frequently captured by laughter or a smile, and that perhaps is why we educationists have to go back over and over again to the children themselves to learn from their play what we need in our work.

COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN NEW ZEALAND: A CASE STUDY

RICHARD THOMPSON

The decision of the New Zealand Rugby Union to exclude Maori players from selection for the representative 'All Black' rugby team which toured South Africa in 1960, plunged the Dominion into what was perhaps its most vigorous controversy since the prohibition issue at the end of the last century. In the course of the dispute, Maori-European relations were reassessed and the country was sensitised to their importance.

There were two reasons why the selection of a rugby team made a favourable context for a debate on racial issues:

First, rugby is taken very seriously. Even in the eighties and nineties of last century, Members of Parliament were pressed into using their influence to secure the release of players needed for touring teams. On one occasion the Premier himself, the Rt. Hon. Richard John Seddon, was persuaded to intervene in this way. When two rugby matches were lost to Australia in 1893 and 1897 respectively, a commentator declared: 'The people received the news of these disasters with disbelief, then sorrow; the Press commented with a gravity that could not have been augmented if the Capital City had been the scene of a debacle.'[1] The public attitude to rugby has not altered so greatly during the last sixty years.

Second, rugby appealed to the Maoris and was promptly adopted by them. The New Zealand native rugby teams that toured Britain and Australia in the eighties of the last century included a generous number of Maori players. The late Sir Apirana Ngata pointed out that the Maoris had not only adopted rugby—they had also adapted it to their social requirements. Rugby matches were played between tribal groups for reasons entirely outside the pakeha code.[2] It is doubtful whether there is any aspect of life in which the reputation of the Maori stands higher in European estimation than it does on the rugby field.

THE CONTROVERSY[3]

Awareness

Maoris had been excluded from All Black rugby tours of South Africa on previous occasions without any widespread public protest. Brigadier-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, who had developed an

[1] W. McKenzie, 'Rugby Football in New Zealand', *The New Zealand Illustrated Magazine*, December 1900, pp. 238–9.

[2] A. T. Ngata, 'Tribal Organization', in I. L. G. Sutherland (editor), *The Maori People Today* (N.Z. Institute of International Affairs & N.Z. Council for Educational Research, 1940), p. 164.

[3] The division of the controversy into awareness, policy determination and outcome is drawn from: R. C. Fuller and R. R. Myers, 'The Natural History of a Social Problem', *Amer. Sociol. Rev.* June 1941, pp. 320–9.

intense admiration for Maori soldiers during the war, protested against their exclusion from the 1949 tour and received some support. After 1949, an increasingly large number of New Zealanders, especially within the Churches, thought of their country as an extension of South-East Asia. They were delighted to find that the Dominion's reputation for racial tolerance was widespread. At the same time, the implications of apartheid were becoming apparent and people were consequently less inclined to compromise with it and more appreciative of that measure of racial harmony which had been achieved in their country.

The Rugby Union anticipated some protest when it announced that it had accepted the invitation to tour South Africa in 1960. The first protests began a few months later, at the beginning of October 1958. Initially the protest was limited to the Churches although an occasional Maori tribal committee or prominent Maori spokesmen declared bluntly that if the team could not be chosen on the basis of merit, no team should be sent. During the first half of 1959, the basis of the protest broadened to include more Maori organisations and tribal committees, trade unions, and student, civil and professional groups.

Policy Determination

The Churches. The Churches were largely responsible for initiating and prosecuting the first stage of the protest. In June 1959 a joint statement was released signed by eight national church leaders—Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and Greek Orthodox Churches, the Congregational Union, the Associated Churches of Christ and the Society of Friends. The statement asserted:

> That in selecting a team that is to represent New Zealand, no player should be excluded on grounds of race.
>
> That, if Maori players are selected to go to South Africa, the responsibility should be placed firmly upon the South African Rugby Union to ensure that Maori players will be treated in all respects like other members of the team.
>
> That, if the South African Rugby Union is unable to accept this condition and to give an assurance that it is able to carry it out, no team should be sent.[4]

The Anglican Primate alone dissented on the grounds that it was unrealistic to expect such a guarantee to be given. Six Anglican bishops made public their disagreement with the Primate.

New Zealand Rugby Union. Shortly after the pronouncement of the church leaders, the Council of the Rugby Union found it necessary to issue this statement:

> The New Zealand Rugby Union has decided not to include Maori

[4] New Zealand Press Association, 8 June 1959.

players in the New Zealand team to visit South Africa in 1960.

This decision has been arrived at after making full inquiries into the whole position and after consultation with the Maori Advisory Board.

In reaching this decision, the union has been concerned with the best interests of its Maori players.

The union must make it quite clear that the South African Rugby Board, in issuing its invitation, left the composition of the team entirely to the discretion of the New Zealand Union.[5]

It has since been remarked that at this time Council members appeared confident that the protest would die out rapidly.

When two months later the International Rugby Football Board met in Wellington and were asked to discuss and rule on the Olympic principle of no discrimination in sport, the Board replied that it was not empowered to do this. When the appropriate by-laws from its constitution were quoted to show that it was so empowered, the Board made no reply.

Maori Advisory Board. The Advisory Board was a group of Maori rugby administrators elected, not directly by the players, but by the provincial rugby unions. Their Council representative was Mr. M. R. Love, private secretary to the Hon. E. T. Tirikatene, Associate Minister of Maori Affairs. At the June meeting Mr. Love supported the exclusion of Maoris from the South African tour, entered a plea for an overseas tour for an exclusively Maori rugby team and declared himself in favour of 'race discrimination' in rugby. The verbal confusion of his last statement did not save him from the wrath of many Maori tribal committees and organisations. His family publicly disassociated themselves from his views and the Labour Representation Committee was later to refuse to ratify his nomination for Wellington local body elections.

Three months later the Maori Advisory Board reaffirmed its support for the policy of excluding Maori players from the All Black tour. The Board welcomed to this meeting the European president of the Rugby Union but refused to hear a deputation of Maori leaders who wished the Board to withdraw its support for the Rugby Union's decision.

A Pacific tour was later arranged for a Maori rugby team for 1960, but Mr. Love's request that the honour of managing the team should go to a Maori was rejected by the Rugby Union Council.

Supporting Opinion. Support for the Rugby Union policy was variously expressed by individuals, a few minor rugby unions, the League of Empire Loyalists and the majority of newspaper editorials. Like the Rugby Union itself, however, the greater part of supporting opinion endeavoured to ignore the controversy.

Prominent among the Rugby Union's supporters were some who

[5] New Zealand Press Association, 12 June 1959.

did not appear to accept the tenet of racial equality and who, having lived for some years in South Africa, considered themselves especially qualified to deal with the 'grizzling' of church people and others who wished 'to worship their natives'. M.R.A. spokesmen saw the agitation as Communist-inspired—the purpose being to weaken the Commonwealth by attacking South Africa and creating tension in New Zealand. 'The Churches today are being used to brainwash New Zealand with Communist-inspired issues,' it was stated. The most specific solution to the controversy offered by the M.R.A. was the suggestion 'that pakeha and Maori, church and national leaders, go to the World Assemblies of Moral Rearmament in America and Switzerland'.

Citizens' All Black Tour Association. In June 1959, shortly after the Rugby Union reaffirmed its decision to exclude Maoris, a protest organisation was formed, under the title of the Citizens' All Black Tour Association (C.A.B.T.A.). Its objective was: 'To combat racial discrimination in the selection of the 1960 rugby team to tour South Africa, and to demand the abandonment of the tour if absolute equality of treatment cannot be assured.'[6] Chairman and accepted spokesman for the organisation was a Wellington surgeon, Mr. Rolland O'Regan. Under vigorous leadership, the various protesting organisations were drawn together and C.A.B.T.A.'s activities dominated the controversy until the Sharpeville massacre and the state of emergency in South Africa.

Opposition became intensified. A stream of letters to newspapers overwhelmingly opposed the tour. Over twenty major branches of C.A.B.T.A. were formed as well as many less formal committees in smaller towns and rural areas. Students staged demonstrations outside Parliament Buildings in Wellington, and outside the Town Halls of Auckland and Christchurch. After a protest march in Wellington, more than 2,000 people filled the Town Hall. The slogan 'No Maoris no tour' became widely used. By September, the protest had reached its peak, and the Rugby Union simply waited for the storm to blow over.

At this point, a national conference of C.A.B.T.A. was held and policy formulated. It was decided to undertake a nation-wide petition and to appeal to the Rugby Union to meet a deputation to discuss the issue. It was also decided that the issue was essentially a domestic one between the Rugby Union and the Association and that no support would be sought from organisations overseas—especially in South Africa.

Political Parties. The Communist Party and the Social Credit Progress League both deplored the Rugby Union's decision, but neither was represented in Parliament. Members of the Labour and

[6] '*No Maoris No Tour*' (Citizens' All Black Tour Association, 1960), p. 6.

National Parties which comprised the Government and Opposition respectively, were silenced by a caucus ban on the public expression of individual opinions on this issue. The Hon. E. T. Tirikatene alone made a lengthy statement disagreeing with the Rugby Union. He was supported by the M.P. for Northern Maori. The Prime Minister, Mr. Nash, defended the right of his Associate to make this statement on the grounds that Mr. Tirikatene was speaking in his private capacity as a Maori chief. The Prime Minister himself asserted that the whole issue was one for the Rugby Union to decide. It was a responsible body and did not discriminate against the Maoris. The Government could not interfere in the activities of a private sporting organisation. The Government, Opposition and Rugby Union all waited for the storm of protest to subside.

After the June decision of the Rugby Union, the Government-controlled broadcasting service refused to allow any discussion of the issue or news of the protest in its programmes. This ban was eventually lifted. During the entire controversy, however, no news of the protest was included in the weekly Maori language news service designed for Maori people in rural areas, although the Minister of Broadcasting denied the existence of any censorship.

The Rugby Union having refused to receive a deputation from C.A.B.T.A., there was no alternative but to approach the political leaders in the hope that they would be willing to discuss the issue and receive the petition containing 153,000 signatures. When the deputation finally met the party leaders, a general election was only nine months away. Mr. O'Regan made it clear that the deputation did not seek any form of civil rights legislation which, it was believed, would leave a stigma on New Zealand's reputation, nor did it seek the exercise of executive action to stop the tour. Submissions made by the deputation did request that:

(1) Members of Parliament should be free to express their opinions on the issue and that the Prime Minister should exercise his influence in the direction of abandoning the tour;

(2) Radio news services should report the controversy fairly;

(3) C.A.B.T.A.'s case should have the moral support of the political leaders;

(4) No official recognition or State farewell should be given for an all-white team if the tour proceeded;

(5) A solemn declaration should be made of New Zealand's racial policy that would act as a point of reference for future generations.

The deputation of church, Maori, trade union and university leaders and well-known sporting personalities was powerful and widely representative. Feeling ran high during the two-hour meeting in the Prime Minister's office. The Prime Minister's customary urbanity and courtesy deserted him. At one point, the Rt. Rev. W. N. Panapa, Bishop of Aotearoa, led the Maori members of the

deputation in a haka. The Prime Minister expressed himself in favour of the Rugby Union's policy and reiterated his official helplessness.

The acting leader of the Opposition, Mr. Marshall, agreed with the Prime Minister that the issue was not one for Parliament and declined to give support to C.A.B.T.A.—moral or otherwise. The National Party, he asserted, stood for and worked for, racial equality. He deplored the harm done by the agitation both to the country's reputation abroad and to race relations at home. He added: 'There is, I think, a responsibility on the Rugby Union to see that the situation does not arise again when future tours are planned.'

Following the deputation, Members of Parliament of both parties were free to make public their views on the issue and revealed great differences of opinion. All agreed, however, on the common helplessness of Government and Opposition. The protest continued. The Ministers of Customs and Broadcasting, Education, and Industries and Commerce deplored the protest and the harm it was doing to race relations within the country. On the other hand the Minister of Finance, the Hon. A. H. Nordmeyer, expressed his strong disapproval of the Rugby Union's decision and in a second statement, made shortly before the team left, the Hon. E. T. Tirikatene, on behalf of the Maori people, thanked all those who had worked to combat race discrimination in sport, especially the Citizens' All Black Tour Association.

Overseas Opinion. News of the controversy appeared in the daily and periodical Press throughout the world. English and American organisations concerned with African affairs or racial discrimination expressed their regret at the Rugby Union's decision. Complementing the New Zealand agitation were the protests of South African liberal Europeans and non-Europeans. If Maoris were to be excluded from the touring side, non-white South Africans would be denied participation in the tour both as players and on occasions even as spectators. The non-racial South African Sports Association protested vigorously and persistently to the New Zealand Rugby Union and Prime Minister. It was joined in its protests by the South African Liberal Party and sections of the African, Indian and Trade Union Congresses. In December 1959 the South African Sports Association and the African National Congress both launched petitions protesting against 'the racial exclusion of Maoris and non-white South Africans' from the proposed All Black rugby tour and appealing for the intervention of the Prime Minister of New Zealand in defence of 'fair play and justice'. Mr. Nash's reply to the South African Congress of Democrats, rejecting their appeal for the cancellation of the tour but expressing the hope that the All Blacks would receive a friendly reception, indicated some official uneasiness.

State of Emergency in South Africa. The tour had been accepted

as virtually inevitable when the Sharpeville massacre and the declaration of a state of emergency in South Africa once again placed it in jeopardy. Further protest within South Africa became impossible. The homes of South African Sports Association officials were raided and their correspondence intercepted and confiscated. Nothing further was heard of the African National Congress petition. A portion of the Sports Association petition was seized by the security police but the remaining 7,864 signatures reached the New Zealand National Council of Churches safely and were forwarded to the Prime Minister.

Protest in New Zealand was revived, especially among trade unionists, and the Federation of Labour called for the abandonment of the tour. The Prime Minister declared the opposition of himself and his party to race discrimination, placed the responsibility for all decisions regarding the tour firmly on the shoulders of the Rugby Union, hinted that he would be relieved to see the tour cancelled and left on an overseas tour. After a fortnight of indecision, the Rugby Union officials announced to their annual conference that, failing further disturbances, the tour would continue as planned. Although it had been widely accepted—even in rugby circles—that the tour would be cancelled, the delegates to the conference did not discuss the issue and were reported as being relieved not to have to do so.

Outcome

The all-white All Black team received a State farewell at Parliament Buildings during which the acting Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition made explicit reference to the representative nature of the team and its ambassadorial role in strengthening Commonwealth ties. Cabinet Ministers Tirikatene and Nordmeyer did not attend. The team's parliamentary reception and the various stages of its departure were marked by a series of demonstrations in which the trade unionists played a prominent part. The manager of the touring team in a final interview declared: 'Now that this team of very fine young New Zealanders is about to leave these shores, it is encumbent on every loyal New Zealander to get wholeheartedly behind the team.' Newspaper editorials echoed this sentiment and deplored last-minute protests by an 'irresponsible element'.

C.A.B.T.A. formally disbanded. The Hon. E. T. Tirikatene presented a petition to Parliament on behalf of the Bishop of Aotearoa and fifteen others asking for a 'full, formal and solemn statement' on New Zealand's race relations. The petition specifically rejected anything in the way of civil rights legislation.

The tour was adjudged a success. Proceeds amounted to almost half a million pounds and the clear profit to over one hundred thousand pounds. On the team's return, a State reception was held and further references to the ambassadorial functions of the N.Z.R.U.'s team were made by the party leaders. The manager of the

touring team declared that the way was now open for the inclusion of Maoris in future tours of South Africa. The chairman of the Rugby Union stated that: 'Provided it is left to the Rugby Unions concerned to get on with the job there should be no problems regarding the Maori question or any other.'

With the approach of the general election in November 1960, the Hon. E. T. Tirikatene received a knighthood and the National Party made a very tentative reference to the possibility of incorporating the Treaty of Waitangi in some kind of bill of rights. Neither of the two main parties referred to the controversy during the quiet and featureless election campaign.

In the general election of November 1960 the Labour Government was defeated decisively by thirty-five seats to forty-five. Mr. Holyoake, the new National Prime Minister, declared in his post-election address that this was the first time for over eighty years that a Government in this country had fallen after only three years in office. Newspaper editorials, National in their sympathies, attributed the fall of the Labour Government to the 1958 budget. After the election, the Dominion passed into a period of intense preoccupation with the place of the Maoris in New Zealand society. Questions of Maori health, housing, leadership, vocational training, crime and urban drift being amongst those given considerable prominence in the daily Press.

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE CONTROVERSY

Four aspects of the controversy are especially noteworthy:

(1) The miscalculation by the political party leaders and rugby officials who were sure that the protest would blow over rapidly. Instead, it continued long enough to embarrass the team's departure, and in election year to lay the Prime Minister open to the charge that he had failed to provide leadership and had allowed the issue to drag on unnecessarily.

J. S. Coleman suggests that there are three indispensable elements in initiating a controversy. Freely interpreted, these are: (1) the presence of a few extreme activists, (2) the existence of an administration which is out of touch with community feeling, (3) the suspected violation of a cherished public norm.[7]

All these elements were present in the New Zealand scene. The activists were provided in the first instance by the liberal wing of the Churches. The rugby officials were securely isolated from opinion in a monolithic and archaic administrative structure. And most important of all was the suspicion that cherished values were being threatened. A basic tenet of the New Zealand creed asserts that there is no colour bar in the Dominion. A New Zealand representative to the Special Political Committee of the United Nations stated that: 'in precept, in practice, and in fact, all New Zealand's people enjoy

[7] J. S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (Chicago, Free Press, 1957), p. 7.

equally, full political, economic, social and civil rights. We could never contemplate a departure from these conditions.'[8] Despite the somewhat unreal nature of such official statements made for overseas consumption, the ideal expressed is one which is widely felt and accepted. Race discrimination certainly exists in the Dominion, but it is indiscreet to make a public acknowledgment of specific discriminatory practices.

Once the controversy was under way it gathered a momentum of its own. The silence and apparent discourtesy of the rugby officials who often did not so much as acknowledge their correspondence, the evidence of overseas interest, and the deterioration of race relations in South Africa provided the controversy with renewed interest.

(2) The extraordinary extent to which the controversy was held within 'the bounds of normal community decision-making'.[9] The changes in issues and social organisation which Coleman lists as typical of controversies as they move towards their climax, ending up with 'the community divided into opposing factions, angry and adamant, arguing about old quarrels which have nothing to do with the original issue', have little relevance to this particular conflict.[10] There was in particular little evidence of direct antagonism or the polarisation of social relations.

In the words of an editorial in a newspaper otherwise unsympathetically disposed, the protest was 'conducted with decorum and obvious sincerity'. It was essentially a middle-class and professional protest. Leading citizens who would not usually be found in such agitations, played a prominent and sometimes controlling part on local C.A.B.T.A. committees. This enabled them to ensure that the protest was carried out in a 'dignified' fashion and was not prolonged after the tour had become inevitable. Even Mr. O'Regan's views and manner were felt by many C.A.B.T.A. committee members to be unnecessarily aggressive.

The controversy did not reflect any deep cleavage of values and interests in the community. Apart from a few uninfluential individuals and groups, every section of the community involved in the issue expressed its devotion to the Maoris and opposition to race discrimination. Some statement of personal regard for the Maori people typically prefaced individual expressions of support for the Rugby Union. C.A.B.T.A. officials shared all beliefs with their opponents and were divided only on the question of whether the tour itself should proceed. Mr. O'Regan's personal views on the future of the Maori in New Zealand even received editorial approval from newspapers which supported the tour.

(3) The crushing defeat of the Rugby Union's critics, despite the fact that they appeared to include almost every articulate section of

[8] *External Affairs Review*, October 1958, vol. viii, No. 10, p. 22.
[9] Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12.

the community. The tour was held and Maoris and all South African non-whites were excluded. The representative status and coveted All Black title were retained for the team. The Rugby Union's diplomatic functions in international sport were recognised by Parliament. No concession of any kind was made to the protest. The critics' only consolation was the belief that the Rubgy Union would not risk causing such a protest again—a belief later to be reinforced by the statements of rugby officials.

Two main factors led to the success of the Rugby Union. It is an immensely powerful business organisation and handles large sums of money. It is indirectly a substantial source of government revenue. It promotes business in general by its tours and shield matches. It fills hotels, trains, planes and petrol tanks. Selection in provincial and national teams is an important means of gaining public recognition and personal advancement. Many of the most prominent men in the community, including the present Prime Minister, Mr. Holyoake, have played in senior or representative teams.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the great majority of the population did not commit themselves on the issue. Many of those who signed the petition because they did not want the Maoris excluded would nevertheless have been disappointed if the tour had been cancelled. If the Universities expressed their opposition to the tour, their rugby clubs accepted a gift of £600 from the Rugby Union and gave it their support. If the Churches opposed the tour, their schools, in some cases noted as rugby nurseries, accepted the leadership of the Rugby Union and continued to provide in inter-school rugby some of the social highlights of the year.

The immense power of the Rugby Union was supported by the lack of institutionalised measures for the protection of civil rights as they are found in Britain and the United States. It is apparent that New Zealand has neither the protection afforded by the British tradition of independence, whereby Members of Parliament ask questions in the House on matters affecting the public interest, nor the protection afforded by civil rights legislation as in the United States. This lack enabled the Prime Minister, Mr. Nash, both to plead that he had no legal power to intervene in the conflict and also to ensure that no party member would raise the issue publicly either inside or outside Parliament.

C.A.B.T.A. was a widely representative organisation containing representatives with both Labour and National sympathies. The continued unity of the organisation depended on a policy of neutrality towards political leaders. The views of Mr. O'Regan and his colleagues on civil rights legislation and the role of the Government and Opposition did not differ in any way from the 'party line' of common helplessness adopted by the parties themselves. Even the petition was taken to the party leaders only after the Rugby Union had refused to receive a deputation and there was nowhere else to take it. When in 1960 the C.A.B.T.A. protest declined, the militant

trade unionists could not press the issue too far lest they embarrass a Labour Government in election year.

The Rugby Union was thus covered on the only two points at which its policy was vulnerable—school and university rugby and Parliament. The South African authorities could be relied upon to see that the tour itself was not embarrassed by the protests of white liberals and non-white sportsmen.

(4) Rugby and Maoris both have a positive value in New Zealand. Rugby is generally considered to be much the more important of the two. The threat to the South African tour in consequence brought to those protesting, or likely to protest, such warnings as a telephone call indicating the withdrawal of business, an abusive anonymous letter or telegrams and letters urging non-intervention. The magnitude of the controversy, however, made it clear that the Rugby Union had erred in announcing the exclusion of the Maoris from the South African tour. This error is unlikely to be repeated—even if Maoris are in fact not included in future tours.

The controversy did not involve a conflict of principles, for all were committed to Maori-European equality. The implication that Maoris were less important than rugby was not acknowledged. The suggestion that the tour should be cancelled, that a sporting series should be abandoned which had provided some of the finest moments in rugby history, was greeted with incredulity. This was carrying principles too far. It did not, therefore, seem incongruous to newspaper editors to suggest, when the tour had become inevitable, that those protesting should now show themselves 'good losers' and 'get behind' the team in its bid for rugby supremacy in South Africa.

With the tour assured, it was the protest itself that completed the rationalisation for the implicit preference for rugby. The protest was something of which the whole country could be proud. Newspaper editorials acknowledged that although the Maoris had been excluded in their own best interests, it was to be expected that New Zealanders would not take this 'lying down'. The protest vindicated the Dominion's reputation for racial tolerance and made it possible to enjoy the tour with a clear conscience.

The All Black controversy provided the opportunity for a much needed reassessment of the idealised Maori-European relations. Allegiances formed during this period cut across racial lines and existing loyalties. In some cases Maoris and Europeans had the experience of working together for the first time. The Rugby Union's decision provided the opportunity to reaffirm the belief that there should be no colour bar in the Dominion. The strength and persistence of the affirmation surprised the rugby officials, the party leaders and the country as a whole. If the position of rugby has perhaps been weakened slightly in favour of competing sports such as soccer, rugby league and hockey, the country has been sensitised to the position of the Maori people. The controversy demonstrated that the customary protestations of racial equality have a surprising vitality.

NEGROES IN CANADA

HAROLD H. POTTER

Introduction

Canadian literature on race relations deals first and foremost with the political aspirations of a 'race' of French Catholics *vis-á-vis* a 'race' of British Protestants. Of this larger picture Negroes form a minute and apparently unimportant part. J. M. Gibbon's *Canadian Mosaic*, published in 1938, contains no reference to Negroes, nor does *Canadian Society*, edited by Bernard Blishen and others and published in 1961. B. K. Sandwell's *The Canadian Peoples*, published in 1941 and 1947, mentions discrimination against Jews and Negroes in one line.

A little further investigation shows, however, that between 1920 and 1958 professional historians and students inclined to social work wrote at least thirty-four articles and theses for higher degrees on the subject of Canadian Negroes.[1] In the media of broader mass communication, too—in wireless broadcasts, telecasts, newspapers and magazines—coloured people have been the object of deep, sustained and well-intentioned interest for well over the past ten years. Through the same period they have been included among those whose employment and civic rights have been discussed in literature published by the Department of Labour, the Canadian Jewish Congress, the United Church of Canada and labour unions.

Negro Populations

Canadian Negroes number much less than one-third of the estimated coloured population of London. The census of 1951 reported a few more than eighteen thousand scattered over almost three and a half million square miles of territory and forming a little more than one-tenth of one per cent of the entire population. An estimate of 23,500 was mentioned in 1957. They are not evenly distributed, but are concentrated in the rural and urban communities of four or five regions. In Sydney, Stellarton, Truro, Halifax, Yarmouth, Digby, and almost a dozen other Nova Scotian communities, they number from eight to thirteen thousand. There are a few hundreds in Saint John, Fredericton and Woodstock, New Brunswick; eight or ten thousand are divided between Montreal and Toronto; a few thousands more are in Dresden, Sandwich, Barrie, Chatham and Windsor, all in south-western Ontario; some are in Winnipeg, some in Edmonton, and several dozens in Vancouver, Victoria, and other Pacific places.

In the national census of 1941 slightly more than twenty-two

[1] *Citizenship, Immigration, and Ethnic Groups in Canada: a Bibliography of Research, Published and Unpublished Sources, 1920–1958* (Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Economic and Social Research Branch, Ottawa, 1960), pp. 81–6.

thousand Negroes were reported. These statistics refer, of course, to avowed Negroes and do not include people who chose to report themselves in other ways to census enumerators. The decrease of more than four thousand Negroes between 1941 and 1951 means that either more Negroes died and emigrated than arrived through birth and immigration in that period, or almost one-fifth of Canadian Negroes chose to report themselves under other labels after 1941. It must be said that official national statistics and unofficial local estimates of coloured populations differ and cannot be reconciled.

A coloured community may have a complex population structure. For example, the Negroes of Toronto, according to Daniel Hill, have four elements in their population: 'old-line' native Canadians, British West Indians, American newcomers and, most recently, Nova Scotians. They are scattered and, in Hill's words, do not form a true community.[2]

In Montreal there are no old-line Negroes. There were slaves in the late eighteenth century, but they seem to have left no traceable issue in the city. Americans formed the first significant nucleus of coloured population about the terminals of the railways that employed most of them around 1910 and 1920. They were joined later by West Indians who remained in Montreal because of their British connexion. Many of these latter lived away from the 'Negro district'. The Americans eventually disappeared; many returned to the United States with the advent there of the New Deal. A thin dribble of Nova Scotians westward to Montreal grew into a considerable migration during and after World War II, forming a new significant element in the local population.

Nowadays six classes of Negro can be distinguished in that city. First, there are avowed Negroes who dwell in a rundown area that is predominantly white in population but is widely known as the 'Negro district'. Outside this area, in various places on and off the islands comprising the city, other avowed Negroes live who have gained a relatively satisfactory economic place. Some have remained in the traditional low-status occupations of sleeping-car porter, station porter, washroom attendant, garage mechanic.

Scattered among the core category and the dispersed category are new arrivals from Caribbean islands. Some of these are virtually penniless strangers whose only friends or relatives in the city are poor coloured people like themselves. Some arrive with marketable skills, but many do not. Some are washed and some are not. Some are dressed outlandishly, others in perfect taste. To be thrown among the sharks and barracudas of a great central city shocks them.

There is a fourth class in the general picture: an undetermined number of non-confessing coloured people whose homes are scattered through various districts. They are in honoured occupations, and many of them marry white men and women.

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[2] Daniel G. Hill, Jr., *Negroes in Toronto: a Sociological Study of a Minority Group* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, September 1960).

Next are scores of students from different lands, many of whom have no connexion with coloured people here. Some find housing accommodation in the 'Negro community'; some live in the rooming-house areas surrounding the two English universities. Some live far from the centre of the city. Some are relatively well-to-do; some are poor. They are in Montreal for periods ranging from several months to eight or ten years. In spite of an immigration regulation requiring West Indians to return home after completion of their studies, some manage to stay north indefinitely, perhaps through the application of another regulation which permits immigration officers to recognise cases of 'exceptional merit' for admission to the country. Negroes from French territories are very few and are scattered.

Added to these five distinct categories of Montreal coloured people are professional and amateur players in football, baseball and basketball leagues, imported from the United States by entrepreneurs who supply sport to the general public. These seem to be located outside the Negro community, and at least one has become a Canadian citizen.

A study of Negroes in and around Halifax was carried out in the late 1950s under the aegis of the Institute of Public Affairs of Dalhousie University, but illness and other misfortunes have delayed publication of its results. However, in *Maclean's Magazine* in 1956, Edna Staebler described the isolation and backwardness of Negroes in New Road, ten miles from Halifax, where taxes were from three to ten dollars per year on a house and an acre of land, and where only five men in the community of one thousand had year-round employment.[3] Some of the efforts to reintroduce formal schooling among them were described. The successes and failures of these efforts are portrayed in different detail by Gwendolyn Shand in a 1961 article concerning help with adult education offered by Nova Scotia authorities to many coloured communities, commencing in the autumn of 1946.[4]

Public Opinion

Since the beginning of 1941 the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion has conducted opinion surveys among Canadians in order to assess their attitudes to specific racial and cultural groups. As a rule, no information is offered in these reports as to sizes of the samples of population or how they are determined and selected for interview. This is hardly a fault in material offered to the general public, but it may cause a shadow of uneasiness in the minds of statisticians. It is therefore reassuring to note that the variations of response according to region, occupational class and political party

[3] Edna Staebler, 'Would you change the lives of these people?' *Maclean's Magazine*, 12 May 1956. Colour photographs.

[4] Gwendolyn V. Shand, *Adult Education among Negroes of Nova Scotia* (Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, Bulletin I, 1961).

preference are as expected by one familiar with the Canadian scene.

Some of these surveys have been inspired by unfortunate incidents in Canadian communities. In one city a coloured boy was asked to leave a public skating rink after he had bought a ticket. A question on this issue was put to two samples of the Canadian population.[5] To the first sample Negroes were cited as an example of victims of racial discrimination; to the second sample, Jews were cited. Responses from the population varied according to the example cited, as indicated below:

> When someone is given a licence to run a place of entertainment, like a dance hall or a skating rink, should he have the right to keep out certain races, say Negroes, or should he be compelled to admit everyone, as long as they behave themselves?

People in the first sample responded as follows:

Have right to keep out	19%
Should admit everyone	77%
Undecided	4%
	100%

When Jews were referred to, people in the second sample responded as follows:

Have right to keep out	12%
Should admit everyone	86%
Undecided	2%
	100%

In every province, the Institute said, there were majorities from 66 per cent to as high as 90 per cent who said that such places of entertainment should not be discriminatory. (The second sample probably included some Jewish respondents, but we do not know how many.)

On a more recent occasion a group in a Canadian city protested at the purchase of a home in their neighbourhood by a Negro. The Gallup Poll asked a sample of Canadians about their feelings concerning this issue. At that time a British Gallup Poll was conducted following serious race riots in London, and results of the two surveys were published together.[6]

The question, put to men and women of 21 and over, was this: 'Would you move if coloured people came to live in great numbers in your area?'

	Britain	*Canada*
Yes, definitely	26%	21%
Might do so	35%	32%
No, would not	39%	46%
	100%	100%

[5] Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 'Gallup Poll Report', *Montreal Star*, 9 January 1946.

[6] *Ibid.*, 10 January 1959.

The Institute's evidence also showed that Canadians in labour groups objected less than those in business and the professions.

	Business and professional	*Labour*	*Farmers*
Yes, definitely ..	27%	17%	25%
Might do so ..	31%	28%	33%
No, would not ..	42%	55%	42%
	100%	100%	100%

The information above can be compared with a report from the Institute concerning attitudes to restrictive covenants.[7] The question put to 2,125 Canadians across the country was as follows:

> If you were buying a home and the neighbours asked you to sign an agreement promising not to sell or rent it later to people of certain races or colour, would you be willing or not willing to sign such an agreement?

Responses were:

Willing to sign	19%
Not willing	68%
Qualified answers	4%
Undecided	9%
	100%

There were regional differences in the responses.[8]

Region	*Total cases*	% *Willing to sign*	% *Not willing*	% *Qualified*	% *Undecided*	%
Atlantic Provinces	225	26	63	4	7	100
Quebec	614	24	61	3	12	100
Ontario	650	21	67	3	9	100
Prairies	453	11	80	3	6	100
British Columbia	183	12	78	6	4	100

In the same newspaper, the Institute reported that in no province and in no social or economic class was there less than majority support for legislation prohibiting refusal of a job to an applicant because of his race, colour or religion.[9]

The responses were:

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[7] *Ibid.*, July 1949.

[8] This further information about the July 1949 report is taken from an analysis, based on more data furnished by the Institute to Dr. Manfred Saalheimer. See his analysis: 'Canadian Public Opinion on Racial Restrictive Covenants', in *Information and Comment*, Canadian Jewish Congress, Montreal, No. 9, October 1949).

[9] Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 'Gallup Poll Report', *Montreal Star*, 18 June 1947.

Approve	64%
Disapprove	23%
Undecided	13%
	100%

There is a relationship between the political party preferences of these respondents and the way they react to such legislation, shown below:

	Progressive-Conservative	*Liberal*	*C.C.F. (Socialist)*
Approve ..	53%	65%	71%
Disapprove..	32%	23%	17%
Undecided ..	15%	12%	12%
	100%	100%	100%

In 1959 a sampling of national opinion was reported on the question: 'If coloured people came to live next door, would you move your home?'[10] Responses were:

Yes, definitely	5%
Might do so	14%
No, would not	81%
	100%

The responses were analysed for regional differences and for variations by occupation, with the following results:

	Atlantic Provinces and Quebec	*Ontario*	*The West*
Yes ..	7%	4%	4%
Might do so	16%	14%	11%
No, would not	77%	82%	85%
	100%	100%	100%

	Business and professional	*Labour*	*Farmers*
Yes ..	8%	4%	4%
Might do so	15%	10%	18%
No, would not	77%	86%	78%
	100%	100%	100%

Other reports concerned with attitudes to European immigrants do not alter the sad picture of a population burdened with gratuitous hostility.[11]

[10] *Ibid.*, 7 January 1959.
[11] *Ibid.*, 30 October 1946 and 26 November 1955.

Opposed to these portrayals of Canadian opinions is the important consideration that a response to an interviewer's hypothetical question may be different from what one does when confronted with the same situation in fact, with all its variables of personalities, wealth, physical appearance, status, economic and sexual opportunities, and so on, immediately given to the senses. For this reason the curiosity of some people is not easily satisfied by reports of poll findings. They prefer evidence found in other places—the record of parliamentary debates, the learned articles of historians, and news and human interest stories published in magazines and newspapers. Evidence in these places bespeaks a strong opinion adverse to Negroes, not altered by the passage of time, and not necessarily in accord with facts.

William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease quote from a letter to the editor of the *Chatham Chronicle* in September 1849 a reference to Negroes as 'destitute of all means of support, uneducated, degraded in mind, and prostrate in infamy'. This letter was part of a long, violent campaign in south-western Ontario against settlement of refugees from American slavery, a campaign 'organised and used to further the Tory political aims of (Edwin) Larwill against the Reform Administration and against McKellar, a local Reform leader . . .' Yet the authors report that the Elgin Settlement experiment was in fact highly successful.

> In the nearly twenty years of its active operation it provided a home for over a thousand Negroes, free and ex-slave. During this period it demonstrated effectively the capacity of the Negro to receive and to profit from education, the ability of the Negro to operate successfully business enterprises, the effectiveness of the Negro as an agriculturist. It disproved the contention that the Negro was inherently inferior to the white, that his potential and his accomplishments must always be of a lower order of excellence.[12]

Citing W. R. Riddell in the *Journal of Negro History*, Volume XIII, 1928, Daniel Hill writes:

> John Dunn, who was Receiver General for Upper Canada during the 1830s and 1840s, stated in a letter to an American abolitionist, 'Negroes asked for charity less than any other groups and seem generally prosperous and industrious.'[13]

J. I. Cooper describes the educational work of the Colonial Church and School Society among Negroes in London, Ontario, in 1854, and records that for the first time in either the United States or Canada coloured persons were introduced as teachers of racially mixed classes, and that work was successful.[14] This work ended

[12] William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease, 'Opposition to the Founding of the Elgin Settlement', *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, September 1957, pp. 202–18.

[13] Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[14] J. I. Cooper, 'The Mission to the Fugitive Slaves at London', *Ontario History*, Vol. XLVI, no. 2, Spring, 1957 pp. 133–9.

in 1859 when the public schools of London accepted Negro children without qualification or segregation.

Ida Greaves gives an account of Negro settlement in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia from the late eighteenth century on.[15] Officials were for the most part helpful and sympathetic as they dealt with the coloured people, but among some rank and file citizens resentment and hostility appeared. A mulatto officer, Colonel Bluck, was in charge of Negro immigrants near Shelburne, New Brunswick. in 1783.

Josiah Henson escaped from American slavery in 1830 accompanied by his wife and four children, and entered Canada three years before slavery was legally abolished there. Margaret K. Zieman wrote about him in 1954:

> Within eight years he owned a farm and was the leading spirit in founding the Dawn Institute, a co-operative settlement of about a hundred families of ex-slaves on three hundred acres near Dresden (Ontario) . . . Its school, the first of its kind in Canada, combined trade training with instruction in ordinary school subjects . . . The Dawn plan (was) officially known as the British-American Institute . . .
>
> Although he was a slave for 41 years and had no schooling, after he escaped from the United States to freedom in Canada he founded a co-operative settlement of ex-slaves at Dawn, near Dresden, and as self-appointed spokesman of his race became an internationally known figure. His speaking tours took him through the northern U.S. and across the Atlantic to England. He was acclaimed and entertained by London society, received by Queen Victoria and the Archbishop of Canterbury, and honoured by the Earl of Shaftesbury, Lord Grey and Lord John Russell, was was Britain's Prime Minister in 1851. Later, he was welcomed at the White House in Washington by President Hayes.[16]

Official Opinion

Racism similar to that recorded by the Peases appears in the record of debates in the House of Commons through the period March 2 to April 3, inclusive, in the year 1911. The Canadian Government had offered free land to all who would settle in the Northwest. Negroes from Oklahoma responded to the invitation and some Canadian newspapers paid special attention to the prospect of their immigration and settlement. In the same period there were questions in the House about racial discrimination in the federal Civil Service. The record shows that some members were favourably disposed to coloured people, but the fears of others were aroused by reports and comments in newspapers. Their questions

[15] Ida Greaves, *The Negro in Canada* (McGill University Economic Studies, No. 16, 1930).

[16] Margaret K. Zieman, 'The Story Behind the *Real* Uncle Tom', *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 June 1954.

to the Minister of the Interior led him to say that the immigration policy of Canada 'today is restricted, exclusive, and selective as compared with the former policy of indiscriminate immigration . . .'

On April 3 he said:

> . . . No doubt there has been some talk in the newspapers about such a campaign (of Negroes migrating from the U.S.A.), but that has only arisen within the last month, and, therefore, we are hardly chargeable with negligence in not having framed a policy to anticipate something which so far is only in the prospective stage.[17]

Even after thirty years official attitudes hardly changed, as the following letter from a Member of Parliament shows, with fictitious names substituted for the sender and addressee.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA

OTTAWA, February 6th, 1942.

Mr. Robert MacLeod,
St. X, Quebec.

Dear Mr. MacLeod:—

I have had some correspondence with the Minister and also spoken to him about you. I learned that only those of pure European descent could be accepted for appointment to commissioned rank and for enlistment in air crew.

This does not prevent enlistment in any category for ground duties. The Minister informs me that the commanding officer of the Montreal recruiting centre states that you will be considered for inclusion in the next radio mechanics quota.

I would be glad to know how you get along.

Yours sincerely,
John Smith, M.P.

More recent official sentiment is noted by D. C. Corbett in his book, *Canadian Immigration Policy*. He quotes Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the effect that immigration regulations are intended not 'to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population'.[18] Dr. Corbett also devotes some pages to discussion of a letter written in 1952 to a Member of the House of Commons by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Part of the letter was as follows:

> In reply to your last paragraph one of the conditions for admission to Canada is that immigrants should be able readily to become adapted and integrated into the life of the community within a reasonable time after their entry. In the light of experience it would be unrealistic to say that immigrants who

[17] H. C. Debates, Session 1910–11, Vol. IV, 3 April 1911, p. 6525.
[18] David C. Corbett, *Canada's Immigration Policy* (University of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 36, 195.

> have spent the greater part of their life in tropical or subtropical countries become readily adaptable to the Canadian mode of life, which, to no small extent, is determined by climatic conditions. It is a matter of record that natives of such countries are more apt to break down in health than immigrants from countries where the climate is more akin to that of Canada. It is equally true that, generally speaking, persons from tropical or subtropical countries find it more difficult to succeed in the highly competitive Canadian economy. It would be quite contrary to fact, however, to infer from this that coloured immigrants are debarred from Canada. As in the past, favourable consideration is given in cases where the exceptional qualifications of the applicant offer reasonable assurance that he will find a satisfactory level in the Canadian community or where refusal would constitute extreme hardship on humanitarian grounds.

Dr. Corbett goes on to say that in order to check the Minister's assertions the Member put questions on the order paper in the House, requiring an answer from the Department.

> Question 1. How many persons of British West Indies origin are at present living in Canada?
>
> Answer: Information not available.
>
> 2. How many persons have entered Canada from the British West Indies during each of the five years 1947-1951, inclusive?
>
> Answer: Statistics are not available as to the number of persons who have entered Canada . . .

The final question, Number 8, was:

> Are any statistics available to show how immigrants to Canada from the British West Indies compare with immigrants from other warm climate countries in the following respect: (a) health records; (b) wages or salaries earned; (c) unemployment records; (d) profession and occupation followed; (e) public liabilities?
>
> Answer: Statistics not available.[19]

Occasional Negroes of ability won satisfactory places for themselves in Canadian communities despite official prejudice and the hostility of some citizens. For the mass of coloured people, however, whether urban or rural, conditions were such that a professor of psychology in one of the great universities taught that they (and women) were inherently inferior to people like himself. It is alleged that in the thirties a scholarship was withheld from a Negro student on the ground that no subsequent opportunities would be presented to her anywhere. It is only fair to record in this connexion that until World War II got under way most Canadians below the middle class lived in lamentable conditions. Negroes were a special case of the man lower down.

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–5.

Metropolitan Negroes in 1941

Unpublished census data of 1941 show that families in the 'Negro district', comprising two-thirds of all Montreal Negroes who avowed themselves as such, reported incomes that averaged $400 per year in one neighbourhood, $500 per year in another, and $1,086 per year in a third, the variation directly agreeing with distance of the home from the ecological centre of the coloured population.[20] These figures are hard to credit; but there is an impressive consistency in the amounts reported by wage-earners, especially when they are grouped by municipal wards of domicile. In 1948 I discussed this information with a professional engineer employed in a factory in the Negro district, and he assured me that the data fitted what he knew of the earnings of white workers recruited into his plant from that same part of the city. In fact, for the twelve months prior to the census date, 2 June 1941, 53·4 per cent of the city's 231,000 male wage-earners reported earnings of less than $950, while 67 per cent of its porters reported earnings of less than that amount.[21]

In 1941 almost half the employed Negro males of Montreal were railway porters and four-fifths of the employed Negro females were domestic servants. Other Negroes were engaged in some eighty other gainful occupations ranging from menial to supervisory and professional employment. The general condition of the mass of coloured people is illustrated by the following excerpts from two interviews in 1948 with coloured women outside the Negro district:

> (1) The interviewer said that his information was that domestics in 1941 claimed to be earning anywhere from eight to twenty-five dollars per month.
>
> Mrs. Chalmers replied:
>
> That's true. I knew any number of people doing housework for ten dollars a month before the war. And they did more than they do now. That was the standard wage. The employers tried to say that ten dollars plus meals and a room really worked out to forty dollars per month. Finns and Poles and Swedes and French girls—they were all getting the same.
>
> What do the Finns do now?
>
> I don't know. Generally they worked by the day because they had families. They worked by the day, so they made more. But they worked harder, too; all the hard and dirty cleaning that the maids wouldn't do, they did.[22]

(2) Elsewhere the interviewer dealt with the secretary to the top executive of a local industrial company. She came to Montreal

[20] Harold H. Potter, *The Occupational Adjustments of Montreal Negroes, 1941–1948* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis—McGill University, 1949), Table 9, p. 39.
[21] *Eighth Census of Canada, 1941*, Volume VI, 'Earnings, Employment and Unemployment of Wage-earners' (Ottawa, 1946), Table 7, pp. 284, 292.
[22] Harold H. Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

from Quebec City in 1937, fully trained as a stenographer, able to take shorthand dictation in both English and French. Unable to find a stenographic job, she became a domestic servant. In the interview she said that ten or fifteen dollars per month was the standard pre-war rate. Referring to former employers in Westmount City, she said: 'For fifteen or eighteen dollars a month they expected you to kiss their feet.'

> The interviewer said that according to his information girls in 1941 worked for wages ranging from two to six dollars per week.

Miss Munro answered:

> Yes; but you know what makes it hard for the coloured girls? It's these French girls coming from Gaspé and all those country places, and offering to work for six dollars a month! Coloured girls can't work for that; but they've got to stay here and take it. Of course those upper crust people don't care whether you have anything to wear or something for your grooming or whether you have time to look after your soul. My boss would say, 'Mrs. So-and-So has a French girl, and she only pays her six dollars a month.' I'd say, 'The girl must be a fool!' She'd say, 'Oh Cassie, don't say that.' I'd say, 'Well, she is.'[23]

Assimilation Today

Even for Negroes, times change. By 1951 the sleeping-car porter's role was no longer restricted to coloured men. Railway management acknowledged the right of porters to form unions independent of the companies, wages were greatly increased, and whites of various ethnic backgrounds began to earn their living in this way. It then became possible for a sleeping-car porter to rise within the industry to another position. The Canada Fair Employment Practices Act came into effect at the beginning of July 1953, and probably has worked to the advantage of the coloured porter. Of course, Negroes of various geographic origins pursued other occupations in other industries.

The medical student mentioned by Ida Greaves[24] in 1930 as having been awarded a National Research Council scholarship is today Dr. Kenneth I. Melville, Professor of Pharmacology and Chairman of the Department of Pharmacology, McGill University. He enjoys a very high international reputation in his field. The other coloured man whom Miss Greaves described as an Assistant Professor was raised to a full professorship in 1954, and was appointed Chairman of the Department of Entomology at Macdonald College in 1955. He is Prof. E. M. Duporte. Since World War II six other coloured men to my knowledge have been appointed to research and teaching posts in Canadian universities.

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 99.
[24] Ida Greaves, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

Unlike most of the university professors, Oscar Peterson is Canadian born. His childhood was spent in poverty in one of the shabbiest sections of the Negro district of Montreal during the nineteen-thirties. He was taught by a classical pianist, Paul deMarky, and is today, at the age of 36, in the front rank of jazz pianists in America.

Percy Rodriguez also grew up in the shabby Negro district. As a professional actor he has performed with distinction for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board, and up to the spring of 1961 was cast in an important role in Lillian Hellman's *Toys in the Attic*, on Broadway. Two others from the district became university professors. From one of these, a former holder of the McGill-Glasgow Exchange Fellowship, a letter was received in which the parts reproduced below provide a contrast with some of the materials already presented.

> When I read of your intention I didn't know how to react. I don't think of myself as a Negro carrying the banner of racism into the battle. I think of myself as an individual trying to make some small but effective contribution to national life. Naturally I am probably objectively classified by observers as a Negro, but I have always operated on the assumption that it doesn't matter, and remarkable though it may sound, I have found that it doesn't.
>
> . . . I was recently appointed an associate member of the —— Control of the Controllers' Institute of America. This was in recognition of my contribution to business education in Canada. This contribution has had several facets:
>
> A. As the Director of the Educational Foundation of SICA I reorganized the curriculum of the educational programme of SICA and implemented the necessary course changes. (This is a programme taken by some five or six thousand students across Canada.)
>
> B. I am a member of the Board of Instruction of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario.
>
> C. As the professor of commerce on the faculty I was deeply involved in the introduction of an MBA programme in the Graduate Faculty, and I am now the supervisor of that programme (some 100 students). As such, I report directly to the Dean of Graduate Studies.
>
> Incidentally, I am a director of —— —— Children's Centre. This is a home for emotionally disturbed children with an average of about eighteen children in residence.

From outside Montreal's 'Negro district' one West Indian family alone produced an Anglican clergyman, a medical doctor, a university lecturer and an office manager. The clergyman remains unmarried; but the others, including a woman, married white persons. Another family outside the district, this one with ten children, produced an advertising executive, the chief architect of a firm in the Canadian

West, a sugar broker in England. The careers of the remainder are unknown to me.

Perhaps special mention should be made of Dr. Philip Aron Edwards, who was assigned in July 1960 to work in the Republic of Congo as a member of two medical teams comprising ten Canadians. He was born in British Guiana and is a specialist in tropical diseases. In 1936 he helped McGill University to capture five inter-collegiate track championships. He came third in the 800-metre and 1,500-metre Olympic races in 1932, third in the 800-metre in 1936, and fifth in that year's 1,500-metre race, in which the first five men all beat the world record. He is attendant physician and clinical parasitologist at one of the great Montreal hospitals, lectures in medicine and clinical medicine at McGill University, has offices at the local Veterans' Hospital and holds a post as medical specialist with the Department of Veterans' Affairs.[25]

In 1957 *Citizen* carried an article which described the settlement of Negroes in Canada and referred at length to 'outstanding Negroes' of the present day. A number of coloured men and women well known in the fields of entertainment and amateur and professional sport were noted; then the article referred to the record of Negro Canadians in World War I, and went on to say

> The present city solicitor for Windsor, Ontario, is a Negro, and Dr. Roy Perry of the same city has been on the Council for seven years and is now a member of the Board of Control. Dr. H. D. Taylor is a member of the Windsor Board of Education. In other cities as well Negroes have held and are holding positions of civic responsibility.[26]

The *Globe and Mail* (Toronto) on 18 May 1961 carried an announcement of the appointment of William A. White as General Manager of the Toronto Cast Stone Company Limited. Mr. White was described as 'responsible to the President for the direction and execution of all administrative policies, enabling other senior officers to devote themselves to the expanding technical, engineering, production and financial operations of Toronto Cast Stone and Beer Precast Concrete (Montreal) Limited'. A list of Mr. White's honorific offices in community organisations was included in the announcement, but only the photograph indicated that Mr. White is a coloured man.

A New Trend

This list of unusual attainments can be greatly extended, but its point should be already clear: the dictum that Negroes form an unassimilable element in the Canadian population does not square with the facts. In very recent years that official position seems to have been abandoned. In fact, for almost a generation Negroes

[25] *Montreal Star*, 27 July 1960.

[26] 'Negroes in Canada', in *Citizen*, Canadian Citizenship Branch, Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa. Vol. 3, No. 3, June 1957.

have benefited from enactments of municipalities, provinces and the federal Parliament, which do not refer to them in particular but are intended for the assurance and protection of Canadians in general. It is worth while to note some of this legislation specifically.

The Unemployment Insurance Acts of 1940 and 1955 as later amended give employees financial protection against involuntary unemployment. In Quebec province in 1943 a Compulsory Education Act abolished school fees and provided free textbooks to pupils. The Family Allowances Act of 1944 provides for monthly federal payments to the mothers of all children under the age of sixteen years born in Canada or resident in Canada for at least one year, and attending school as required by the laws of the province in which they reside and are maintained by the parents. The National Housing Acts of 1944 and 1954 as later amended were designed to encourage the construction of dwellings for sale or rent, and recently they have been made to provide sanctions against builders who discriminate socially against prospective buyers. The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act in April 1957 made federal grants-in-aid available to the provinces to assist them in operating publicly administered insurance plans for general hospital care. At this date of writing all ten provinces have entered the scheme.

In less than ten years seven provinces and the Government of Canada enacted laws that require employers to pay women the same wages they pay men for comparable work. Similarly, Acts prohibiting discrimination in gainful employment, in trade union membership and in public accommodation (such as hotels, restaurants, barber shops and theatres) on grounds of race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry or place of origin have been put in effect by federal authorities and by six of the ten provincial governments. Ontario had a Racial Discrimination Act in 1944, and Saskatchewan had a Bill of Rights Act in 1947. These were followed in later years by more specific legislation concerning discrimination in employment and in public accommodation. Racial covenants in real estate transactions were outlawed in Ontario and Manitoba in 1950.[27]

In 1948 the British Columbia franchise was extended to Canadians of East Indian and Chinese origins. (In fact, a Chinese Canadian war veteran now sits as Conservative Member of Parliament for Vancouver Centre.) Also, in 1948, clauses in the Federal Elections Act that discriminated against the same classes of Canadian in British Columbia were removed. In July 1960 Canadian Indians were granted the right to vote without having to surrender their various treaty rights. In August 1960 a Canadian Bill of Rights went into effect which lists certain 'human rights and fundamental

[27] The information in this paragraph and the one following is derived from various issues of *Information and Comment*, Canadian Jewish Congress, Montreal, dating from issue number 6 in 1947.

freedoms' which 'shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex'.

At the time of writing the Quebec Legislature had before it a Bill to provide to Quebec mothers ten dollars per month for ten months of each year, not taxable, for each student aged 16 or 17 years. This is to encourage parents to keep their children in school longer than they do at present.

Terms of the Fair Accommodation Practices Act of Ontario were extended in May 1961 to include the rental of premises in buildings with more than six apartment units.

This casual survey of welfare legislation brings us to the early spring of 1961. Legislation has not stopped there, but a reader may be convinced without further evidence that improvements in the position of the Canadian Negro can be properly understood only with reference to improvements in the well-being of the whole nation. The financial difficulties of raising children have been eased for him as well as for others, and the same is true of worries about involuntary unemployment and hospital care. These facts can be expected to produce a favourable result generally in the economic, educational and mental condition of future Canadian Negroes.

The wind of change has blown through business offices, banks and stores, as well as through parliamentary chambers. In Montreal, for instance, all five of the English department stores employ coloured men and women in a variety of occupations. One of them employs twenty or twenty-five Negroes in many categories of help, including that of sales clerk. Recently the director of personnel training in that store said to me, grinning, 'Remember that—(proper name)—I told you about? He starts with us next Monday. Everybody's excited.' He rubbed his hands gleefully and laughed. The Negro in question had worked for twenty years in a responsible post in another corporation before deciding to try his luck with this company.

In August 1960 a Montreal Negro applied to an industrial firm for employment and its chief accountant telephoned me for information about the applicant's background. He said: 'You know, integration, desegregation and all that sort of thing; we want to do our share.' The young man, of whom I knew nothing, was hired. The following month an executive of a very powerful corporation telephoned to ask if I could recommend to him some coloured girls for employment. He explained that the coloured girls at present under his authority were 'eminently satisfactory' high school graduates, but not many of them were bilingual; the company's customers were seventy-five to eighty per cent French. The interesting thing about this request was that an officer of that same corporation was approached in 1941 by a white Y.M.C.A. secretary who asked that he should employ a coloured person.

The officer's reply was that it was 'out of the question' to employ even one Negro.

It is worth mentioning that the improved position of Negroes, though substantial when compared with that of a generation ago, does not seem remarkable when compared with the social and economic gains of other ethnic groups through the same period. In the last twenty years the social advancement of Italians, Greeks, Armenians, Jews and French-Canadians—to mention only a few culture groups—has been spectacular.

Conclusion

This has been a short account of the efforts of a people to be law-abiding Canadian citizens since the middle of the nineteenth century. Many learned articles not touched on here describe their history. In metropolitan cities the social characteristics of Negroes have changed markedly in their favour through one or two generations but in some districts, notably in the Atlantic Provinces, coloured populations live even now in a backward state economically, educationally and culturally. In a number of communities many have made places for themselves in the middle ranks, though it is sad to note that a second World War was needed to speed the process. In recent years pictures of coloured newly-weds and of mixed couples have graced the society page of at least one metropolitan daily newspaper. This would have been unthinkable fifteen years ago, even although the record shows that Canadian popular opinion is divided on racial issues and always has been so.

Crime and dependency are brilliantly portrayed by Hill in his doctoral study of Toronto Negroes in the 1950s. In that work he devotes about ten thousand words to a discussion, with case histories, of the noticeable number of men and women who have married out of the coloured group in recent years. We note also that orphans of mixed racial origin are numerous and difficult to place in foster homes or in adoption, and that an *Open Door Society* has been formed in Montreal, composed of white couples who have legally adopted children of this kind.

A survey of occupational change among Montreal Negroes from 1941 to 1948 made it clear that a class of Jew played a significant part in providing opportunities for their upward mobility in employment. A generation or two earlier this intermediary role in Montreal seems to have been played more by Englishmen and Scots newly arrived in Canada and still governed by evangelical convictions concerning the brotherhood of man. (The Irish were Catholic and were still, on the whole, far down the social ladder.) In an ideal study, the attitudes of various classes of Jew would be compared with—let us say—the racial attitudes of corresponding classes of French-Canadian. Similarly, new Canadians' racial attitudes would be compared with those of more settled Canadians. In this

way some light might be thrown on the process of Negro adjustment in Canada.

Studies are needed now which will focus on the types of coloured immigrant admitted since 1945 and the varieties of their adjustment to Canadian life. The occupational careers of longer-settled Negroes from the Atlantic Provinces west to British Columbia should be recorded, with some attention to details such as recruitment, membership in voluntary associations and occupational duties. One might ask: How great is the Negro's economic success? To what extent is economic success followed by assimilation into the ranks of cultivated people—by accumulations of books, attendance at symphony concerts, ballet performances, art exhibitions? How many make fortunes in the stock market? Also to be studied are the effects of scholastic and economic success on family solidarity.

The general tendency is for Negroes to be absorbed into white communities; but as poor and lonely foreign coloured students increase in universities across Canada their difficulties may becloud the adjustments between settled elements of the Negro and white populations.

BLACK MUSLIMS: A NATIVISTIC RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT AMONG NEGRO AMERICANS[1]

WILLIAM A. SHACK

The religious rationale conceived by the Negro of his destiny in a changing American society, a century or more ago, has been aptly stated by the historian W. E. B. DuBois. He wrote: 'To most of the four million black folk emancipated by civil war, God was real. They knew him. They had met him personally in many a wild orgy of religious frenzy, or in the black stillness of the night. His plan for them was clear; they were to suffer and be degraded, and then afterwards by Divine edict, raised to manhood and power; and so on January 1, 1863, He made them free.'[2]

Since then, this rationale has been profoundly changed. Many Negroes have argued that religion is not necessary for the securing of equitable rewards, nor is it effective. Others, like the Black Muslims, whom this paper concerns, have rejected Christianity; to them Christianity is a religion of the 'Slavemasters', propagated specifically to construct, then to reinforce and finally to rationalise the dominant-white, Negro-subordinate socio-economic class-status system. Islam, as interpreted by the Prophet, leader of the Black Muslims, provides a religious basis for readjusting this status system to accord with his ideal concept of society.

In this paper, the social and economic background against which the Nation of Islam, the religious community of the Black Muslims, came into existence, is discussed first. Then the 'nativistic'[3] aspects of the ideology of the group, as manifested in its religious beliefs and activities, are examined; finally, a comparison is made between the factors giving rise to the Black Muslims and those giving rise to other independent religious movements elsewhere.

The Socio-Religious Background

In the Great Migration, between 1914 to 1918, of Negroes from the poverty-stricken rural towns and urban cities—all taking flight from oppression in the South to a Promised Land of Freedom in the

[1] This is a revised version of a paper read in a Seminar on Religion and Sect Formation, conducted by Professor I. Schapera, at the London School of Economics. Grateful acknowledgment is due to Professor Schapera and to members of the Seminar who offered many useful comments on this paper. This paper was written while the Author held a predoctoral Ford Foundation Fellowship.

[2] W. E. B. DuBois, *Black Reconstruction*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p. 124.

[3] The term is used in this paper as it is defined by Linton to describe movements which perpetuate selected aspects of culture through apocalyptic or messianic doctrines. See R. Linton, 'Nativistic Movements', *American Anthropologist*, LXV, April–June 1943, pp. 230–40. Cf. also Marion W. Smith, 'Towards a classification of Cult Movements', *Man*, 1952, p. 2.

North—the Negro clergy were included. With the establishment of the Negro church in the North, the pulpit again became what it had been in the South, the symbol of leadership, and the structure in which it was housed served as a shelter against a hostile white world. Even the larger white denominations, the Baptists and the Methodists, to which Negro churches belonged, tended to look upon these churches as a field for 'home mission work'.

The struggle for existence against competing secular institutions for the mass support of the many disillusioned Negroes who had made the great trek north, and now found themselves unable to rise in the urban social and economic class structure, compelled the Negro church to shift its emphasis. It became a 'race institution' rather than a purely 'religious institution', and as protest organisations Negro churches have always been associated in the popular mind with 'racial advancement'.[4]

In the Negro church, the patterns of religious behaviour reflect to a great extent the different social and economic classes which it serves. There is an almost complete secularisation of worship among the upper and middle classes. In sharp contrast is the search for salvation and the expiation of sin among the lower class, who look upon the possession of worldly goods as a necessary part of the ritual cleansing. This class is numerically the largest among urban Negroes; the religious theme, leaned upon heavily by the lower-class ministers serving them, is 'advancing the race'. It is interwoven into the prayers recited in 'Temple' rituals and consulting oracles addressed by the many Priests and Priestesses who, as Evangelists, Prophets and Messiahs, comprise an essential element of the lower-class religious world. Together with the Spiritualists, with their numerous wayside shrines, they offer to the masses a paradoxical theology of despair and hope.[5]

During the Great Depression several prominent 'prophets' of religious cults appeared, soon gaining a considerable following among the lower classes. In a revolt against orthodoxy, the doctrines and rituals of these cults emphasised the racial qualities of the communicants almost to the exclusion of any preoccupation with the Deity, the Christ, or the Trinity.[6] It was also in this period that the Islamic cult founded by the Prophet W. D. Fard, later known as the Nation of Islam, was first heard of. But before turning to a description of this, the messianic doctrine of the *Moorish Science Temple of America*, a cult originating from the visionary experiences

[4] H. Cayton, and St. Clair Drake, *Black Metropolis*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944, p. 398.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 642.

[6] I use the term 'cult' here loosely to mean an independent religious group characterised by not being derived from a parent body; by 'sect' I mean the opposite of this. For purposes of this paper, the ritual and doctrinaire characteristics of cults and sects are not considered important. A succinct description of religious cults among Negroes during the depression years is given by A. H. Fausett, *Black Gods of the Metropolis*, University Park, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944.

of Noble Drew Ali,[7] in 1913, will be described, because it is the background for understanding a similar version of it, originating from the visions of Prophet Fard.

The First Coming of the Prophet

From the description given by Fausett, the doctrine preached by Prophet Drew can be summed up as follows. First, the theme of salvation stressed that hope for the Negroes lay in the discovery of their national origin. They were told to give up calling themselves, and refuse to be called, Negroes, black folk, coloured people or Ethiopians, and be known instead as 'Asiatics, Moors or Moorish-Americans'. Implicit in this notion was the rejection of Christianity and identification with a 'past' in which the white world played no part.

Secondly, the moral teachings compiled in the Prophet's scriptures pronounced strict religious taboos on eating, drinking, smoking, social activities, sex indulgence, marriage and divorce, for all of these were held to contribute to the Negroes' suffering, socially and economically. While adherence to these ritual restraints tended to maintain the socio-religious endogamous character of the group, the fact that 'Temple' meetings were barred to whites entirely, and non-Moorish Negroes were admitted cautiously, bestowed on the group an element of secrecy and exclusiveness.

Finally, in the millennium envisaged by the Moors Negroes were to be totally free of white domination. Members of the cult, all of whom possessed a 'nationality and identification card', and wore fezzes as an outward symbol of Islamic identity, believed that the mere sight of this card would be sufficient to restrain a white man who was bent on disturbing or harming its holder. They also believed that 'a sign, a star within a crescent moon, had been seen in the heavens, and that this betokened the arrival of the day of the Asiatics, and the destruction of the . . . whites'.[8] These beliefs led the Moors to treat white folks with open contempt and accost them on the streets 'singing praises of their prophet because he had freed them from the curse of white domination'.[9]

The decline of the activities of the cult and its eventual collapse were due to both internal and external factors. The latter are a direct result of conflicts between the Moors, and the white community and the authorities. Internal strife took various forms; the struggle for leadership and power; the exploitation of members through the sales of herbs, magical charms, potions and literature, from which several leaders grew rich; the slaying of one of the leaders, for which Noble Drew Ali was charged and detained, but died before standing trial. Upon the death of Drew his followers split into numerous

[7] Originally named Timothy Drew, born in North Carolina. The cult founded in Newark, New Jersey, spread to Chicago, where it flourished and later collapsed.
[8] Fausett, *op cit.*, p. 42.
[9] *Ibid.*

sects. Some now claim to follow the spirit of the Prophet, others that they follow the reincarnation of Ali, their present leader claiming to be the former Prophet returned to earth in another body.[10]

The racial catholicity of Islam still appealed to many old followers of Drew, and, as we shall now see, they were attracted by a similar doctrine preached by the Prophet W. D. Fard.

The New Prophet and the Nation of Islam

The mythological charter held by the Nation of Islam relates Prophet Fard to the Hashemite Sherrif dynasty of Mecca. Coming from the same tribe (Koreish) of Muhammad the Prophet, Fard is said to have dispossessed himself of all worldly goods to enable him to bring 'freedom, justice and equality' to his 'uncle'; in the cult ritual, 'the black men in the wilderness of North America' are symbolically referred to as the 'uncle of Mr. Fard'. Accordingly, the Prophet envisaged his 'uncle' surrounded and completely robbed by the 'cave men', i.e. the white men.

This rejection of worldly possessions apparently explains why the Prophet first appeared in 1930, as a hawker of silken cloth said to have come from the East. Proselytising activities began with 'teaching' small groups of recent Negro migrants to Detroit (Michigan) their 'true' religion, names and birthplaces. Those who listened were told to abandon Christianity and their Christian names. These, the Prophet taught, were responsible for the ill-health and discomforts suffered by many Negro migrants unaccustomed to the cold northern winters; and above all, Christianity was responsible for their economic plight. This message had wide appeal. Within four years of the Prophet's ministry, eight thousand Negroes heard the call and became members of the Nation of Islam.[11]

The conception of a world differing from the world as it is and approaching more nearly to what a world ought to be is characteristic of most prophetic cults. The ideal world conceived by Prophet Fard was in line with the social and economic expectations of his following, who could bring about the new millennium by specific secular and ritual practices.

In the secular field, the command over economic resources and the revitalisation of 'Negro culture' were held to be essential in the plan for world renewal. An economic buttress against the misfortunes and disappointments experienced in the present world was built up by small collective enterprises established under the leadership of the Prophet. The pecuniary rewards which obtained from these communal efforts were said to be a favour of Allah. In preparation for the new millennium, symbols of the white man's culture

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[11] For a discussion of the Prophet and his early missionary efforts see E. D. Beynon, 'The Voodoo Cult Among Negro Migrants in Detroit', *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII, 6, May 1938, pp. 894–907.

were, in so far as it was practical, discarded, and in their place cultural and historical symbols of the Black African civilisations, and of the Negro in America, were revived and greatly emphasised.

Ritual activities, unlike economic ones, were a personal responsibility. To make the world as it ought to be, sanctification of the Prophet was necessary, and this was conceived to be the religious duty of his following. 'He taught explicitly that it was the duty of every Muslim to offer as sacrifice four Caucasian devils in order that he might return to his home in Mecca.'[12] This notwithstanding, there is no evidence that any whites were ever sacrificed, for it seems that the Prophet himself was not clear as to how the 'devils' could be obtained. But several incidents of human sacrifice of Negroes are reported to have occurred in cult rituals, between 1932 and 1937. In the last sacrifice recorded, one of the cult ministers was arrested as he prepared for the 'ceremonial slaying and cooking of his wife and daughter; a sacrifice which was to have cleansed him from all sin.'[13]

At the time when human sacrificing was not unusual, Prophet Fard disappeared. This mysterious disappearance, sometime in June 1934, has contributed enormously to the cult's mythology, which claims that he was supernaturally endowed. He is believed, presumably, to have returned to 'Mecca'.[14] Meanwhile, his deification, the perpetuation of his teachings, and the bringing together of schismatic elements within the cult, which was then beginning to spread geographically at a steady pace, occurred under the leadership of Elijah Muhammad, who inherited from Fard the title of 'Prophet'.[15]

In consequence of the leadership of Fard, the efforts of the Nation of Islam to construct a more satisfying culture reached two stages, namely: the reformulation of diffused socio-cultural elements of the subsystem; and the identification of social benefits definable in some new cultural system with the revelation of the Prophet. The other stages in the process of revitalisation were achieved under the leadership of Elijah Muhammad: he crystallised the organisation of the 'Nation' by conversions, convincing rational arguments, inducements through crowd situations, and expediency and opportunity; and he provided the strategies of adaptation by which the original doctrine could be continuously modified to comply with contemporary conditions.[16]

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 903.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 904.

[14] See the Appendix to this paper.

[15] The fullest description of the Nation of Islam under its present leader Elijah Muhammad is given by C. Eric Lincoln, *Black Muslims in America*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1961. No figures exist on the size of its membership, but it is estimated to number about 250,000; there are sixty-nine Muslim Temples in various parts of America where Negroes are heavily concentrated. For some aspects of change in Muslim Negro family organisation see W. A. Shack, *Social Changes in an Isolated Negro Community* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago 1957).

[16] 'Prophetic cults', 'cargo cults', or 'messianic movements', all seem to follow a similar 'processual structure' in adapting to the existing social system. We have shown only part of that process analysed by Anthony F. C. Wallace, 'Revitalisation Movements', *American Anthropologist*, LVIII, 2, April 1956, pp. 264–81.

The transformation from a magical-religious, loosely organised cult, into a tightly-knit socio-political movement underpinned by a rational-religious structure is a consequence of several inter-related religious, economic, and political factors. Of these, the charismatic qualities of Muhammad, 'The Messenger of Allah', stand foremost, for under his mantle, Muslim political strength and economic resources were organised and given direction. Although their political power is at the moment latent, their economic power is being engaged in a Negro-Muslim communal trade programme of 'buying black'; the initial phase of a twofold plan to effect, first, a complete economic withdrawal from the white community, and second, the establishment of a separate 'State' in America for the Nation of Islam. The land demanded for the creation of the new state is to be payment partly for the 300 years in which Negroes were slaves, and partly for the 100 years after emancipation in which the Negroes laboured as 'free slaves'.

An enormous part in this transformation of the cult was played by the Prophet's reinterpretation of the Holy *Qur'an*. His version, often called 'The Message of Islam', provides not only a religious rationale for past and contemporary social conditions, but also a strict moral code, backed by ritual sanctions, which gives spiritual meaning to the Muslim way of life. The deviations and doctrinaire differences from orthodox Islam, characteristic of most sects, are of no relevance to the Prophet. Indeed, few Muslims can read the *Qur'an*; its ritual function is wholly symbolic, validating the words of the Prophet and the repeated calling upon Allah. The '*Qur'an*' compiled by the Prophet, *The Supreme Wisdom: The Solution to the So-Called Negroes Problem*,[17] comprises the ideological core of the movement, providing a scriptural basis for the ritual condemnation of the white world which is essential to the Muslim doctrine.

A summary of the important passages of Muhammad's message, in shortened verbatim quotations, is appended to this paper. Its essential themes can be stated thus. First, the religious and moral code is an expression of the Muslim way as evidenced in the 'pillars' of Islam: the confession of faith (which is implied in the rejection of Christianity and the 'slave name'), ritual prayer, fasting (one meal a day), and almsgiving. Secondly, the restraints on social and sexual activities are a symbolic condemnation of the white world, which is held to be responsible for the ills of everyday life. Thirdly, the coming of the millennium is to be brought about through rational, rather than ritual, practices. Fourthly, religious, economic and political salvation are attainable only through a revitalisation of Negro culture. Finally, there is the theme of peace and goodwill to the faithful elect.

The consciousness of a past culture, though few attempts are made to revive it; the techniques evoked for the perpetuation of selected

[17] Elijah Muhammad, *The Supreme Wisdom*, Chicago, University of Islam Press, 1957.

aspects of their current culture; and the opposition to assimilation into the society which surrounds them, are the main forms in which 'perpetuative nativism' are expressed by the Muslim group. They believe themselves to be members of the 'lost-found Nation of Islam', which was rediscovered by the coming of the Prophet. The symbolic identification with the glorious past, its reconstruction being of import to the 'Nation', occurs through the ritual rebirth of a Muslim convert, commemorated as he drops his surname and is known simply by his given name and the letter 'X'. The symbol 'X' repudiates the white man's name and announces the rebirth of the Black Man, endowed with a set of qualities unknown to the white man. The explanation given by a Muslim minister is that 'X' is for mystery; the mystery confronting the Negro as to who he was before the white man made him a slave and put a European label on him. That mystery is now resolved. But 'X' is also for the mystery confronting the white man as to what the Negro has become.[18]

To sum up, the following notions are implicit in the beliefs held by the Black Muslims: 1. the present world is divided into 'black-good'—'white-evil' forces which are in opposition; 2. the discomforts of everyday life are a consequence of the teachings of Christianity; 3. social, political, and economic salvation is sought in this world, here and now; 4. Islam is the 'original' religion of the black man denied him through a long history of slavery under the guise of Christianity; 5. rebirth returns the Negro to his 'original' uncontaminated good-self; sins committed by him as a Christian are at once absolved.

Conclusions

The more dynamic aspects of the Muslim doctrine, which have become the centre of considerable controversy, have not been discussed here. These issues have been adequately outlined by Lincoln, to whose study we have referred. We suggest, however, that the articulation of Muslim beliefs and behaviour, such as the regeneration of the Negro-self, the rebirth of converts, the revival of moribund elements of Negro culture, and the opposition to racial assimilation, contributes toward strengthening the racial aspects of the Muslim doctrine; and these forms of racial extremism underlie the conflicts between Muslims and the wider community. This, more than the irrational millenary aspects of their doctrine, causes great concern to whites and to some Negroes as well. On the other hand, conflicts tend to increase internal solidarity, and at the same time to attract round the core of the movement a substantial number of non-Muslim Negroes who agree with its aims.

The social and cultural stresses already mentioned, and the extent to which these symbolise the existence of the group as a separate entity, are manifestations of 'rational revivalistic' and 'rational

[18] Lincoln, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

perpetuative' forms of nativism. The common denominator of both types of nativistic expression, with the Black Muslims, as with other groups, is the inequality of the societies in contact. The desires of the adherents of the Melanesian Cargo Cults[19] to throw out the Europeans so that they may again be masters of their fate, and to recapture unity and common endeavour and re-establish the dignity of their group, are similarly inherent in the Muslim ideology. These aims underlie the 'solution to the so-called Negroes problem'.

The inability of the vast majority of Negroes to obtain what the dominant society has defined as the ordinary economic and social satisfactions of life is manifest in their widespread and extended lack of them. This bears a direct relationship to the emergence of the Nation of Islam. One form which these inequalities take is in the ethos of the Black Metropolises. It is an ethos rent by despair. Deprivation has been experienced at its worst by lower-class Negroes and they are the predominant adherents of the Message of Muhammad. Yet not all of them are attracted to the Movement. A considerable number of 'middle-class' Negroes are, if not actual cult members, at least converted to the principles held by the cult of altering the socio-economic class-status system made rigid by the dominant white *status quo*. Space does not permit further elaboration of these facts, but in assessing the relevance of the deprivation concept to the foregoing discussion, two important considerations can be put forward. The first is that Negroes embraced the Movement mainly after the Great Migration, during the depression years, and in the years after the Second World War. The second is that the unstable economic condition of the Negro, a corollary of the same periods of economic strain—when the Negro standard was never at any time equal to that of the whites—is positively correlated with the rise and decline of the proselytising effectiveness of the sect.

Although the extent to which wants and the means to satisfy them are correlated, in determining the relative magnitude of deprivation, is important, too great an emphasis should not be placed on economic factors.[20] For the Nation of Islam has served a wider purpose than the solely economic, as shown by the continued adherence of members to the Movement even when most of their wants and needs had been, at least relatively, satisfied. We submit that though the lack of the possession of goods is an important factor of deprivation and its relationship to the manifold forms of social unrest which gave rise to the Movement, the social and psychological aspects are of equal importance, for these seem to have persisted long after economic disparity had diminished. But how to elicit a satisfactory answer to the question why certain lower-class individuals join the sect and others do not, is yet to be discovered. It can only be said that the cult has an emotional appeal to individuals who share a

[19] Ian Hogbin, *Social Change*, London, Watt, 1958, p. 233.
[20] An example of this is given by R. Firth, 'The Theory of " Cargo Cults ": A Note on Tikopia', *Man*, September 1955, p. 142.

common set of human experiences, and provides for some individuals verbal, rather than direct, outlets for aggression.

Finally, independent religious movements, widely separated goegraphically, have been classified, in one way, according to their world-view ideology. The Ghost Dance, with its complete rejection of the new world, has been contrasted with the eagerness for participation in it represented by the 'Cargo Cults'. A further distinction has been drawn between the Ghost Dance and religious movements in the South Pacific and in Africa, where developments among the Bantu African show a rational understanding of the social situation. Here, as with the Black Muslims, the millenary element plays a relatively small part, and in other ways, as in the struggle for power, and the moral teachings of the Prophet, they parallel the Bantu Prophet Cults in South Africa. In both situations 'religious organisations', as Mair has said, 'will be formed in circumstances where other types of organisation are liable to be suppressed; their significance then is as much in the expression of internal solidarity and differentiation from other social groups as in the emotional appeal of their doctrine'.[21]

APPENDIX

This text of Muslim beliefs is not to be considered inclusive. If it is difficult to follow, this is due partly to the abstract form in which the text is here presented, and partly to the unorthodox way in which the Prophet's message is expressed. For a better comprehension, one must consult *The Supreme Wisdom: The Solution to the So-Called Negroes Problem*, from which the appended material has been drawn.

The Creed

> Allah came to us from the Holy City of Mecca, Arabia, in 1930. He came alone. Regardless of our sins that we have committed in following and obeying our slavemasters, Allah will forgive us if we (the so-called Negroes) turn to Him and return to our own kind. Allah taught us the Knowledge of ourselves, of Himself (god) and the devil, the Measurement of the Earth, other Planets and Civilisations of some of the Planets other than Earth. He measured and weighed the Earth and its water, (and taught us these) and the history of the Moon, and the history of the two nations that dominate the earth, black and white. He gave us information as to the exact birth of the white race and the name of their God who made them, and how, and the end of their time. Also, the Judgment, how it would begin and end. He taught us the truth of how we were made slaves, and how we are kept in slavery by the slavemasters' children. Allah

[21] L. P. Mair, 'Independent Religious Movements in Three Continents', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. I, 2, January 1959, p. 134.

declared the doom of America, for her evils to us it was past due, and that she is number one to be destroyed, but her judgment could not take place until we (the so-called Negroes) hear the truth.

Allah told us that the slavemasters had taught us to eat the wrong food, and that this wrong food was the cause of our sickness and short span of life. He declared that he would heal us, and sit us in Heaven at once if we would submit to Him; otherwise He would chastise us with a severe chastisement until we submit. He would make a new people out of us who submit to Him by causing us to grow a new growth, not an entirely new body but a reversal of the old decayed body into a new growth. And there will be no decay in this new growth of life. Allah's greatest teaching and warning to us (the so-called Negroes) is: *Be Yourself.*

From the first day that the white race received the Divine Scripture they started tampering with its truth to make it suit themselves and blind the black man. It is their nature to do evil and the book cannot be recognised as the pure and Holy Word of God. [The Bible] has poisoned the very hearts and minds of the so-called Negroes so much that they can't agree with each other. The Bible charges all of its greatest Prophets with evil, it makes God guilty of an act of adultery by charging Him with being the father of Mary's baby (Jesus); again it charges Noah and Lot with drunkenness and Lot with getting children by his daughter. What a poison book.

We, being robbed so thoroughly of the Knowledge of self and kind, are opposed to our own salvation in favour of our enemies. [The Bible teaches] love your enemies, bless them who curse you, pray for those who spitefully use you, him that smiteth thee on one cheek offer the other cheek, him that taketh away the cloak, forbid not to take thy coat also. The slavemaster could not have found a better teaching for their protection against the slaves' dissatisfaction of their master's brutal treatment.

Christianity is a religion organised and backed by the devils for the purpose of making slaves of black mankind. Our first step is to give back to the white man his religion, Christianity, church and his names. These three are chains of slavery that hold us in bondage to them. We are free only when we give up the above three.

Allah has warned us how He would (one day) destroy the world with bombs, poison gas and finally fire that would consume and destroy everything of the present world. Not anything of it (the present world of white mankind) would be left. Those escaping the destruction would not be allowed to take anything of it out with them. Allah (has) pointed out to us a dreadful looking planet that is made like a wheel in the sky today. It is a half-mile by a half-mile square; it is a human built planet . . . it is up there and can be seen twice a week. Ezekiel saw it a long time ago.

The slavemasters' children are doing everything in their power

to prevent the so-called Negroes from accepting their own God and salvation, by putting on a great show of false love and friendship. This is being done through 'integration' as it is called, that is, so-called Negroes and whites mixing together, such as in schools, churches, and even intermarriage, and this the poor slaves really think that they are entering a condition of heaven with their former slaveholders, but it will prove to be their doom. Today, according to God's word, we are living in a time of great separation between the blacks and whites. The prophesied 400 years of slavery—that we the so-called Negroes would have to serve (the white) people—ended in 1955. The so-called Negroes must now return to their own; nothing else will solve their problem. The separation would be a blessing for both sides.

The history of this man Jesus has been greatly misunderstood by us, the so-called Negroes. John Hawkins brought our forefathers here (from Africa) on a ship named Jesus. But our foreparents did not know at that time it would be 400 years from that day before the real ship (God Himself) [the Prophet] would come and get them and their children and cut loose every link of the slave chain that holds us in bondage to our slave-masters by giving us a true knowledge of self, God and the devil. The end of the world has arrived and most of us know it, and our enemy's greatest desire is that we remain asleep.

Allah rejoiced over us and was . . . happy that He had found us —the lost Nation of Islam in the wilderness of North America. [He] has taught us that we the so-called Negroes are the original people of the earth who have no birth record. Peace and happiness [cannot] come to us under any other flag but our own. If God desires for us such joy, why shouldn't we give up begging and be real men, and sit with the rulers of the earth, ruling our own?

America is the Babylon of today. [She] committed suicide when she brought the so-called Negroes from their native land and into slavery. This can't be forgiven her, though the so-called Negroes would gladly forgive for promise of social equality. But it is not left to the slave to forgive his master.

The Great Mahdi [who came from the Holy City of Mecca, Arabia, in 1930] is indeed the most wise and powerful being on earth (God in person). It is He who with a strong voice announced the immediate doom of America. [He] said to us that there is no punishment great enough to repay the slave-masters for their evils against the so-called Negroes in America. He also said that this country is filled with devils and every kind of evil. His voice was strong and mighty, and to everyone who believed and accepted the True Religion (Islam) he gave a holy name of Allah's. Every word that he said is true. He came for the salvation of the so-called Negroes, warning them to join on their own kind (the Nation of Islam).

RACE AND NATIONALITY IN EUROPE*

JAN CZEKANOWSKI

It is characteristic of the European peoples that, while they have strong feelings of ethnic separateness, they have no real consciousness of the different racial strains that are found amongst them. Moreover, these feelings of ethnic separateness take an entirely different form in the West, the East and in Central Europe. Central Europeans regard it as perfectly obvious that a person's nationality should be determined by his mother tongue—an attitude which we may call *linguistic nationalism*. With this often goes the brutal imposition of the language of the dominant national group with the aid of legislation and bans on the use of the minority group's mother tongue at public meetings and in schools; attempts may even be made to beat it out of the children, as in the Prussia of Wilhelm II.

In the West, on the other hand, nationality is determined by citizenship, so that we find what may be termed *passport nationalism*. For example, before the First World War, the French authorities could not understand why Polish exiles and migrants made such vigorous protests when the police noted the nationality of those with Imperial Russian passports as 'Russian'. In the Italian-language domain both the linguistic and the civic conceptions of nationality were to be found in different districts. In Piedmont and Corsica nationality was identified with citizenship. The French-speaking population of the Alpine valleys regarded themselves as Italians, while the Corsicans, who speak an Italian dialect, regarded themselves as French. On the other hand, in the province of Veneto, which was under Austrian rule until 1866, nationality was determined by language.

In Eastern Europe and the Balkan states the situation was again different. Here the natives' nationality was associated with religious adherence, a situation which may be called *denominational nationalism*. Roman Catholics generally regarded themselves and were recognised as Poles, members of the Evangelical churches as Germans. One of the achievements of Russian policy was to set Lithuanians against Poles in the Catholic fold and Letts and Estonians against Germans in the Evangelical camp. Nevertheless, those Trans-Volga Germans who were Catholics usually became Polonised when they left their colonies. The denominational character of the Eastern conception of nationality emerged most vividly in the Balkan countries, where members of the Greek Orthodox Church were Serbs, while Roman Catholics were Croats, although there is no corresponding differentiation in the Serbo-Croat language. Lastly, the Muslim Bulgars

* Translated by Sheila Patterson.

(Pomaks) not only regarded themselves as Turks, although they did not speak Turkish, but emigrated to Turkey in great numbers after the proclamation of Bulgarian independence in 1879 and again in 1912. It is curious to note that the older denominational approach to the problem of nationality has survived on the peripheries of the European continent. We find it for instance in the far West, in Ireland, where the mother tongue of the majority of irreconcilable Irish nationalists is still English, while their main link is their shared Roman Catholic faith. Linguistic nationalism, on the other hand, tends to supersede the denominating form as the Bourgeois intelligentsia gains in influence. In Hungary, for instance, this took place after 1848, when the Hungarian tongue of the new Bourgeois intelligensia replaced the Latin spoken by the nobility as the parliamentary language.

The examples just given show that the various nationalisms of Europe, which have been the real dynamos for the turmoil which has shaken the continent over the last century-and-a-half, have three very different aspects: political in the West, linguistic in Central Europe and denominational on the periphery. It should also be stressed that in these European nationalistic conflicts, which have been greatly influenced by economic factors, the racial differentiation of the European population has not played any real or significant part. This is because the anthropological structure of the population runs counter to any such intensification and simplification of these conflicts. Our anthropological map, which is based on the results of quantitative analyses of the contemporary European population, illustrates this point very clearly.

The account of physical 'race relations' in Europe which follows is based on the assumption that the great majority of the European population is the product of the crossing of five racial stocks. The first outline of these basic elements was given by the Polish linguist Laurentius Surowiecki as early as 1824. Only three of the five constituent elements mentioned by Surowiecki were discussed by Paul Broca in his widely-known work which appeared in 1860. In 1882, however, Julius Kollmann published a work accepting Surowiecki's synthesis with the modification of only one element, and it thus became the foundation of the work currently being done by Polish anthropologists and based on the results of the application of quantitative criteria. This work owes much to a detailed knowledge of British biometrical studies, the main quantitative achievement of which in the field of genetics were the deductions drawn from the Mendelian laws.[1]

The studies of the racial composition of the European population

[1] J. Czekanowski, *Les lois de Mendel et de Galton et les coéfficients de l'hérédité de Pearson, Revue Générale des Sciences Pures et Appliquées*, 1921, XXXII, pp. 671-5; *Mendelistisches' 'Law of Ancient Heredity', Zeitschrift für induktive Abstammungs—und Vererbungslehre*, 1933, vol. LXIV, pp. 154-168.

that have been carried out during the past century indicate that the ollowing main elements are involved:—

1. *Nordic:* tall, fair pigmentation, narrow face, thin nose, dolichocephalic.
2. *Mediterranean:* short stature, dark pigmentation, long face, thin nose, dolichocephalic.
3. *Armenoid:* medium stature, very dark pigmentation, face of medium breadth, brachycephalic with head flattened at back, extremely thin and prominent nose.
4. *Lapponoid*[2]*:* short stature, dark pigmentation, rather broad nose, broad face, brachycephalic with head rounded at back.
5. *Palaeo-European* (*Cromagnon type*)*:* light pigmentation, broad face, broad nose, dolichocephalic.

This clear and simple classification of the fundamental racial components of the European population is the product of the method of quantitative analysis. The employment of this method has made it possible to demonstrate that all the physical anthropologists concerned have in effect been attempting to distinguish the same elements. The chaos which was said to prevail in anthropological theory was, in fact, caused by the fact that a number of competent anthropologists were designating the above components by their own terms, without regard to the fact that the elements had been described under other names by their predecessors. Julius Kollmann drew attention to this practice nearly eighty years ago.

It emerged, moreover, that the differences in the number of components distinguished by various researchers have resulted from the fact that some confined themselves to the basic racial elements while others also distinguished some, but not necessarily all, of their first-degree crosses. For instance, it is generally agreed that there is a compromising divergence between the schemes drawn up by Joseph Deniker in 1898 and W. Z. Ripley in 1900. Both schemes were based on the same field material, the result of a century's researches, but one distinguished up to ten European races while the other retained the old threefold classification. When Deniker presented his scheme in the Huxley Memorial Lecture for 1904 the discussion that followed failed to elucidate the true nature of this divergence, which was the reverse of a tribute to the anthropological methodology of the time. It was only after more than twenty years had passed that the Polish anthropological school was able, by using the method of quantitative racial analysis, to show that Deniker and Ripley had, without realising it, reached conclusions which were basically in agreement. Ripley confined himself to three basic racial elements, but he included both brachycephalic elements in his 'Alpine' race and he also failed to include the Palaeo-European

[2] The 'Alpine race' found in the terminology of some physical anthropologists in reality embraces the two brachycephalic elements—the Lapponoid and the Armenoid —together with their hybrid.

element which is today found in significant numbers only in North-East Europe. Deniker, on the other hand, did not differentiate the Armenoid element from the Dinaric race, which is the result of Armenoid-Nordic mixture; he did, however, recognise the Palaeo-European element and the first-degree crosses of the four remaining components.

After this elucidation of the true basis of the divergences between the schemes of Deniker and Ripley it became clear that the later schemes of H. F. K. Günther (1921), Egon von Eickstedt (1934) and Renato Biasutti (1940-59) are only modifications of Deniker's classification, differing mainly as to the names which they give to the different races. In the later editions of his work Günther gradually increased the total of races, thereby moving further away from Ripley and towards Deniker's scheme; this evolution was the result of an increased mastery of field-work material which led to the introduction, hitherto unconsidered, of first-degree hybrids.

Our map distinguishes the following anthropological conformations:—

1. *Nordic-Littoral type:* territory showing an absolute Nordic majority, with a higher percentage of Mediterraneans than Lapponoids.
2. *Nordic Sub-Littoral type:* relative majority of the Nordic element, with higher percentage of Mediterranean than Lapponoid admixture.
3. *Nordic-Continental type:* absolute majority of the Nordic element, with a higher percentage of Lapponoid than Mediterranean admixture.
4. *Sub-Nordic:* territory showing relative majority of the Nordic element of 40 per cent or more with a higher Lapponoid than Mediterranean percentage.
5. *Sub-Nordic type:* relative majority of the Nordic element, not exceeding 40 per cent; other elements as in 4 above.
6. *Sub-Lapponoid type b:* relative majority of the Lapponoid element, not exceeding 40 per cent.
7. *Sub-Lapponoid type a:* relative majority of the Lapponoid element from 40 to 50 per cent.
8. *Lapponoid:* with an absolute majority of Lapponoid element.
9. *Sub-Armenoid:* with a relative majority of the Armenoid element, falling locally in Switzerland and the Tyrol to the position of the most important minority element.
10. *Armenoid:* with an absolute majority of the Armenoid element.
11. *Mediterranean:* with an absolute majority of the Mediterranean element.
12. Large admixture of the Palaeo-European element accompanying a relative majority of the Nordic race, not falling below 40 per cent.

13. *Mixed Steppe Type:* considerable Palaeo-European admixtures, associated with Nordic majority not falling below 40 per cent.
14. *Sub-Ural:* considerable Palaeo-European and Nordic admixtures associated with Lapponoid majorities.
15. Nordic-Mediterranean Steppe conformation.
16. Demarcation line showing equally-balanced Armenoid and Mediterranean admixtures.
17. Hypothetical Western boundary of traceable admixtures of the Palaeo-European element.
18. Boundaries of the area of the greatest concentration of the Nordic race (80 per cent and over) in Scandinavia.

With the use of Wanke's approximation, which solved the problem of how to make a quantitative analysis of racial structure, our map distinguishes as many as fifteen anthropological conformations. This gives an extremely clear and detailed picture. It does not, however, provide a uniform picture of Europe as a whole, because it presents only the present state of our information as to the anthropological differences found in various parts of the continent. There is as yet no uniform research-network over the entire continent; moreover, the analysis of the materials that are already available is still in progress. Information about smaller territorial units is available for Switzerland (cantons and sub-cantons) and Poland (*powiaty*); and about larger units such as provinces for Finland, Sweden, Norway, Prussia, Italy and the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately these territorial units vary greatly in size and also in many cases in the completeness of the information available. It has therefore been necessary to make some interpolations. In Germany, with the exception of the Kingdom of Prussia, Bavaria and Baden, the former member-states had to be treated as territorial units. On the other hand, the Rumanian data on which the interpolations are based came from unevenly distributed areas. The data from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were more exact, being collected by districts. Unfortunately not all districts were included. Lastly, the French data were taken from the work of F. Keiter, as earlier data for the various departments have not yet been analysed.

The most essential feature of the anthropological structure of the population of Europe lies in the fact that the areas of concentration of its basic elements are on the peripheries of the continent, while the central area is occupied by mixed conformations. This over-all regularity is, however, broken by enclaves formed by the remnants of earlier racial stocks which have not been swept away by later migrations—the anthropological correlates of historical processes.

The anthropological relationships in the Europe of today are the outcome of the profound changes which have occurred in the dozen or so millenia since the Upper Palaeolithic era. For only at this


J. CZEKANOWSKI & P. A. GLOOR
1961
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL MAP OF EUROPE
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BALTIC SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
OSLO
STOCKHOLM
HELSINKI
LENINGRAD
TALLINN
RYGA
MOSKWA
KAZAN
COPENHAGEN
DUBLIN
LONDON
AMSTERDAM
BREMEN
HAMBURG
BERLIN
BRUSSELS
GDYNIA
KALININGRAD
MINSK
WARSZAWA
POZNAŃ
DRESDEN
PRAHA
KIJÓW
PARIS
ORLEANS
LUXEMBURG
BASEL
BERN
WIEN
BUDAPEST
DEBRECZEN
CZERNIOWCE
BORDEAUX
MARSEILLES
BELGRAD
BUKURESCI
SARAGOSSA
MADRID
BARCELONA
ROMA

relatively late period is there proof of an anthropological conformation which has direct affinities with the European population of today.

In the opening period of the Upper Palaeolithic era, associated with the Aurignacian culture, the Mediterranean race appeared in Europe. Presumably the numerical predominance of this race lasted into the Magdalenian period that followed, although by then the Nordic race was also to be found in Europe. The Mediterranean race occupied the southern and Atlantic confines of Europe, since the interior of the continent was an ice-covered desert. And it is in this southern area that the Mediterranean element is most numerous to this day.

The Neolithic epoch, the era of polished stone, saw the expansion of the Mediterranean agricultural cultures. It was probably in association with this movement that the Mediterranean element achieved its maximum ascendancy in the racial composition of the Central European population. This was reflected in the anthropological composition of the earliest waves of the Indo-European expansion, which undoubtedly displayed a decided numerical preponderance of this particular element. This still remained true of the Scythians, who formed a return wave of Indo-Iranian expansion ejected from Asia by the autochthonous Turkish and Mongol peoples. As a result they were back in the steppes of Eastern Europe by the second quarter of the first millenium B.C. The archaic steppe conformation, which was pushed northward between the Volga and the Don by the invasions of nomadic Turkish and Mongol peoples in early historical times, and which stretches south-west as far as Rumania between the Carpathians and the Danube and perhaps to the Aluta river, is undoubtedly a remnant of this old Scytho-Sarmatian area, a remnant that has been transformed on the north-west by Slav colonisation.

At the time of their great expansion into the interior of Asia the anthropological composition of the Indo-Iranian peoples showed a decided predominance of the Mediterranean element. Presumably the earliest North Indo-European peoples possessed a similar anthropological make-up at the period when they became a distinct group in the area of the last glacial retreat (just south of the Baltic). For it is highly probable that the later numerical decrease in the Mediterranean element, which is confirmed over the whole area of Europe north of the Alps, because of its lack of adaptability to the severe northern climate, enabled the more resistant Nordic element to achieve numerical superiority there. This probably happened as early as the last half of the second millenium B.C., because the later waves of Celts, Germans, Balts and Slavs were incontestably Nordic in character. The same was indeed true of the ancient Hellenes, as is borne out by Homer and by Iron Age skulls such as those of the Achaeans found in Cyprus.

As we have already noted, the appearance of the Nordic race in

Europe occurred in the Magdalenian period of the Upper Palaeolithic Age. Today it is concentrated around the Baltic and North Seas and reaches far into Northern Scandinavia. The close association of this race with the last Ice Age in Central Europe is most clearly noticeable in Poland and Germany. The later waves of expansion referred to above did, however, complicate the schematic simplicity of the picture. This emerges most obviously in Switzerland, where a concentration of the Nordic race forms an anthropological enclave left behind by the invasion of the Germanic tribe of the Alemani. In Eastern Europe the Nordic areas are the outcome of the expansion of East Balts and East Slavs, and also of Scandinavian penetration.

The expansion of the East Balts, which took place in the first half of the seventh century B.C., as Herodotus attests with his reference to their forebears, the Neuroi, left an anthropological trace in the concentration of the Nordic element in the upper Dnieper basin. It was only more than a thousand years later, in the second half of the sixth century A.D., that the Eastern Balts began to move towards the coasts of the Baltic under the pressure of the invasion of the Mongol Avars. They did not, however, reach the Baltic area until the beginning of the ninth century A.D. First to arrive were the Letts, who formed a marginal conformation changed by their long contact with the Finns. The Lithuanians arrived still later, possibly only at the beginning of our own millenium.

The expansion of the Eastern Slavs from the Vistula basin began in the middle of the first millenium B.C. and at first took a south-easterly direction. These Slavs were the ancestors of the later Ukrainian people. Their expansion was helped by the aftermath of the Scythian invasion, since the Scythians, after expelling the autochthonous Thracians, needed a labour force to till the fertile steppes and therefore encouraged the Slavs to settle. The Scythians required wheat for trading with the Greeks, to pay for the latter's craft products. These they imported in great quantities, as the evidence of the Scythian kurgans shows. It would seem that the plundering raids which the Scythians made into Slav territories were chiefly aimed at seizing slaves for such work. The Nordic territory of Volhynia is an anthropological trace of this very early phase of Slav expansion.

The next phase of Slav expansion took a north-easterly direction. This is supposed to have started as a result of an attack on the Slavs by the Gothic ruler Hermanaric[3], who ruled the Black Sea steppe area before the Hun invasion of 375 A.D. These Slavs were the ancestors of the Krivichians and Novgorod Slovenes and of the later Northern Great Russians. Starting from the Baltic area, probably in the neighbourhood of the Vistula estuary, they are

[3] See F. Dwornik, *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*, Polish Research Centre' London, 1949.

thought to have passed south of the territory of the Western Balts (East Prussians), already settled in the area with which they have always been associated, and to have passed north-east through the no-man's-land dividing the Western and Eastern Balts. The Nordic territories of North Russia in the area colonised from Great Novgorod and extending as far as the White Sea are a survival of this expansion.

Finally came the third phase of Eastern Slav expansion. This also began from the Vistula basin and is provisionally attributed to the time of Charlemagne. This was the migration of the Radimichian and Viatichian peoples, who were the ancestors of the White Russians and Southern Great Russians. They moved eastward along the northern shore of the Pripet, where settled the Dregovichians, who spoke a related dialect. This Slav wave then pushed the Lithuanians north towards the Baltic and occupied the upper part of the Dnieper basin, the Oka basin and the adjacent area of the Don basin. The anthropological result of this migration was probably only to strengthen the Nordic element in the area of the archaic steppe conformation. For it reached beyond this conformation into areas formerly occupied by East Balts, who belong to the continental Nordic conformation.

The Finns reached the Baltic at about the beginning of the Christian era, when the Germanic peoples already settled there were occupying the Baltic coast lands. These Germans were undoubtedly the Aestii mentioned by ancient writers. South of the Gulf of Finland they were entirely absorbed by the Finns, but in Finland and on the island of Runö in the Gulf of Riga the process is still continuing today with the Swedish inhabitants. This process of assimilation brought about a total transformation in the anthropological composition of the Estonians. They became affiliated to a Nordic conformation of the continental type, while the Nordic littoral conformation survived only in the islands, in small coastal areas and in the Finnish tribe of the Livs. This continentalising process led to the absorption of the autochthonous Lapps of the continent. This is the origin of the continental-type Nordic enclaves in central Finland, in the south-western fringes of Finland and Norway, and also of the altogether puzzling concentration of the Lapponoid element near the northern bend of the River Niemen in the frontier no-man's-land that divided the Eastern and Western Balts. Probably the Lapps were driven there as they retreated southward before successive waves of Finns and Balts moving towards the Baltic. It is in this area that we should place Ptolemy's ' Fenni ' or ' Finnoi ', who were not Finns but Lapps.

The East German wave of expansion which smashed the ancient world order left no mark on anthropological structure. Historical sources and archeological evidence leave it uncertain whether the small enclaves of Nordic littoral type people located on the left

bank of the lower Vistula are vestiges of the Goths' stay in Polish territories or of the Linear Pottery (Danubian I) Culture. The only sure indications of early Germanic invasions are a few skulls and place-names. On the other hand, the results of the southward expansion of the West Germans are clearly traceable. The boundaries of the first continental homeland of the Germanic peoples have been preserved in the form of the lower Saxon *Kulturkreis*, marked by the range of the lower Saxon dialect and the old Saxon style of house, which are found as far east as the mouth of the River Oder. In anthropological terms this original Germanic homeland was associated with a terrain of Nordic, littoral-style conformation, which was broken by Slav expansion to the east up to Kiel Bay. The Germanic wave of expansion caused this conformation to thrust a deep wedge southwards towards the Rhine.

It has not yet been explained to what extent the predominance of the Nordic element in the anthropological composition of the population of France is due to the survival of this element from the Upper Palaeolithic era, when its presence is already attested as a result of archaelogical field-work, and to what extent it should be attributed to the invasions of Celts and the Germanic Franks.

The Lapponoid race may be presumed to be the last Palaeolithic arrival from the Solutrean era, although its remains undoubtedly date from the final Epipalaeolithic phase of this era, as the famous discoveries made at Ofnet in Bavaria show. Its main area of concentration today is the northern periphery of Europe, to which the Lapps withdrew under pressure from Finns, Slavs and Scandinavians. In earlier times, however, this area must have extended much further south, possibly even to the boundary-line between forest land and steppe. This is proved by the considerable admixture of the Armenoid element in the Lapps of northern Scandinavia, an element which they could have absorbed only in the zone of influence of the Caucasus. The Lapponoid race has, however, survived in Central Europe as well and is numerically predominant over a considerable part of this area, even attaining an absolute majority in the Carpathian and Sudeten foothills and in the Transylvanian basin. In Central Europe the Lapponoid race is undoubtedly a survival of the Palaeolithic or Epipalaeolithic era. In the East and in the Hungarian Basin the matter is complicated by the fact that the Lapponoid race there is mainly a sediment left by the Turkish and Mongol invasions of early historical times. An instance of this in Hungary was the absorption of the Cuman invaders, while the Szekelers of Transylvania are said to be descended from the Huns.

Before concluding this account of the three Palaeolithic elements in the European population which play such a great role today, i.e. the Mediterranean, Nordic and Lapponoid races, we must mention some exotic stocks of equal antiquity which have not, however, had any appreciable effect on the composition of the

European population. In this early period of the Upper Palaeolithic era, when Europe was divided from Asia not only by polar deserts but also by the Caspian Sea's extension far to the north, certain anthropological traces of a connexion with Africa are evident. Contacts with Asia become evident later, in the form of skulls as well as artifacts. As an illustration of this I will cite only the Chamblandes find, a skull which French anthropologists regarded as Eskimo and dated as belonging to the Magdalenian period. Polish anthrolpologists, on the other hand, described it as a representative of the Arctic race. Today sporadic traces of this element are to be found only on the most distant north-eastern periphery of Europe.

A characteristic element in the Mesolithic population of Europe was the Palaeo-European or Cromagnon type described by Wojciech Kočka in 1958[4]. Today this element (called by Deniker the ' Oriental race ') is relatively well represented in the Finno-Ugrian population of North-Eastern Europe and in the adjacent areas of Northern Asia. Presumably it was a stabilised hybrid within the bounds of Palaeolithic possiblities, connected with the Nordic race by pigmentation, with the Lapponoids by its facial structure, and with the Arctic race by the structure of its skull.

The last of the four basic elements in the modern population of Europe—the Armenoid type—was noted on our continent only towards the end of the Neolithic era. Its appearance is connected with the expansion of various Asianic peoples and its cradle is the Caucasus. The first Armenoid wave of expansion came from Asia Minor in the third millenium B.C. It reached the Mediterranean area and even as far as the British Isles. Traces of this wave are to be found in the Armenoid territory in the western half of the Balkan Peninsula and in the considerable admixture of this element in the Basques. The second phase of Asianic expansion came at the end of the second millenium B.C., when the Etruscans settled in the Appenine Peninsula and under the name of Rhaetians penetrated deep into the Alps. On the other hand the Caucasus area influenced the composition of the population of the Pontic steppes and even of the Lapps. There was also a particularly strong Armenoid infiltration deep into the European continent during the Bronze Age.

This brief outline of the present anthropological structure of the population of Europe will suffice to show why the racial factor in its scientific sense plays no part in intra-continental conflicts. Ethnic frontiers do not coincide with those of the various anthropological areas.

The Polish-German conflict which is today one of the most bitter in Europe is a conflict between populations with an identical anthropological make-up living in the area between the Bug and the Rhine.

[4] W. Kočka: *Zagadnienie Etnogenezy Ludów Europy—Materialy i Prace Antropologiczne*, Wroclaw, 1958.

The same is true of the Czech-German conflict—the Czechs are an anthropological continuation of South Germany. Finally we may cite the violent feeling between Serbs and Croats during the Second World War. This was a conflict in which the opponents did not even differ as to language.

The artificial and unreal nature of the German concept of racism is best illustrated by the fact that its main propagators, Adolf Hitler, Paul Joseph Goebbels and even Hermann Göring, did not themselves represent the ' Nordic race ' which they glorified as the rightful rulers of the world, but were from a racial viewpoint no more than Nordic mongrels. On the other hand the Polish population living on the Polish-German frontier was more ' Nordic ' than the Germans themselves.

The romantic, operatic kind of Germanism popularised by Richard Wagner was not taken seriously by such eminent pre-1914 German anthropologists as Rudolf Virchow and Felix von Luschan, nor later by Rudolf Martin. After Germany's defeat in the 1914-18 war, however, this Germanism assumed an entirely different hue. The German people regarded themselves as betrayed by the Socialists and refused to admit that they had been beaten by force of arms, since the victors did not occupy Reich territory beyond the Rhine. Even before the First World War they had been characterised by a feeling of *Minderwertigkeit;* this was particularly strong as regards the British and most likely dated back to the period when German soldiers were sold as mercenaries to the British army. The need to compensate for this inferiority complex was probably the real psychological incentive which drove the Germans to build up their pre-1914 navy, and this led to the outbreak of war. After the German defeat their sense of injury and frustration produced an obsessional desire to regain the status of a colonial power. As there was no chance of acquiring coloured colonies overseas post-1918 Germany looked to the economically exploited areas of Eastern Europe. This led to the formulation of a theory which bore no resemblance to reality but which claimed to provide a ' scientific ' justification for regarding the Slavs as colonial, ' ersatz-coloured ' natives. In practice, during the Second World War the German occupying authorities treated these peoples with far more brutality and cruelty than had ever been used by the earlier, relatively humane German colonial authorities.

For years before this, the National Socialists, who drew their main strength from the German lower-middle class, had carried on a campaign of exceptional cruelty and barbarity against the Jews of Germany, who were presented as members of a different race that endangered the Nordic race. The real object here was, at least to a very large extent, to eliminate the well-to-do and privileged German middle class that held most influential positions and in which the bulk of German Jewry had been assimilated over the last century and to replace them by the Nazi newcomers. Those

responsible for the liquidation of the Jews were not concerned with the fact that in the strict racial sense North German Jews were more ' Nordic ' than most South Germans, particularly the Bavarians who were the most extreme anti-Semites.

The German endeavour to introduce a racial element into Europe's political conflicts had, as we have shown, no connexion with anthropological realities. It nevertheless had the most appalling consequences and left a grim legacy of prejudices and delusions which still haunt our continent today.

A JOINT CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN RACE RELATIONS IN BRITAIN

On 27 March 1961 a discussion arranged jointly by the Royal Anthropological Institute and the Institute of Race Relations took place at the Institute of Race Relations, regarding a programme for research in race relations in Britain. The following were present:—

Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, K.B.E. (Chairman)
Dr. Michael Banton
Sir George Beresford-Stooke
Mr. J. R. Warren Evans
Mr. William Fagg
Dr. D. G. MacRae
Mr. Philip Mason
Dr. Alfred Metraux
Mr. H. S. Morris
Mrs. H. S. Morris
Mrs. Sheila Patterson
Mr. H. Pollins
Dr. Audrey Richards
Dr. Cyril Sofer
Miss Margaret Usborne
Mr. J. J. Way
Dr. John Westergaard
Dr. Donald Wood

This meeting arose from the symposium, also arranged jointly by the two Institutes, which resulted in the publication of the book *Man, Race and Darwin* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960). It had been suggested in the course of that discussion that it would be useful to consider a list of significant projects for research in race relations. It was by no means the case that large sums of money were available, but from time to time opportunities did occur of guiding a scholar into one particular field rather than another and it was surely better that such subjects should be chosen after full discussion and in relation to a framework of thought rather than on a purely hand-to-mouth basis.

The group had before them a paper which reminded them that the Institute of Race Relations had the following projects either in progress or planned:—

1. *Mrs. Sheila Patterson's Croydon Study*
   This contrasts the integration into industry of West Indians with that of Poles and others. The field-work is complete and it is hoped that the book will be published in 1962.
2. *Study of Gujerati Communities in Britain*
   This is being conducted by Mr. Desai under the direction of

Dr. Bailey of the School of Oriental and African Studies and its object is to consider a community which wishes to remain separate and thus to provide material for contrast with those which wish to be integrated. The field-work is nearing completion.

3. *Dr. M. Calley's Project for the Study of Pentecostal Religious Groups among West Indians in Britain*

   Funds have so far been made available only for the first or demographic part of this study. If complete the study would throw incidental light by a flank attack on the respects in which West Indians feel that they are rejected by the British community.

4. *Dr. R. Davison's Project*

   Dr. Davison is on the staff of the University College of the West Indies in Jamaica. He has proposed taking a random sample of Jamaicans leaving the country (through co-operation with the Passport Office) and following up in Britain the fortunes of these men by three enquiries over a three-year period. This project has begun and is obtaining a high percentage of co-operation from the West Indians leaving the country.

The group had also before them a list of possible projects which had been sent in either by those present or by others who were prevented from attending. These projects formed the raw material for discussion.

Before these projects were considered in detail, some general discussion took place. Some difficulty was felt as to the frame of reference against which the projects should be viewed; was it not necessary to define the value judgments employed before hazarding an opinion as to which of these projects could be regarded as 'more important' than others? In reply it was suggested that for the present purpose it was not necessary to define aims closely; one object was simply to know more about the relationship between different racial groups, another to help in the formulation of policy, for example in relation to housing. It was hardly possible to adjudicate between these in advance. Further, when a study was actually undertaken, it would necessarily be re-shaped by those responsible.

There was general agreement that it was unreal to regard each project in isolation. For example, a study of a given area would bring out much material about mixed marriages, about attitudes, about relationships at work and leisure, about the effect of different institutions on the situation. It would hardly be satisfactory to deal with any one of these aspects of a total relationship in isolation, and it might well be economical, both of time and money, to recognise this and tackle on as broad a front as possible.

The importance of co-ordinating information about what other workers were doing was recognised by all; for example, it came to light that one of those present was aware of work in progress similar

to that of Dr. Calley's but had not known of Dr. Calley's own interest. It was mentioned that the final section of the monthly *Newsletter* issued by the Institute of Race Relations was designed to make information of this kind generally known and that the more it was used the more valuable it would become. This exchange of information would become increasingly important as team-work became more general; for instance, it might be necessary for specialists, such as labour economists, to be associated with sociologists in certain types of investigation.

The discussion turned to bibliography. If the subject was race relations in Britain, it would not be very difficult to compile an up-to-date bibliography; it must be an object to do this from time to time. The select bibliography compiled by Mrs. Patterson for Mrs. Judith Henderson's section in *Coloured Immigrants in Britain* (London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1960), could, for example, be brought up to date annually and the results published in the Institute's *Newsletter*. If, however, it was proposed to compile a world bibliography, the task would be immense. Material from the United States was enormous in volume though uneven in quality; to keep up to date with it was a formidable task. Dr. Metraux explained that UNESCO were shortly to publish an international bibliography regarding prejudice. It was agreed that the Institute of Race Relations should keep up to date (and from time to time publish) a current bibliography of work in Britain, but would not be wise to venture into the international field beyond being aware of where bibliographies, both American and international, were to be found.

Discussion now turned to the specific projects which had been suggested for consideration. As a result of the discussion the projects have been rearranged and regrouped, not in an order of priorities, omitting those in which little interest was shown.

1. If a better appreciation of British behaviour towards coloured immigrants was to be acquired, more systematic data was needed on British behaviour towards other distinctive minorities. There was some evidence, for example, that in Scotland, attitudes towards tinkers were more negative than towards West Indians. The position of gypsies in England might also be considered. Studies of social distance in respect of these groups, of Jews and Irish and of West Indians might be compared. The unskilled British labourer in a strange town or district might be included in such comparative enquiries.
2. Further studies of the circumstances under which contact between racial groups reduces antipathy. American research has shown that personal contact results in greater friendliness only if the parties are of comparable economic and social status but many qualifications have to be made. For example, where the relationship is a competitive one, contact on an equal footing may produce greater hostility. Many of these

findings come from the north and west of the United States where Negroes and whites share many basic beliefs, values and norms. They also relate to interaction in relatively formal relationships. It would be of more than national interest to try to isolate certain of the relationships within which such contact occurs between Britons and both West Indians and Pakistanis, so as to assess their effect upon the formation of sentiments. It would be valuable to try to define more closely what constitutes a relation of equal status in the British context and to see how easily different kinds of contact can be brought about. Many contacts between coloured and white people are competitive, as for example for jobs or houses, but others are primarily co-operative, as for example, in trade unions, in churches and perhaps in other fields. Is it true that those contacts which are the most easy to initiate are the least likely to lead to important changes of attitude?

3. Is there a radical difference, or only a difference of degree, in the nature of the problems faced by a minority from Europe who seek assimilation in Britain and by one from the West Indies, in whose case physical differences are apparent? Again, what are the differences which arise where a community has a strong cultural tradition of its own and does not wish for integration? (These questions will it is hoped be largely answered by Mrs. Patterson's Croydon Study and the study of the Gujeratis undertaken by Dr. Bailey and Mr. Desai.)
4. A study of job satisfaction and labour turnover (or some other industrial subject) in firms with a fair proportion of immigrant labour. Here the ostensible (and indeed actual) subject of study would be the industrial question but considerable attention would be given at the same time to the position of migrants. Such a study might get truer results because of its indirect approach. It would be of interest to investigate the effect of different forms of industrial organisation upon the ease with which a firm can employ and integrate coloured labour. The mobility of labour within the British community might also provide a study which would lend itself to this kind of flank attack.
5. In the United States many rural Negro migrants to the United States cities get caught up in a distinctive sub-culture or 'contra-culture'—the product of resentment, isolation and the force of the 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. Is this process at work in Britain?
6. The views of the Centre for Urban Studies, University College, London, as placed before the Conference may here be quoted verbatim:

> The problems of planning future research into 'race' relations in this country arise mainly from the lack of basic data concerning

the size and distribution of the coloured minorities. Such data are urgently needed from official sources. But so long as they are not available, it is desirable, in our view, to concentrate on studies which do not depend for the validity or interpretation of their results upon assumptions about the numbers and distribution of coloured people in the United Kingdom as a whole.

Studies of particular towns and localities offer one major line of approach. Such community surveys would throw light on patterns of settlement and residential segregation, the housing conditions of coloured as compared with white people, movements between homes and between districts, and social relations between white and coloured. A series of such studies undertaken in different towns and localities would also enable comparisons to be made between coloured communities of different origins and composition.

Community surveys of this kind would yield some information about patterns of employment; but this is a field in which more direct studies would be both feasible and valuable. There is scope, in particular, for comparative analyses of the employment histories of coloured and white workers. Samples of coloured and white workers (matched at least for degree of skill, as well as age, sex and marital status) could be selected from the recruitment lists of a number of firms, and their employment records compared over a period of a year or more. Much of the information (on such matters as length of employment, promotion and other changes of jobs within the firm) should be obtainable from the files of the firms, though such data could be supplemented by interviews with the workers. The possibilities should be explored of following up workers who leave the selected firms (for instance, through collaboration with the Ministry of Labour's Employment Exchanges). If possible, the firms chosen should be selected in such a way that comparisons could be made, in respect of employment histories and relationships in work, between firms or departments with different patterns of work organisation.

7. Studies of other immigrant communities, notably the Chinese; the Somalis; the Cypriots; the Irish.

8. A study of the 'Keep Britain White' movement, that is to say, of the individuals concerned in movements of this kind, whose whole background and past should be studied.

9. A study of the relationships between migrant groups, e.g. West Indians and West Africans and also of their relations with American Negroes in Britain.

10. Intensive studies over time of social processes in selected industrial organisations, schools or neighbourhoods, where members of minority groups are starting to enter the preserves of dominant minorities. Ideally each series of studies should deal with roughly comparable situations (e.g. schools might

be chosen which attract more or less the same class and proportions of majority and minority group children) so that there is no special reason to expect the situation studied to develop in drastically different ways from each other. From these accounts might emerge information as to what combination of sociological and psychological factors exacerbate or ameliorate racial friction. And administrators and research workers together might then work together in attempts to minimise friction while simultaneously recording and analysing what they do.

11. The Institute has recently published *White Man* (London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1961) by Gustav Jahoda, about the pictures of Europeans which were held by the African inhabitants of the Gold Coast before its independence. Similar studies are required regarding the West Indians' pictures of the native British at different periods (which would require to be related both to the period since their arrival and to changing circumstances, in particular employment and housing).
12. Some British people say that their acquaintances are unfriendly towards coloured immigrants but that they themselves are well disposed. A further investigation of this might lead into a careful study of group controls upon individual conduct. Though many writers believe such controls to be of considerable importance their operation has not been adequately examined. This might lead to a general study of the reliability of verbally-expressed attitudes as predictors of behaviour in different racial situations.
13. The same concept might also be approached from the trade union angle; there is a marked contrast between on the one hand the official views of trade union leaders and the expressions of universal class solidarity expressed on certain occasions by the workers themselves and on the other their particularism in action, which often amounts to hostility to all strangers. An individual trade union leader is often caught between conflicting pressures from the national policy makers and his own members.
14. A study of the images of coloured people in English literature, including not only classical works but popular magazines, children's books, cartoons and the like.
15. A history of the image of coloured people in Britain, illustrated not only from literature but from all kinds of sources.
16. A survey in schools, using selected forms in selected schools, to assess the static or changing image among British pupils of non-white peoples of the Commonwealth and to discover how far such mediums as television, speakers and teachers, books, coloured classmates, etc., influence this image. This would

amount to a continuation of the UNESCO book, *The Teacher Was Black*, by H. James and C. Tenen (London, Heinemann, 1953), in other areas and schools.

18. Can British colonial withdrawal be associated with increased emphasis on racial identity at home, and with, for example, support for the 'Keep Britain White' movement? It may be argued that research into a question of this kind would hardly be susceptible of scientific proof, but it may be worth investigation none the less.
19. A psychiatric investigation of the sexual factor in white-Negro fantasies and group images; how closely a white man's conception of the Negro woman corresponds with the white woman's conception of the Negro man, and how far, in short, the pattern of sexual jealousy is symmetrical.

* * *

The above were the projects which attracted most interest in discussion. A number of subsidiary points arose, many of which suggest valuable lines of approach. There was a general feeling that where the problem could be reached from a flank, as in the industrial approach, there would always be advantages in that the reference to race relations would be un-self-conscious. Market research might prove fruitful; in the United States it was well known that if the appeal was to a Negro market, certain assumptions and techniques should be used which were not the same if it was meant to capture a white market. Attitudes towards coloured doctors and dentists were mentioned; the idea that some kind of magic cure might be expected from a coloured practitioner was still widespread. There was, it was argued, a wealth of information available with welfare workers and social workers generally which had not been sufficiently drawn on; the point of view of women migrants had also been neglected and also the attitude of other women looking at them. It was useful to obtain a starting point and in the history of the family the birth of a child was an event of critical importance; the maternity wards of hospitals and antenatal clinics might thus prove the starting point for an investigator who was interested in the development of family life among migrants. Foster children and adoption societies would also prove a good starting point, particularly for a woman research worker. Again, the children left behind in crèches were usually well known to the workers in the crèches who often had much information about their parents. (After the conference a view was strongly expressed by one member that information collected by social welfare workers must be treated with great caution if it was to be used for sociological investigations, because it was collected with different ends in view;

the sociological research worker would have to use it as a starting point and collect his data from his own angle.)

There was general regret that more psychological work had not been done in this country; it was badly needed and the Institute of Race Relations asked to be informed of any such work or of anyone considering research in this field.

It was suggested that a book or pamphlet about expected standards of behaviour and manners would be useful, though this would not be research.

BOOK REVIEWS

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Number One

(St. Antony's Papers, Number 10)

Edited by KENNETH KIRKWOOD

London, Chatto and Windus, 1961. 162 pp. 18s.

This is a collection of eight unrelated papers on very diverse subjects, each by an established scholar or expert. That each of them deals with some aspect of African studies does not give the book any kind of unity. Presumably it is not meant to have any but to be a repository of source material accumulated by intensive study. Nevertheless it seems a pity to include linguistic, historical, political and statistical essays, none over thirty pages long, and dealing piecemeal with unrelated parts of the continent, between the same pair of covers, and it gives an impression of rather random editing.

Mr. Wilfred Whiteley deals interestingly but inconclusively with the rendering in Swahili of some Western political terms and its influence on the speaker's political concepts. Despite manful efforts to translate fully, his contribution will not prove easily comprehensible to non-Swahili speakers. Mr. Colin Newbury writes on the history of the now extinct French Government-General in West Africa meticulously but without providing enlightenment about the prospects, problems or advantages of Federal systems in the ex-French empire today. Mr. Humphrey Fisher recounts in extreme detail the history of the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims in Nigeria but does not explain why it is important enough to deserve thirty pages of the book. Mrs. Mary Holdsworth gives an informative survey of the present stage of African studies in Soviet Russia, describing their general subservience to Marxist prejudice and cold war propaganda needs, but suggesting that one or two Russian African scholars may be seeking a greater objectivity. She considers that in contacts with Soviet youth, and with '"front" and solidarity organisations . . . African intellectuals are well able to hold their own'. But she does nothing (how could she in this space?) to interpret the Soviet approach to Africa or the response of Africans anywhere to Communism.

Mr. John Shaul outlines with dry technicality some processes and results of his work in demographic, agricultural and socio-economic 'sample surveys' among Africans in the Central African Federation. It is tantalising because neither the procedure nor the results are sufficiently interpreted. Lots of fascinating facts seem to lurk behind his statistics but they do not emerge. It is interesting that the natural increase of Africans is lower in Northern than in Southern Rhodesia and that 'the African mean expectation of life at birth is 49 years in Southern Rhodesia, 37 years in Northern Rhodesia, 38 in Ghana and 48 in Swaziland'; and that the population structure of the Federation is similar to that of Mexico. Mr. Shaul does not think much of the chances of increasing the European population of the Federation, whether by reproduction or immigration, to rival the African. Dr. Ellen Hellmann describes the application of *apartheid* to the Urban Areas of South Africa up to October 1959. It is a depressing, well-documented account of short-sighted discrimination and oppression which has the good sense to let the facts speak for themselves. One cannot avoid noticing the similarity between South Africa's attitude to urban Africans and the one which prevails under the false name of 'partnership' in Southern Rhodesia. Nearly all the legislation Dr. Hellmann details in the Union is still on the Southern Rhodesian Statute Book. In both countries 'it is a primary aim of the Government to curb the growth of a permanent African population'.

Incomparably the best papers are Mr. Thomas Hodgkin's 'Note on the Language of African Nationalism' and Professor Edgar Brookes on 'The [South African] General Election of 1958 and After'. Both deserve a wider currency than inclusion in this narrowly academic volume will give them. Mr. Hodgkin, analysing the political vocabulary of West African leaders in French and English, puts up some absorbingly important political and philosophic

hares which it is to be hoped he will pursue to the death elsewhere—whether for instance, African freedom movements are inspired by an *élite* vanguard (as Nkrumah and Sékou Touré appear to believe) or whether they originate with the awakening masses, who produce and largely control their own leaders (a more healthy process, which seems to have taken place in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where neither Dr. Banda, Joshua Nkomo nor the charismatic Kenneth Kaunda and their entourages are an *élite*), whether free African societies, when they have developed, are classless and egalitarian (which of course they are not), whether the dehumanised, godless Marxist metaphysic commends itself to African judgments. He quotes both Sékou Touré and Leopold Senghor to suggest it does not. 'Marxist atheism', says Senghor, ' is a reaction, Christian in origin, against the deviations of historical Christianity.' Hodgkin concludes that Africans on the whole have the good sense to discard metaphysics and adapt to their use the beneficial aspects of whatever European political theories they inherit; and that thinking about socialism and centralism, even in the allegedly 'fellow-travelling' states in West Africa, derives more from Rousseau than from Marx. He emphasises that the African 'nationalist' theories of freedom belong to the same 'family of theories' as the European ones of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and proceed from the same social causes. It is always refreshing to find a writer who recognises that African problems have the same social essence as our own and that the difference of race and colour is unimportant.

Professor Brookes surveys the growth of the Afrikaner nationalist dictatorship in the Union with irony, urbanity, and an unsparingly ruthless charity to all concerned which leaves none of their weaknesses uncovered. He exposes the failure of the United Party, and its impotence ever again to provide an alternative government, as well as its hopeless prevarication on all racial issues, without rancour. He dissects the inconsistencies of *apartheid*. 'Not Socrates, not Moses, not Abraham Lincoln, could win an election in South Africa on the basis of *apartheid* to be carried out by alienating for African settlement the constituency for which he was standing. Almost anyone can win an election on the basis of *apartheid* somewhere else . . . *Apartheid* is an emotion rather than a policy, an evasion rather than a solution, an escape from reality rather than a manful facing of the facts.' He opposes, rightly, the advocacy of violence but is unwilling to face the fact that, in the South African situation, very destructive violence is inevitable. (Professor Keppel-Jones faced this fact, and its dire consequences, in *When Smuts Goes*.) His final message to South African liberals is that they must lead good, God-fearing, permanently protesting but never violent lives and 'do their daily work well' (which lots of Nationalist Afrikaners do too). It is a disappointing end to a passionate piece of analysis but is symptomatic of the hopeless situation of this distressful country.

It is to be hoped that in future St. Antony's College will devote its great resources of talent, and its not inconsiderable ones of finance, to producing substantial pieces of research by individuals into some of Africa's urgent and fascinating problems, rather than in publishing what can only be called a high-grade academic miscellany.

T. R. M. CREIGHTON

POLITICAL AFRICA

A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties

By RONALD SEGAL

London, Stevens and Sons, 1961. 475 pp. 50s.

Two claims are made for this book: by the publishers, that it provides 'a reliable, accurate and factual form of reference to people and events in Africa today'; by the author, that it is 'not a dictionary of politics drained dry of all opinion'. Some would say that the first claim must be invalidated by the second.

Certainly the second claim is fully justified; the compilers' opinions stand out a mile. There are sententious pronouncements, for instance that Tshombe's régime 'depends entirely on Belgian arms, men and money'; that on Lumumba's

death 'a wave of disgust and anger swept across the world . . . and Tshombe was widely held to have been responsible for the killing'; that Odinga's 'wild statements' generally 'turn out to have a clear and well-thought-out purpose behind them'; that Mrs. Ballinger 'conducted a running battle against the complacent cruelties of the Smuts Government'. There is political conjecture: that Chisisa, of Malawi, is 'likely to hold a key post in any African administration'; that Chitepo is 'likely to be drawn increasingly into the African struggle against white dominion in Southern Rhodesia'; that Chona, a 'tireless speaker' with an 'elastic voice', is 'destined to play a crucial part in the development of Central Africa'. There is near-gossip, sometimes irrelevant, sometimes heavily loaded. We are told that Sir Ernest Vasey was the son of travelling actors, himself played child parts and is now a good bridge player and charming conversationalist; that the South African Minister of Lands is 'genial and appreciative of a good table'; that Kenneth Kaunda has suffered recurrently from tuberculosis; that Sir Roy Welensky was educated to Standard 4, 'too low an educational qualification automatically to qualify an African for an "ordinary" vote in the Federation'.

Such diversions—regrettably quotable—are of course out of place in a factual reference book and will blind many readers to the enormous amount of apparently accurate and reliable information that the book unquestionably contains. The names of parties and people and places and the dates that anyone who writes or speaks or just thinks about Africa is always wanting are there, as up-to-date as can be expected, not very stylishly expressed, fairly easy to find—though an Index would have been an added help. The entries about the personalities and parties of ex-French Africa are perhaps the most valuable for the many who are bewildered by the less familiar names and initials and baffling *regroupements*. It must be added that these entries, relatively 'drained dry of all opinion', since the compilers were no doubt less personally involved, are, if possibly the most 'reliable', by far the least readable.

MARGARET USBORNE

THE LIGHT CONTINENT

By U. R. EHRENFELS

London, Asia Publishing House, 1960. 192 pp. 30s.

If we can trace a theme in this not very well constructed book, it is the necessity of preserving African culture in the face of technological innovations from the West. African culture comprises music, dancing, dress, ritual and the plastic arts, *and also* the principle of matrilineal inheritance. Dr. Ehrenfels believes, with the famous ethnologists of the nineteenth century, that this is one of the earliest forms of social organisation, but he does not share their view that father-right is more advanced. On the contrary, he considers that only in matrilineal systems are women properly treated; among patrilineal peoples they are married with a bride-price and thus made into slaves. He takes as literal truth the Kikuyu legend recorded by Kenyatta of the revolt of the men against matriliny.

He is rightly critical of the assumption of moral superiority that most Europeans have brought with them to Africa, but he has almost as little patience for many of the efforts that are made to secure what even he would regard as objective improvements in African conditions. Everyone is concerned at the increase of population in Africa, but to complain that the introduction of medical services should have been accompanied by instruction in birth control is really asking rather much.

Dr. Ehrenfels is not the first anthropologist (though his book might give that impression) to have been concerned about situations where desirable and even necessary technical improvements have been misunderstood and rejected. He is confident, however, that in an independent Africa such problems will be solved by 'the young African will to live . . . especially if it makes full use of the matrilineal concept with its power to condition personality harmoniously into culture'.

L. P. MAIR

THE DAWN OF AFRICAN HISTORY

Edited by ROLAND OLIVER

London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 106 pp. 10s. 6d.

This little book about pre-European history in Africa—largely, in Africa south of the Sahara—should be widely welcome. Its authors are all distinguished scholars who have done much for their subject (some of them, indeed, like the editor, can be said in a large sense to have founded the subject and fought for its academic recognition); its matter is wide-ranging, often authoritative and mostly unknown to the wide audience for which the book is intended. This is a field of research which has only gained its right of existence among the 'respectable' faculties; but the book comes well on its hour, for regained African independence—reborn as nationalism—promotes keen interest in the African past and an understandable desire to build cultural self-confidence as other nationalities have done. At the same time, one may regret the particular form that Dr. Oliver has been obliged to follow: a collection of broadcast talks already three years old. The overall impression is rather muddled.

Dr. Oliver has tried skilfully to save the situation with a general postscript called 'The African Achievement'; but the effort is rather late. This sort of drawing together of the threads should have come at the beginning; yet there, instead of Dr. Oliver, we find Sir Mortimer Wheeler; and Sir Mortimer Wheeler's introduction to the dawn of African history reads very much as though it had been written well before the arrival of that enlightenment. Here we have the dear old Hamites in their full Seligman-like glory. Here we have the Coupland view of the medieval civilisations of the East Coast, dismissing those cities and their trading systems as merely peripheral to the history of the Continent (although Dr. Gervase Mathew, in his paper, treats them as an integral and important part of the central subject of the book). Here, to offer another case, we have the metalwork of medieval Nigeria thrown in as an afterthought and somewhat apologetically, since it would be 'incomplete and indeed unfair' to make no reference to such arts and skills; but never a mention of Nok, never a suggestion (already possible, even three years ago) that the Nok Culture was ancestral to that of Ife and Benin.

This old-fashioned introduction is followed by thirteen modern essays, several of them excellent and all carrying great authority. Dr. Arkell writes on the Valley of the Nile, 'vital channel through which the influence of ancient Egypt passed southwards': on Cush, that is, and its intra-African connexions. This illuminating chapter is followed by Dr. Kwapong on 'Carthage, Greece and Rome' and by Dr. Huntingford on 'The Kingdom of Axum'. Other contributors include Messrs. Bernard Lewis, Thomas Hodgkin, Gervase Mathew, Roland Oliver, D. H. Jones, J. D. Fage, C. R. Boxer, J. Vansina and W. M. Macmillan, all of whom help to shed light on subjects that are still obscure. What comes out, perhaps inevitably, is not so much a 'picture' as a number of scattered fragments. Yet the fragments will certainly give pleasure and instruction.

BASIL DAVIDSON

I SPEAK OF FREEDOM

By KWAME NKRUMAH

London, Heinemann, 1961. 291 pp. 21s.

This selection from President Nkrumah's speeches, lightly linked by narrative, is dedicated to the late Patrice Lumumba 'and to all those who are engaged in the struggle for the political unification of Africa'. The dedication, characteristic both of Nkrumah and Nkrumahism, not only sets the tone of the book, but goes a long way towards explaining its *raison d'être*. Nkrumah not only acts, but also writes as an African rather than a Ghanaian. He is a self-conscious prototype of African revolutionary: the independence he won in 1957 was the first in the post-war queue and he saw himself then, as he still does, as an example for

others to follow. In only a limited way is this volume a continuation of his Autobiography, taking the story on from his return to Ghana after his student days, in 1947 to 1959. It is rather a manual of African statehood, teaching its lessons by a single example.

For the European reader, this didactic quality detracts from the book's usefulness. One scarcely expects self-criticism in a political speech, but here there is no attempt, even in the narrative, at objectivity. The words 'Opposition' and 'United Party' do not figure in the index; nor do the names of such statesmen as Senghor or Houphouet-Boigny. Despite all this, the book has pace and imparts excitement. For a number of years, Nkrumah's speeches *were* the history of Ghana, and it was an exciting history.

As a guide to Nkrumahism, the selection of speeches gives equal prominence to its main planks. The first is Pan-Africanism. 'As I have often emphasised, the freedom and independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa,' he told the C.P.P.'s 10th Anniversary meeting in 1949. Ten years later, addressing Parliament on the Congo problem, he developed the same point by defining the two big threats to that liberation: 'balkanisation' and 'neo-colonialism'. '. . . In the same way as defensive alliances by the Balkan powers, with rival powers outside the Balkans, resulted in a world war, so a world war could easily originate on the African continent if African states make political, economic and military alliances with rival powers from outside Africa. The new colonialism creates client states, independent in name, but in point of fact pawns of the colonial power that is supposed to have given them independence . . . The only way out is to stand together politically.' The second plank is strong party organisation. 'But the people were still not organised. Organise! Organise! Organise! we urged' (in 1949). Thirdly, political independence is a *sine qua non* of progress. 'Comrades, it is no idle boast when I say that without the Convention Peoples' Party there would be no Ghana, and that without political independence there would be no hope of economic salvation.'

This last cause is, of course, virtually won throughout Africa and the implications of this now provide the principal ammunition for Nkrumah's critics. His political counterparts in other new states, particularly the ex-French states, are more confident than he that independence is genuine enough to allow them to negotiate on equal terms with Europe. As is so often the fate of true revolutionaries, Nkrumah has lived to see himself labelled out of date.

WALTER SCHWARZ

THE EMERGENT STATES OF FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

By VIRGINIA THOMPSON and RICHARD ADLOFF

Stanford University Press and London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 595 pp. 48s.

Books on contemporary Equatorial Africa are few and far between, and this book is the first to be written in English on these four former French colonies which became independent last year. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff have written a long book, after considerable research; but the result is disappointingly muddled. They set out to give the background to the four countries: Gabon, Tchad, the Central African Republic (still called Oubangui-Chari when they were writing) and the Congo (Brazzaville) Republic, known until recently as the Middle Congo. Much of the background is certainly there among the statistics; and the accounts of the administration, the status of the chiefs, of labour legislation, of financial resources—or rather of their lack—of trade, education and religion in these four countries, and in the separate chapters on the political and economic developments in each country. But one rather suspects that the authors, who have already given the former French colonies in West Africa much the same kind of treatment, lost themselves in the morass of the information they had collected: the material is badly arranged; and used for reference, it certainly proves a most frustrating book. Nor are its style and analysis sufficiently penetrating to make Equatorial Africa and its people come alive. Like so many American scholars, Virginia Thompson and Richard

Adloff seem to have forgotten the importance of individuals in shaping events in contemporary Africa: Equatorial Africa's leaders have earned only scant mention in this long book—and yet men like the Abbé Youlou Fulbert, President of the Congo (Brazzaville Republic) or Leon M'Ba, head of Gabon have had, and continue to have determinant roles; and not only in Equatorial Africa but on a wider African horizon. Again, the relative obscurity of Tchad and of the Central African Republic, can be explained not merely in terms of their poverty, or geographical remoteness, but also in their current dearth of leadership.

The authors, who completed their work before these four countries became independent, and before it became clear that they would, at least for the time being, reject political federation but maintain at least some of the economic links introduced by the French administration. But during their journeys in the area, they must have seen much of the French influence in these countries so short of trained manpower, and with economic resources either scant or undeveloped; and yet they are once again more concerned with the statistics of French assistance than with the rather questionable role of certain French political parties in the period before independence and which has, incidentally, continued in the post-independence period.

It seems perhaps unkind to criticise, when after all, this book does open the vistas to this fascinating part of Africa, which is so little known here. It borders on the Congo, on the Cameroun Republic, and reaches into the heart of Africa and beyond to Sudan, Lybia, and East Africa. Even if its four countries have not been hitting the headlines recently, they were the centre of Free French activities in Africa during the war, it was to Brazzaville that General de Gaulle came in 1944 to help define France's post-war colonial policy and it was in the same city that the majority of the now independent African colonies decided to form a moderate political block in Africa. Three of the countries are extremely poor, but one of them, Gabon, has oil, uranium and other mineral wealth. Whether they want it or not—and Congo (Brazzaville) under Youlou Fulbert certainly does want—they are likely to play an increasingly important part on the African scene. This book will certainly help to explain future developments in the area, and if I have been too critical, it is only because of disappointment that with so much effort put into it, it still does not pin-point sufficiently the forces which have been at work in this strategic part of Africa.

HELLA PICK

TANGANYIKA AND INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

By B. T. D. CHIDZERO

London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1961. 286 pp. 38s.

Dr. Chidzero's book was not written to mark Tanganyika's achievement of independence. Nevertheless, in the year of independence the appearance of the results of a careful investigation into the part played by international trusteeship in promoting Tanganyika's political and constitutional development is most opportune.

Where, as the author recognises, moral influence rather than coercive power is involved, it was wise on Dr. Chidzero's part to limit his enquiry to the practical effects of the mandate and the trusteeship agreement upon a number of outstanding issues rather than to attempt to pass a more general judgment upon the value of international accountability so far as Tanganyika is concerned. Even accepting this restriction, however, his task was not an easy one. Both the mandate and the trusteeship agreement left the final responsibility for action to the administering authority, and, since Britain's policy towards her tropical dependencies in general did not differ fundamentally from her terms of reference as administering authority, it is difficult to assess the specific contribution made by international supervision in Tanganyika.

The source materials upon which the author has drawn—the proceedings of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Trusteeship Council and the questionnaires which they issued to the administering authority, the report made by Britain in response to the questionnaires, debates in the Tanganyika

Legislative Council and in the British Parliament, command papers and newspaper reports—all bear witness to the continuing interest displayed by the supervisory bodies and to Britain's awareness of some at least of her responsibilities under the mandate and trusteeship agreement. But one would need access to more intimate records before giving a reasonably confident estimate of the motives underlying British policy decisions. Thus, while the mandate prevented Britain from acquiring Crown land in Tanganyika, British land policy in Tanganyika between the wars, as in other parts of East Africa, would certainly appear to have been mainly influenced by Britain's experiences in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Again, L. S. Amery, while Secretary of State for the Colonies, pressed for closer union between Tanganyika and her neighbours in spite of the provisions of the League covenant, while the decision to restrict federation to the limited field of the East Africa High Commission appears to have been taken at least as much as a result of almost universal opposition in East Africa as of the protests of some of the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission and Trusteeship Council.

All this the author clearly demonstrates, but he is also able to underline a more positive conclusion, namely that international supervision in the trusteeship era is very different in character from what it was between the wars. For not only does he point to the more definite obligation laid upon the administering authority to develop Tanganyika politically under the terms of the United Nations charter and the trusteeship agreement; he also stresses the importance of the political nature of the Trusteeship Council as compared with the expert membership of the Permanent Mandates Commission. He emphasises, too, the publicity attracted by debates in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly of the United Nations and the manner in which the Council is used as a forum for anti-colonial propaganda. In these changed circumstances it would require great courage, or obstinacy, on the part of an administering power to resist popular criticism. Yet, as the author shows, even a country as deeply in agreement with the objectives of trusteeship as Britain undoubtedly is could resist the pressure of the Council for speedier progress.

Could resist, but for how long? Here we must begin to ask ourselves whether this excellent study was not, after all, completed two or three years too soon. The main text leaves us in the era when Britain was still insisting upon gradual development and although an appendix refers briefly to the spectacular changes of the last few years there is no room for discussion of why this *volte face* on Britain's part took place. Undoubtedly Mr. Nyerere's own particular genius must have had a lot to do with it. The arrival of a new Governor, Sir Richard Turnbull, must also have been a contributary factor. But, while recognising the encouragement given by popular interest to the development of political opinion in Tanganyika, we can only guess at the part, if any, played by international trusteeship in accelerating Tanganyika's advance to independence.

KENNETH INGHAM

THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

By G. V. DOXEY

London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 218 pp. 22s. 6d.

This is a valuable book which should promote a better understanding of the industrial labour market in South Africa. In the compact space of 200 pages the author, Mr. G. V. Doxey (Senior Lecturer in Commerce and Applied Economics at the Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg) achieves the unusual by producing a work which is at once readily readable and informative as a source of reference. It is refreshing to find in Mr. Doxey one who is not only a master of his subject but also an objective analyst and critic. Of special appeal, at a time when so much attention is focused on South Africa and so much criticism levelled, not always soundly based, is his description of the historical growth of racial attitudes in the South African labour market and his explanation of the reasons for their rigidities. These are traced from the time when diamonds were discovered in the 1860s and 1870s, the subsequent impact

of gold and thereafter the progressive expansion and diversification of secondary industry up to 1960.

The reader is brought quickly and vividly to grips with the fundamental problem in this multi-racial community, of how to reconcile the maintenance of the higher standards of the whites with the need, economic and humanitarian, to advance the lot of the non-whites. It soon becomes crystal clear that, as H. A. Fagan puts it in 'Our Responsibility', the mandate given to the Nationalist Government in 1948 was 'impossible to perform'. (The mandate of *apartheid* to rid the European areas of the infiltrating Bantu by sending them back to the Reserves.)

Three of Doxey's ten chapter, covering more than a third of the book, are devoted to the growth of legal rigidity in the labour market. From his description of the underlying factors and from his account of the relevant legislation enacted it emerges that one of the most important factors to influence the scope and content of industrial legislation has been the collective power of white labour. Aided by traditional racial prejudice, white trade unionism, ever fearful of competition from non-white workers with lower living standards, has consistently consolidated its own position. But as Doxey points out, balanced economic growth is unlikely to take place when one of the key factors of production, namely labour, is not regarded as a whole but split into racial groups. Clearly, too, it is a wasteful system where a large part of the industrial labour force is still migratory and spends significant time in the subsistence economy. Yet despite these handicaps the growth of industrial development in South Africa, indeed of the economy as a whole, has been very considerable.

This book is well documented with bibliographical references and an adequate index. Such repetition as there is serves to underline the main issues. It seems a pity that this fair-minded work should see the light of day only in mid-1961 when, to judge from the Acknowledgments, it was completed in January 1960.

Doxey shows that the colour bar as a whole as well as in industry has been firmly drawn, and yet South Africa seems further from solving the wider race problem than ever before. It is a sad reflection, but in my view true that, as the author concludes, the racial prejudice which has characterised the attitude of whites to non-whites in South Africa over the generations, albeit thoroughly understandable in earlier days, has now 'slowly hardened into a national tradition'.

PATRICK MCDONAGH

MULTI-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA: THE RECONCILIATION OF FORCES

By Z. J. DE BEER

London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1961. 68 pp. 6s.

Dr. Z. J. de Beer, M.P., has set out very succinctly in this little book his Progressive Party's approach to the South African dilemma. There are details of fact and of emphasis with which one could quarrel but, accepting the limitations imposed by condensation into 68 pages, I propose to deal with the present position rather than to comment on his historical analysis.

De Beer rules out the 'partition' solution, rightly, on the grounds that it could not work and that in any case the Whites are not genuinely prepared to make the sacrifices involved in even a serious attempt. He rules out too the elimination of the white man—3 million is too big a minority to be forced out—and expresses the belief that a multi-racial solution will come and, however long it takes, will come in time to prevent the country sinking into chaos.

This belief is the heart of the matter and whilst all predictions are precarious I wish I could share his optimism. He argues that the analysis of a white supremacy implacably facing a black nationalism in irreconcilable opposition is superficial; that in fact they are not diametrically opposed and that there are other forces and groups in the country whose impact will prevent a head-on collision. The Progressive Party certainly offers a *theoretic* programme—my pessimism flows from the inability of the Party to 'sell' its policy to the majority of the

Whites, and time is of the essence here because more and more of the non-Whites are demanding more than the Progressive Party's franchise proposals offers them.

De Beer correctly says: 'If it is manifest that a genuine attempt at fairness is being made . . . unconstitutional resistance to government will be absent or at any rate minimal.' But unfortunately the opposite is manifest. Oppression of the non-White increases, all attempts at *peaceful* protest destroyed by a show of force, and this last month or two has seen *for the first time* an open declaration by African leadership that they are now having to accept that a resort to violence may be their only way. De Beer's belief in a peaceful solution is difficult to understand, however one may share his hopes, when he himself writes: 'An African leader can afford to counsel moderation to his followers only if that moderation brings dividends. Where the moderate is snubbed the followers will naturally demand extreme leadership.' A snub is a euphemism for the ruthless rejection with which African and Coloured political representations to Government have been met. De Beer concedes: 'White intransigence has bred black intransigence.' All he can hope for is that 'in time perhaps white generosity will evoke an equally generous response'.

De Beer pins his faith on the forces of economic necessity; that white and black will be forced to compromise and that the instinct of self-preservation will blunt political extremism; 'civilised human beings would rather co-operate than quarrel'. If history is any guide man's rationality is a very puny foundation for so optimistic an interpretation.

All this is the view of a South African now looking in from the outside. For those like de Beer who choose to remain, life would be intolerable other than on an optimistic premise. This book is a clear and simple account of the only sensible basis on which White South Africans can operate. One hopes its publication will help to win the Progressive Party adherents in the new Republic.

R. BENNUN

REACTION TO CONQUEST: EFFECTS OF CONTACT WITH EUROPEANS ON THE PONDO OF SOUTH AFRICA

By MONICA HUNTER

London, Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, Second Edition, 1961. 582 pp. 50s.

This is a republication, with a short introductory note by the writer, now Professor Monica Wilson of the University of Cape Town, of a classic African anthropology which first appeared in 1936. At that time there were few professsional studies of the organisation of African tribes, and yet anthropologists were beginning to cope with the problem of change. Professor Wilson tackled these problems by studying three different groups of Pondo: those dwelling and subsisting in the reserves of Pondoland, those dwelling and working on European-owned farms, and those living in the location of East London and working in that town. She examined in each area the persistence of traditional culture and the development of new adjustments in response to new economic and social conditions. This was an immense task for a young and inexperienced field-worker; and the resulting monograph was a very considerable achievement. Anthropology itself, as Professor Wilson says in her new introductory note, was then much less well-developed than it is now, a generation later, and particularly at that time it was working with the concept of cultures in contact, which has proved less fruitful than the concept of expanding social systems, which she herself, with her late husband, Godfrey Wilson, used in later studies of the Nyakyusa of Tanganyika. She therefore fears that this reprint will 'appear somewhat simple-minded'. The fear is groundless. For we have to look at this book in the perspective of its achievement: and we have to recognise that no other scholar has attempted so comprehensive a study of a single tribe. The comparisons of Pondo in tribal reserve, on European-owned farms, and in towns, are still unique in the literature. The reporting of their modes of behaviour and their adjustments remain as fresh and vivid as they originally were.

One of the most important chapters of the book was the final discussion of

'Tendencies', in which Professor Wilson contrasted the three areas, set out the main lines of changes, and discussed the phenomenon of 'selective conservatism', and Bantu ideas about the changes going on, as well as new forms of organised action. Presumably she has only been allowed, with present-day high costs of publication, to write a very brief new introductory note summarising developments in the Union of South Africa during the last twenty-five years. The original book was well over 500 pages. I cannot help feeling that an addition to the price would have been warranted, to allow her to examine in greater detail how far her assessment of tendencies was correct. On the whole, it was correct; but the reader will have to work this out from his or her own general knowledge. Nevertheless, this is clearly more than the 'a record of (the Pondo) manner of life as it was at one period' of their history, to quote Professor Wilson's modest assessment: it is also an illuminating analysis of a major process of social change, which repays study in terms of present-day problems.

MAX GLUCKMAN

TRAGEDY IN ALGERIA

By GERARD MANSELL

London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1961. 76 pp. 6s.

So far as I know this is the first general account of the rising in Algeria, and of the background to it, which has yet appeared in England in book form, though at least four have been published in America and Penguins are producing one in England. For this reason as well as for its intrinsic merits the booklet is to be warmly welcomed. Mr. Mansell has succeeded in giving a remarkably comprehensive, accurate and balanced account within the limits of only 76 pages. Only one caution has to be given, a point which is inherent in the phrase *Tragedy in Algeria* which he has chosen for his title. Mr. Mansell writes as one who has accepted the point of view of enlightened and liberal Frenchmen, as is indicated by the titles in the short bibliography which is given at the end of the book. He therefore sees the tragedy as the failure of France to carry through successfully the process which was initiated in 1830 and so assimilate a reconciled Franco-Muslim people into the group of western European states. This differs fundamentally from the view of the most representative Algerian Muslims. It is the view of General de Gaulle rather than that of Ferhat Abbas. For the latter and his people there is indeed tragedy in Algeria, abundant tragedy which overflows into Tunisia and Morocco and France. But for them the basic fact is that there is also a nation reborn, a resurrection, a heroic struggle, a new hope, the promise of a new life. The point is important for all students of the relations of races if this, rather than 'civilisations' or 'cultures', is the proper word to use in this case. Otherwise such readers may find it hard to understand why the Algerian representatives at Evian insist that the integrity and independence of Algeria must be assured before and not after an understanding about future relations with France. With this caution Mr. Mansell's essay is very much to be recommended.

NEVILL BARBOUR

BECOMING MORE CIVILISED: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLORATION

By LEONARD W. DOOB

London, Oxford University Press, 1961 for New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960. 267 pp. 48s.

The author is a distinguished American psychologist who spent two years in East and South Africa, and a summer in Jamaica, doing research on acculturation. He carried out lengthy interviews and administered a variety of tests to over 400 people. The vast amount of material collected in this way is, however, not presented directly. The chief aim of the book is to raise, and in part to answer, two major questions: why do people in contact with more civilised societies

become more civilised themselves, and what happens to them in the process? On the basis of extensive reading of modern anthropological literature, and the writer's personal observations as well as the findings of the survey, he set about constructing a series of hypotheses. These are concerned with such problems as the initial motive for change, the conditions under which change is most likely to be accepted in particular spheres of life, the personality characteristics distinguishing those who welcome or resist change, and the effect of change on language and such fundamental psychological processes as perception.

After an introduction in which the difficulties of such an approach are fully and frankly expounded, there is a sketch of what are regarded as the common attributes of less civilised peoples, which provides the *terminus a quo*. From then on, the book is organised around the hypotheses. Findings from the Africa-Jamaica studies are cited in support, reinforced by other evidence drawn from acculturation investigations among American Indians and in the Middle East. The style is lively, and there are good discussions both of methodological and substantive problems. It should therefore be emphasised that the critique which follows is directed specifically against the hypotheses.

Professor Doob claims that his supporting evidence is based on a 'cool, objective statistical approach'. In fact, detailed scrutiny of the material indicates that a large dose of subjective judgment must have been applied in the processing of the raw data, before they were fed into the statistical mill. Thus most of the projective techniques have not been validated in Africa, results being used in a questionable and sometimes question-begging manner. One gets the uneasy feeling that Doob, in spite of his assurances to the contrary, was not fully conversant with the pitfalls of psychological research in Africa. However, it would perhaps be unfair to press this too far, as he disarmingly concedes that 'the evidence at hand is insufficient to test the general hypotheses'.

Unfortunately it is necessary to go on and ask the further question whether, quite apart from the limitations of our present techniques, the majority of the hypotheses are in fact capable of being tested as formulated; in the opinion of the reviewer, the answer must be negative. The first of the twenty-seven hypotheses will serve as well as any to illustrate the nature of the difficulties: 'In comparison with those who remain unchanged or who have changed, people changing from old to new ways are likely to be more discontented.' This rests on two postulates; one is purely psychological ('discontent almost always precedes learning'); the other is a translation of a well-established anthropological generalisation ('the acceptance of something new always entails stresses and dislocations') from the *cultural* to the *individual* level. Although both postulates could be and have been challenged, they appear in the guise of axioms. Leaving this aside, what about the hypothesis itself? How are the seemingly clear-cut units of unchanged, changing and changed to be defined operationally? Even more troublesome is the notion of 'discontent'; in the discussion, it often takes on the general connotation of misery, and no psychologist has yet ventured to measure such a variable. Doob himself must have felt somewhat uncomfortable about the whole business, for the hypothesis is followed by qualifications which are so extensive as practically to cancel out the original hypothesis.

The same kind of straining after lofty generality characterises the whole work, though the actual content of some of the hypotheses is surprisingly meagre. The idea expressed in one, reached after 'much soul-searching', can be found in the writings of Condorcet. The author, a behavioural scientist schooled in rigorous theorising, comes to grief when trying to use his customary approach in a sphere where it ceases to be appropriate, because the number of uncontrolled variables is too great. Hence students of race relations will gain little from the few *obiter dicta* concerning this issue; for instance, he explains the failure of urban Zulu to conform to one of the hypotheses about attitudes to Europeans by pointing out that the Zulu 'at the time were experiencing a form of African nationalism'.

This critique of the central purpose of the work is not intended to discourage potential readers interested in Africa and in problems of social and psychological change. In itself, much of the material assembled is of great interest, and Doob has many wise and shrewd things to say. Had he been content with hunches and broader interpretations, there would have been no need to squeeze the findings into a rigid mould, thereby distorting them. Psychological research in Africa is still in its infancy, and it is too early to reach for the stars.

GUSTAV JAHODA

COMMON SENSE ABOUT RACE

By PHILIP MASON

London, Gollancz, 1961. 170 pp. 12s. 6d. and 6s. (paper back)

Our generation is surely more race-conscious than any of its predecessors. This is partly because the Nazis have so recently shocked the world by the most appalling outburst of racial crime ever known; partly because, in the present conditions of international intercourse, races whose origins are visibly different are now brought increasingly into contact with one another. Moreover, when this happens, the supremacy of the white man over the black, brown or yellow no longer goes unquestioned as it often did even fifty years ago.

It is therefore timely that Mr. Gollancz in his admirable series should have chosen 'Race' as a proper subject for common-sense analysis. He could have found no better interpreter of this complex topic than Mr. Philip Mason. The reader 'of average education', to whom the series is explicitly addressed, will have no difficulty in following the argument or in grasping the facts. This is the more remarkable when one reflects that this short book of 170 pages ranges from the biological background of the racial problem to historical and sociological factors and from ancient Greece to Nazi Germany, the Union of South Africa and Notting Hill.

Mr. Mason effectively exposes the fallacies surrounding the supposed biological superiority of one race over another showing that variations within each racial group are, in general, far wider than any differences between them. Moreover, antagonisms between groups, though they are all too often ascribed to racial incompatibility (and so are visited unselectively upon all people of a particular race or colour) are in reality the outcome of economic, cultural and religious differences or of a sort of collective inferiority complex which leads one particular group to seek self-assertion in the persecution of another.

Mr. Mason does not make the mistake of thinking that racial prejudice is any less real or dangerous merely because it can be scientifically shown to be based upon false premises, and at the end of the book he makes a plea for governments to take it seriously and to legislate against it. In urging this he makes the valuable point that the very people who, owing to their own sense of inadequacy, are most liable to succumb to racial prejudice are also most likely to be influenced by measures which outlaw racial discrimination. This argument is particularly relevant to the situation in Britain where racial prejudice has not yet led to extreme forms of discrimination except in a few limited areas, and where there is still time to bring the weight of social disapproval to bear before passions run too high.

It is only through public opinion, reinforced at suitable points by the law, that the catastrophies arising from race hatred can be avoided. Mr. Mason's book, if it is as widely read as it deserves to be, will do much for public enlightenment and for the victory of common sense in a field where irrational emotions are as dangerous as they are easily aroused.

KENNETH YOUNGER

THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION: PERSPECTIVES ON A NEW NATION

Edited by DAVID LOWENTHAL

New York, Columbia University Press and London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 142 pp. 15s.

The progress of the British West Indies towards independence has passed almost unnoticed outside the Caribbean. In Africa, events are on a heroic scale and the voices of black and white nationalism are strident; in comparison the debate in the West Indies seems muted and gentle. Emergent Africa has brought forth a torrent of books; the great experiment of trying to make a Federation of the scattered West Indian islands has inspired only a trickle. The publication of this collection of four essays, which were originally presented at a symposium at Carleton University in Ottawa, is doubly welcome. Not

only is it one of the few books on the problems facing the modern West Indies but it is also a good and thoughtful book.

The essays deal with the survival of the past on the modern scene, the social background, the political structure and the prospects and problems of these territories. The problems are indeed severe. Only the islands are in favour of federation while British Guiana, a natural geopolitical base, remains aloof. Each island has its own traditions, jealousies and ambitions, and each island has its own ethnic diversity. Some islands are poor, some are very poor. All face the problem of unemployment and how to broaden predominantly agricultural economies. The mineral wealth is almost entirely in Jamaica and Trinidad and their leaders must decide how to build up their own fortunes and at the same time help the smaller islands which cannot exist without help from outside. And all development is jeopardised by the birth-rate, for the population will double itself by the end of the century. Since the book was written, moreover, Jamaica has voted to leave the Federation, and nobody can tell what form of union will emerge.

In spite of all this, the symposiasts are cautious optimists. Given the growth of a feeling of common nationhood among the islanders, improved communications and orderly development, they believe these difficulties will in time be resolved. But it will be a close-run thing.

DONALD WOOD

SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY

By RICHARD N. ADAMS and others

New York, Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960. 345 pp. 40s.

This book, comprising the conclusions of six North American university dons and published for the United States equivalent of Chatham House, is required reading for anyone who is interested in the present and the future of Latin America.

The introduction by Lyman Bryson begins with the statement that 'most policies in international relations, even for a country like ours whose interests have expanded so fast, are based on ancient ideas'. The volume under review successfully explodes most of these outmoded notions.

Above all it does away with the myth that Latin America is a country where *mañana* is not tomorrow but a century away, and makes plain that tomorrow is already here today. In this context it underlines one very important point: that social mobility is an ever-increasing factor in Latin America, and that as a consequence the middle class, the historic exponent of sociological change, is becoming ever more important and powerful.

The stodgiest section of this work, that on Guatemala by Richard N. Adams, is at the same time the most eye-opening on this point. In spite of the overthrow of Guatemala's left-wing Government in 1954, with the aid of the State Department and the C.I.A., it is evident that the social changes initiated by Arévalo and Arbenz Guzmán could not be checked by Castillo Armas or by his successor Ydígoras, despite the support these have received from Washington.

Even more important is the chapter on Brazil by Charles Wagley, particularly in view of the fact that it was written before the accession of the present neutralist President, Jânio Quadros. '. . . To anyone who has known Brazil during the past fifteen years, it is apparent that [the middle class] has increased many times over and that it is growing with every year.'

Equally relevant to the present situation is Richard W. Patch's chapter on Bolivia, which effectively proves that after 400 years of reasonably meek subservience the Indian peasantry of that country are at last awakening to their rights and recognising their potential power. The chapter on Peru makes much the same point, while that on Mexico implies that the 1910 revolution, which antedated the present social ferment, is already out of date.

What are the alternatives? In Peru there is Haya de la Torre's A.P.R.A. party, reasonably amiable towards the so-called 'West'; elsewhere Fidelismo

and/or Communism represent the hopes of the working classes and of the intelligentsia among the *bourgeoisie*. The North American Way of Life, as at present presented, has a very limited appeal. It is to be hoped that Mr. Adlai Stevenson, after his recent trip, made this plain to Mr. Kennedy, who should have a copy of this work on his desk.

J. Halcro Ferguson

INDIAN AFFAIRS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK

By ALLEN W. TRELEASE

Ithaca, Cornell University Press and London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 363 pp. 54s.

Most of the older accounts of Indian-white relations in Colonial America display a marked bias in favour of the European settlers, and depict the Indians simply as obstacles to the advance of civilisation. But in recent years American historians have begun to study the problem with detachment and fairness. Despite the difficulty that the surviving documentary evidence comes almost wholly from white sources, the old stereotypes of the Indian are being abandoned and the focus is now upon the unequal clash of cultures in which the weaker side was tragically overborne.

To this growing body of critical work Professor Trelease's analysis of Indian-white relations in seventeenth-century New York is an important and welcome addition. It is based on a thorough examination of all the relevant printed and manuscript material, and provides a clear, objective account of all aspects of Indian affairs during the colony's first century. The first half of the book deals with the Dutch period and focuses chiefly upon relations between the Dutch authorities and the Algonquian bands of the Hudson Valley and Long Island. The second half examines the period after 1664, when New Netherland became New York, and emphasises relations with the Iroquois, or Five Nations, the most powerful Indian combination east of the Mississippi.

What emerges from the book is that the Dutch and the English closely resembled each other in their attitudes to their Indian neighbours. Unlike the French and the Spanish both were extremely race-conscious and in neither was missionary zeal particularly marked. In both New Netherland and New York the chief influence on official policy was the fur trade, competition for which led to the encouragement of tribal rivalries and to the evils of the liquor traffic. Professor Trelease demonstrates, however, that the New York Indians eventually saw the folly of acting as the white man's pawn. The Iroquois, at first the allies of the English against New France, came in time to see the advantages of neutrality and by the end of the seventeenth century were skilfully playing off the French and the English against each other.

Maldwyn Jones

THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN

Edited by CHARLES GRIER SELLERS, Jr.

Oxford University Press for North Carolina Press, 1960. 199 pp. 40s.

This book consists of nine essays written by historians of Southern birth and education. It is thus particularly significant that the traditional attitude toward the history of the South is uniformly rejected. The authors agree that a monolithic Southern culture existed only as a social myth, that the American Civil War was not an inevitable expression of hostility between two opposed 'civilisations'. The basic theme is succinctly expressed by Dr. Sellers, the Editor:

> How . . . did the fundamentally liberal, Christian, American South even become an 'aggressive slavocracy', . . . wage war for the purpose of holding four million human beings in a bondage that violated their humanity? The answer is that Southerners did not and could not rationally and

deliberately choose slavery and its fruits over the values it warred against. Rather it was the very conflict of values, rendered intolerable by constant criticism premised on values Southerners shared, which drove them to seek a violent resolution (p. 67).

This is a challenging and illuminating approach, and it is echoed in virtually all aspects of Southern history which the authors discuss. The richness of the Southern literary tradition is seen to express the continuing conflict of social values; the dominance of the Democratic Party is considered to mask a fundamental liberal-conservative dichotomy; the Southern Negro is viewed as a 'study in attachment and alienation' (p. 130). Like any generalisation, of course, the thesis that the South never had a social existence separate from a broader American culture cannot express the full truth, and the particular method of presentation—each chapter by a different author—tends occasionally to obscure the dominant theme and to introduce conflicting elements which are never resolved. If, however, we regard the book not as a comprehensive study but as a selective discourse, its true value can be appreciated.

The Southern belligerance which led to the outbreak of the Civil War, the demagogy and racism of even the present generation in Southern politics are here explained as symptoms of social instability and uncertain identity. And if we follow the thesis that there was more to unite than to divide North and South, we may understand the reasons that the freed Negro was so quickly relegated to a subservient status after the War; 'for in the sequel of Reconstruction, white Northerners and white Southerners discovered a spiritual brotherhood . . . [in which] material progress took precedence over democracy' (p. 95).

The authors themselves tacitly reveal the same ambivalence toward Southern history that they identify as the theme of that history. Racism and boastful ignorance co-exist in Southern life with an unmistakable grace and gentility; in its simplest terms the present social dilemma in the South expresses the question, if the evil is to be expunged, must the good disappear as well? The history of the South and, indeed, of America in the half-century following the Civil War does not yield a hopeful answer.

ROBERT A. BURT

THE CHINESE OF SEMARANG

A Changing Minority Community in Indonesia

By DONALD EARL WILLMOTT

Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960 and London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 374 pp. 46s.

This book is an account of the Chinese minority community in Semarang, in Java, and is written by a sociologist who has had considerable experience in China and has already to his credit a book on the national status of the Chinese in Indonesia. The present book is based on field work completed in 1954-55, and it is a pity that it has taken the author so long to write it, for the scene with which he is concerned is a rapidly changing one (not least where it concerns the position of the Dutch).

Dr. Willmott has a wide field of view. He is concerned with the economic activities of the Chinese in Semarang, with their relations to other ethnic groups, and with Chinese community structure, family systems, organisations, leadership, schools, and religion. His account is clearly and on the whole attractively written, though there is some repetition. He is at his best in developing such themes as the differences between Peranakans (Indonesian-born Chinese) and Totoks (China-born Chinese), and the contrasts between religious attitudes in China and those amongst the Chinese of Semarang.

Those whose primary interest is in race relations will, however, probably be a little disappointed by his Chapter 4 ('Ethnic Group Relations') in which he brings together his findings on the relations between the Chinese and Indonesians, Dutch and other groups. The chapter is short, its argument is not fully developed, and it leaves a number of questions unanswered.

B. H. FARMER

DOUBLE IDENTITY: THE CHINESE IN MODERN THAILAND

By RICHARD J. COUGHLIN

London, Oxford University Press for the Hong Kong University Press, 1960. 222 pp. 37s. 6d.

The story of the Chinese in South East Asia forms a kind of antipole to the more familiar forms of racialism. The Southern Chinese immigrants are similar to, and often identical with the physical types in their adopted countries. While their 'hosts' live mainly in the countryside, the Chinese live almost entirely in the towns: so they do not 'run down the neighbourhood'. Religion forms a barrier in the Malaysian countries, but in Thailand immigrants and hosts have borrowed from each other to evolve a syncretic Buddhism-cum-animism. In the economic sphere the Chinese have created wealth (as by tin-mining). Moreover, in Thailand persons of Chinese race have played a patriotic role in national history: like Taksin, who rallied the kingdom after the Burmese sack of Ayudhia. Many ministers and governors have been pure Chinese, while the reigning dynasty has a substantial admixture of Chinese blood. Why, then, are they so frequently resented? The answer seems to be that, however long their families have been domiciled in the South Seas, they still regard themselves as belonging to the Middle Kingdom. Whereas the West Indian immigrant to Britain longs to be recognised as British, the Chinese immigrant to South East Asia is indifferent to the culture of his adopted land; he remains sealed off in the superiority of his own tradition.

Mr. Coughlin decided to write his book for the 'intelligent reader' at large. He has given us a work which is scholarly and fully documented but which eschews sociological jargon and presents its argument clearly and cogently. He covers a broad field of social, economic, and political activity within a relatively limited compass. Some of his most interesting passages concern the mixed Sino-Thai, who move freely in two worlds and who form a notable component in the administration, and other services.

Mr. Coughlin detects signs of the assimilation of both Chinese and Thai at a fairly sophisticated level towards a westernised norm. At the same time he notes the steady increase in Chinese economic power as Western operations decline. He concludes by suggesting (pp. 204-5) that China's millions must eventually dominate and perhaps absorb South East Asia. We have been so conditioned to think of the inevitable assimilation of an immigrant minority group by the host society that we overlook too easily the likelihood of the host society itself being overwhelmed, demographically and culturally by its giant neighbour . . . The overseas Chinese have a double identity, both Chinese and Southeast Asian; rather than a withering ethnic group, they may in fact be the present-day image of the future Southeast Asian.

This is about the best future one can hope for in the area: the alternative solution would be the fate of Tibet.

HUGH TINKER

MERCHANT IN A MIRROR

By WILFRED RUSSELL

London, Asia Publishing Company, 1961. 264 pp. 21s.

Wilfred Russell's life began on lines conventional enough. There was money, and his family had connexions and friends in France and America. He went from Marlborough to Cambridge, and did not get either the First or the Blue which it was possible to think of; on the other hand, he enjoyed himself enormously and dipped deeply into two lives, one with the Hawks Club and the athletes, the other with gramophone records and French literature. Winter sports, long vacations in America—it was all very pleasant. He missed the Diplomatic and went to India as a merchant in one of the great finance houses of Bombay.

And to begin with this too was conventional and pleasant, a little flatter perhaps, a little more philistine; and a sharp jar to the spine when he heard senior ladies, those dragons of Anglo-India, speak of how dreadful it was to have to dine

with Indians. But gradually a change came; he began to meet Indians who were so anglicised that you could forget they were Indians; then he began to meet Indians who had not been to an English school or to Cambridge, who were orthodox Hindus, who were bitter about the English, who belonged to another class.

You might call his book a love affair with India, begun unwillingly, continued with most of his heart but less than half his will. He trained and worked and fought with Indian pilots during the war; he married an Indian wife. This is not strictly true because Sheila Russell's mother was English but they were a family who had decided to be Indian. Tweeds to play golf but a sari in the drawing-room—her family are happy expositors of the culture of which such clothes might be the symbol. Yet Wilfred Russell himself remains obstinately normal, obstinately English. He likes most of the people he meets; he sometimes fights them but he is good-natured about what is best in them. His book therefore will not be a success with the Sunday critics; there is neither *Angst* nor Augustan elegance, but a running pen and a warm heart. There will, nonetheless, be readers —some because they remember the faces and the names, others to whom it will be one more documentary of the last days of British rule. There is also a useful appendix on the life of the British after independence and an interesting suggestion that the traditional contempt of the Brahman and the Thakur for the Bania has something to do with the attitude of the Government of India towards private business today. Before the British came the Indian business man, rightly apprehensive of what might befall him from a hostile government, took what he could when he could and displayed just those shortsighted, avaricious, and timid chatacteristics which his detractors have always attributed to him. And today when the Brahman's orthodox contempt has turned socialist and speaks with approval of the public sector; he has still little encouragement to take a long view. To readers of *Race*, however, perhaps the reflection which this book will bring most often is that if everyone was as sane and as courteous as Wilfred Russell, no one would have heard of race relations.

PHILIP MASON

RACE

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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO COLOUR VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN

ALLEN D. GRIMSHAW

Anthony Richmond, in a 1954 monograph, examined patterns of relations between West Indian Negroes in England and other English groups in an attempt to see whether a general theory of intergroup relations based on American experience could illuminate that of Britain.[1] He observed that different historical and cultural factors in the two countries might be expected to produce significant contrasts but felt that similar patterns appearing in different social contexts could provide more convincing confirmation of a general theory than further re-examination of American materials. The purpose of this paper is to carry such comparative study a step further, through examination of a particular variety of intergroup relations in the United States and England—relations culminating in social racial violence. There are marked differences between historical patterns of coloured-white conflict in the two countries, particularly those differences generated by a briefer history of a much smaller (both in absolute and in relative size) coloured community in Britain. Similarities confirming a general theory of racial conflict are, however, no less remarkable.

Violence is social when it is directed against an individual or his property solely or primarily because of his membership in a social category.[2] Thus if a West Indian or West African in Britain or a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant in the United States is assaulted because he is a West Indian or a West African or an Anglo-Saxon Protestant, this is social violence. If, on the other hand, he is the random victim of armed robbery because he happens to be in the right place at the right time, or if his home or place of business is randomly vandalised, there is violence, but not social violence. Group violence against persons because of colour, whether or not it is mutual, is particularly noticeable because of the saliency of the social characteristic involved and, in the United States, has been of great social cost.

Research on urban race riots in the United States resulted in two findings which are of relevance for general interpretations of intergroup relations.[3] The first is essentially confirmed by more limited English experience, the second cannot be tested with any assurance because of insufficient data. Both findings seem banal once stated,

[1] Anthony H. Richmond, *Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941–1951*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.

[2] Allen D. Grimshaw, 'A Study in Social Violence: Urban Race Riots in the United States', Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1959.

[3] See Allen D. Grimshaw, 'Lawlessness and Violence in America and their Special Manifestations in Changing Negro-White Relationships', *Journal of Negro History*, 44, 1, January 1959: 52-72 and, 'Relationships among Prejudice, Discrimination, Social Tension and Social Violence', *Journal of Intergroup Relations*, 2, 4, Autumn 1961: 302–310.

neither has been stated with sufficient emphasis in the research literature.

The first was that urban racial social violence in the United States has resulted not from conscious policy decisions of either the white or the Negro group, but rather from reactions of the dominant group to real or perceived assaults upon the accommodative structure. There may have been occasional instances when whites, for political purposes, manufactured threats by Negroes against the *status quo* or where particularly militant members of the minority have espoused violence against whites as a tactical policy. In the large, however, when the Negro has 'stayed in his place' Negro-white violence has been very rare. This has been true not only during the current century, with widespread urban rioting in northern states, but in all historical periods of Negro-white violence in the United States.

With the exception of a brief period after the Civil War, the pattern closely approximated the classic accommodative pattern of superordination-subordination, with the whites a continually dominant group. The most savage oppression, whether expressed in rural lynchings and pogroms or in urban race riots, has taken place when the Negro has refused to accept a subordinate status. The most intense conflict has resulted when the subordinate group has attempted to disrupt the *status quo* or when the superordinate group has defined the situation as one in which such an attempt is being made (and British experience confirms the American, that the reality of such an attempt is irrelevant, belief in it alone being sufficient to generate conflict). Conflict in Negro-white relationships in the United States has been conflict generated by the breakdown of an essentially unstable accommodative pattern, essentially unstable because the subordinated group has refused to accept its status and has had increasing power with which to challenge it.

Two obvious differences between coloured-white relationships in Britain and in the United States are suggested in the paragraph above. The first is that Britain, unlike the United States, has no history of a 'colour problem' of any magnitude prior to the First World War.[4] Britain's experience since then has been similar to that of the United States, but conflicts have occurred on a much smaller scale and the development of intergroup relationships, including patterns of prejudice and discrimination, has occurred at a different pace. The lack of a long tradition of conflict and violence in England has given the coloured community a fund of goodwill and tolerance which, in the view of many American whites, never existed or was long ago exhausted by Negroes in America. The second difference, of course, is the much smaller size of the coloured community in Britain. Even the highest estimate of the size of the group places its number at around 200,000—substantially less than 1 per cent of

[4] This is true in spite of occasional reports of disturbances in dockland areas or references to coloured 'gangs' at very early periods. Such instances were small in scope and affected a minimal proportion of England's white population.

the total population.[5] The total non-white population of the United States (constituted largely of Negroes) is slightly over 10 per cent of the population and is probably close to 20,000,000. There are several cities in the United States with non-white populations greater than 200,000, some with Negro populations larger than those of smaller African states. Coloured people in the United States can, with increasing effectiveness, show the power necessary to challenge their subordinated status. Events of recent years, such as the non-violent demonstrations of power in the Deep South, show the Negro population of the United States unwilling to wait for spontaneous concessions from the majority community. The coloured community in Britain is too small and too weak to challenge the accommodative structure so sharply as to generate violence comparable to that which has occurred in the United States.

The second major finding of the research on American race riots was a reaffirmation of the importance of external forces of constraint in the determination of the occurrence or non-occurrence of social violence. This conclusion is also obvious once stated, though perhaps less obvious from the perspective of events in Britain. British students of intergroup relations who have attempted to isolate the relationships among prejudice and discrimination and conflict have found the assertion that discriminatory behaviour is merely the acting out of prejudiced attitudes to be, at best, an over-simplification. In the research on urban racial violence in the United States an attempt was made to analyse factors involved in the development of 'violence-proneness'.[6] In addition to a review of the many causal allegations about urban race riots, this required a careful examination of relationships among prejudice, discrimination, social tension and social violence. If the concepts of prejudice, discrimination, social tension and social violence represent real phenomena, it should be possible to state relationships among the variables which are so labelled. Relationships between prejudice and discrimination have frequently been stated and attempts have been made to isolate relationships between social tension and social violence. Systematising of the interrelationships among all four phenomena simultaneously had not been done.[7] It was from such an attempt that this second major conclusion emerged.

A brief review may help to understand some of the American experience and, perhaps, to anticipate some possible development in Britain. It is possible for a prejudiced person to fail to act in a discriminatory manner and for a non-prejudiced person to discriminate. A violently anti-Negro southern white American may find himself seated next to a Negro in an eating facility or in public transportation

[5] See, among others, James Wickenden, *Colour in Britain*, London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1958, and Ruth Glass, *Newcomers: the West Indians in London*, London, Allen & Unwin for Centre for Urban Studies, 1960.

[6] See, e.g., 'Negro-White Relations in the Urban North: Two Areas of High Conflict Potential', forthcoming in the *Journal of Intergroup Relations*.

[7] An attempt to do this is made in Grimshaw, 1961, *op. cit.*

in the north. Law has intervened to prevent discrimination. When the law intervenes massively to prevent discrimination, as in fair housing ordinances and the like, an increase in social tension will occur. The law in some southern states will, in the same manner, force a white northerner, liberal or illiberal, to acquiesce in discrimination if he wants public lodging or wants to eat in a public place.

When social tension occurs, whether it is generated by the kind of event just mentioned, or others which will be noted below, it is not automatically followed by violence. Nor, on the other hand, is social violence always preceded by a period in which there is a gradual build-up of social tension. Readers will be familiar with instances where organisations with a monopoly of the legal use of force (police or the military) have prevented, by a firm stance, the eruption of violence between categories defined by social characteristics.[8] British readers may be less familiar with instances in which the police, because of partisanship or inefficiency, have been unable to control violence.[9] They will also recall instances in which violence, perhaps spontaneously generated, quickly becomes social violence in the sense of this paper.[10] The claim has been made that major racial violence in the United States has occurred only when the police have been corrupt, partisan, ineffective, or some combination of these three characteristics (such a claim fails to explain, of course, why violence has *not* occurred in some cities). The appearance of any of these characteristics, of course, is likely to be followed by the others. If the English constabulary is as stouthearted and honest as it is generally believed to be (by Americans, who must make comparisons with the frequently scandalous actions of their own police), large-scale racial violence is not likely to occur. It is not likely, however, that British police will be put to the test. Events of 1958 notwithstanding, there have been no major outbreaks of racial violence in England. Banton remarks, of the events in Nottingham and North Kensington, 'The disturbances were widely described as "race riots", an expression which may cause people to overlook the fact that no one was killed and no one—apparently—severely disabled.'[11] The small size of the coloured community in Britain and its relatively great dispersion makes unlikely the occurrence of the widespread violence which characterised major riots in the United States (such as those of Chicago in 1919 and Detroit in 1943, in both of which several dozen persons were killed and hundreds injured).

Many people are prejudiced. External constraint, in the form of law, may serve to prevent them from discriminating. Such constraint serves to increase social tension—as discrimination itself creates

[8] This is the role claimed by Britain in the months of communal strife preceding independence in India and Pakistan.

[9] References to such cases appear with some frequency, however, in the *Summary of Press News and Comment*, published by the Institute of Race Relations until December 1960.

[10] For some illustrations see, Grimshaw, 1961, *op. cit.*

[11] Michael Banton, *White and Coloured: The Behaviour of British People Towards Coloured Immigrants*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1959.

tension in the coloured minority. If sufficient strength is demonstrated by an unbiased force of external constraint social violence will not occur. (It may be noted that it is theoretically feasible to assert that there is some absolute threshold of social tension above which social violence *must* occur. However, a ceiling on the effectiveness of external controls seems a more likely limit to the suppression of violence. As has been noted, this ceiling is not likely to be reached in Britain.)

It is unlikely that the findings on the importance of external variables of control will find a test in Britain. In this paper attention will be focused on factors which contribute to social tensions and to generally more moderate forms of social conflict, erupting only occasionally as social violence. Here there is a very high degree of comparability between British and American experience. The factors which have contributed to rising racial tensions in England have also been important in the creation of 'violence-proneness' in the United States. Additional factors in the latter country, however, have received less attention in England and have been of less importance.

Causal analysis of social conflict and of social tensions underlying conflict can take place on three levels. In the most fundamental sense, all general historical trends; changes in intellectual *milieux*; changes in economic organisation; changes in international relationships; urbanisation and industrialisation, have contributed to the development of social situations conducive to social conflict. A second variety of causal analysis, micro-social rather than macro-social, involves the isolation and analysis of specific incidents which provide occasions for social disturbances. Given a sufficient level of social tension and/or a sufficiently low level of efficiency in agencies of external control, any one of a variety of incidents can initiate conflict processes. Finally, a third set of factors consists of the characteristics of relations between conflicting groups; in which an opposing group is identified, in which accommodative relations are strained and in which there are gradual increases in social tension and violence-potential. In these sets of relationships there are marked similarities between American and English experience.

These factors vary in degree of specificity as to time and locale. They are commonly characterised by identification of opposing groups. They may be distinguished by the type of intergroup contact which they involve. Most notable, in both countries, are those areas of interaction where contact is direct and assault upon the *status quo* therefore most noticeable. While smaller numbers of whites have been involved in Britain than in the United States, direct contacts between white and coloured persons have occurred in housing, in employment and in recreation. Processes of segregation, invasion, succession and re-segregation have characterised patterns of coloured housing in both countries. Both mixed (Stepney) and segregated (Cardiff) patterns of occupancy can be found in Britain, but disputes

have frequently occurred in areas where a transition from segregated to mixed patterns has begun. The most publicised events in the northern states since the Second World War (in Cicero, Illinois; Trumbill Park in Chicago; and in Levittown, Pennsylvania) have all followed the appearance of Negroes in previously all-white areas. Housing disputes were of great importance in the generation of social tensions which culminated in the Chicago riot of 1919, one of the bloodiest twentieth-century disturbances in the United States.[12]

A complex of personal, cultural, social and economic variables raise housing to a position of great importance in the determination of patterns of prejudice and tension in intergroup relations. In the United States, as in England, 'a man's home is his castle'. But it is more than this. In most instances it is his single most valuable economic possession, and any perception of threat to its value, whether warranted or not, is a threat to himself. In so far as coloured persons are conceived of as having inferior status, living in the same neighbourhood with them will, many whites believe, cause their own status to deteriorate. The cultural differences of white and coloured, in social activities, conceptions of morality and the like when, for example, he discovers his hours of sleep do not coincide with those of his new neighbours, frequently cause the white person to feel personally attacked. It is true, furthermore, that when genuine housing shortages exist, coloured movement into a neighbourhood may cause some deterioration. Landlords, knowing the greater difficulty in finding housing which confronts the coloured person, will charge him greater rent for equivalent or even less desirable housing. The higher rent, frequently coupled with lower income, can cause one of two patterns to develop—both of which serve to cause housing quality to be damaged. The first is a fragmentation of dwelling units in which more and more persons are crowded into a single dwelling. The second is one in which so great a portion of the tenant's income must be spent on housing that he is unable to maintain the property. Where other housing, either public or private, is obtainable some landlords are content to let properties deteriorate knowing that their tenants will have to stay in them and that municipalities cannot condemn the buildings because no alternatives are available. Thus we find an instance of the 'self-fulfilling prophecy', and neighbourhoods do deteriorate and values do fall.

Another area of interaction in which there is direct contact and in which social tensions have been generated in both Britain and the United States is that of work. Here, however, the differences in historical background in the two countries and differences in the size and character of the labour forces involved, have interacted to produce a situation in contemporary Britain, which while superficially similar to that in the United States, is in reality not.

[12] A study of this Chicago riot, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago*, Chicago, 1922, is the best single study of a case of racial violence available.

Large-scale violence over coloured labour occurred a century ago in the United States. The domestic situation in the north during the Civil War was marked by numerous civil disturbances. There was violent rioting in Cincinatti in 1862, apparently growing out of competition of Negro and Irish hands on the riverboats. Other riots at the same time combined as their basic causes hostility to a war-time draft which was inequitable and a concomitant fear that Negroes would take over the jobs of white labour. The most spectacular of these so-called 'Draft Riots', which took place in New York City in July of 1863, remains the bloodiest case of inter-racial violence in American history. Estimates of deaths of white rioters alone range as high as 1,500 and, while the total number of Negroes slain is unknown, the population of Negroes in the city dropped by 20 per cent, from 12,472 to 9,945, between 1860 and 1865. The Draft Riots in New York had at least two interacting causes, one direct and one indirect, which were related to the status of the Negro. The discriminatory nature of the draft legislation was felt particularly by working-class people who were unable to pay for substitutes. They were being forced to fight in a war about which they had no enthusiasm. In addition, they felt they were being forced to fight to 'free the niggers', whom they perceived as a threat as a source of cheap labour. It is claimed that these fears were nourished and encouraged by anti-Administration politicians and the Democratic press.[13]

In the years after the Civil War coloured participation in the labour force continued to be a source of social tensions. Negroes were denied the right to engage in some kinds of employment, in both the north and the south, and were often paid lower wages for performing the same tasks as whites. At the time of the First World War, however, labour shortages in northern industry precipitated very substantial migration of coloured persons to northern cities and factories. Some of the large-scale disturbances which occurred in the years during and immediately after the First War, in East St. Louis and Chicago, had disputes over jobs as an important contributory cause.

In the years after the war, the complexion of the labour problem in the north changed. In a context of unionism quite different from that in Britain, Negroes had developed a not unwarranted suspicion of and hostility towards unions. Experiences with unions had meant one thing to the coloured community, a reification of barriers to the industrial progress of the Negro labourer. While some Negro leaders, a small but vociferous minority, insisted that salvation lay within the union, Negroes as a group were anti-union and remained so. As industrial unionism developed in the thirties, however, white labour leaders saw that as long as Negroes constituted a large bloc of anti-union labour it would be relatively easy for large employers to break strikes through the importation and employment of Negro workers. A Negro labour force which had moved north in response

[13] The paragraph above is adapted from Grimshaw, 'Lawlessness and Violence, etc.', 1959, *op. cit.*

to war-time needs had stayed on to be used by employers to stave off the encroachments of union power. Packing and steel strikes in the twenties and automotive and rubber strikes in the thirties forced unions to bring in coloured workers. These men stayed in unions and became good union men, in spite of frequent protests from the white rank-and-file. Frequently, however, official policies were honoured only in the breach by union locals and, in spite of activities of the Federal Government, Negroes continued to be last hired and first fired.

As the Second World War approached, and industry stepped up its pace, Negroes again found themselves in an increasingly tenuous situation. Defence industry was in desperate need of trained personnel and the Government undertook the responsibility of providing much of this training. In spite of some of the gains of the inter-war period most of this training was provided for whites only and Negroes found themselves systematically excluded from opportunities for training and subsequent skilled employment. Concurrently, northward migration of southern whites into industrial areas such as Detroit, began to undermine the position even of those Negroes who were unionised. The period prior to the Detroit riot of 1943 was punctuated by a series of wild-cat strikes in the Detroit area directed against the upgrading of Negroes.

With increased employment—for whites—at the beginning of the Second World War, and a subsequent closing down of Federal work programmes, Negroes again made up the bulk of relief cases and of the unemployed. They were taken into the military arms on a quota basis; were not incorporated into training programmes; and were last hired. Murmurs of Negro protest, never completely stilled, grew to an almost strident roar and Negro leaders asked publicly why they should fight a 'white man's war to maintain Jim Crow'. In 1940 and 1941 there emerged from the protest the March on Washington Committee, an all-Negro movement unprecedented in its inclusion of Negroes and Negro organisations from across the whole spectrum of militancy.[14] While the later activities of the March on Washington Movement did not culminate in unqualified success, partly at least because some of the government officials involved were either unsympathetic or felt that rigid enforcement of non-discriminatory practices might hurt the war effort, the activities of the M.O.W.C. either coerced President Roosevelt into issuing Executive Order 8802 appointing the Committee on Fair Employment Practices or made it politically possible for him to do this.

Commentors have not agreed in the evaluation of the effectiveness of F.E.P.C. Some have emphasised its success, particularly in increasing Negro employment in government agencies. Others have claimed that the incorporation of coloured persons into the labour

[14] An excellent study of the activities and achievements of the M.O.W.C. and its successor organisations the M.O.W.M. is to be found in Herbert Garfinkel, *When Negroes March*, Glencoe.

force, particularly in defence industries, resulted from the very real exigencies of a war-time labour market. Negroes and other coloured persons were initially hired when there were no whites available, they claim, and once employed unions were compelled to organise them. By the time the war was over certain types of employment, usually dirty jobs, had become identified as 'ethnic jobs' and coloured persons were so firmly entrenched in them that it was not possible to displace them (this, of course, is merely another form of segregation).[15]

Whatever the precise interaction of causal variables may have been, by the middle of the fifties the position of the Negro in the labour movement in the northern and western United States seems to have become that of earlier migrant groups. Many of the craft unions, long the strongholds of anti-Negro sentiment, are now agreed at least in principle to equal rights for all employees. Most of the gains made by coloured labour in the war were maintained, although Negroes still hold a disproportionate share of 'dirty' jobs. Negroes, as a group, have not attained job parity with white fellow workers; findings of the United States Civil Rights Commission and current activities of the Negro Labor Congress (within the A.F.L.-C.I.O.) do not permit such an interpretation. Nonetheless it is here, as in probably no other area of race relations in the United States, that Negroes have been able to break down the colour bar and become not only assimilated, but partly integrated as well. There have been no expressions of public concern by the leaders of organised labour, in the years since the Second World War, over too rapid incorporation of Negroes into the labour force, nor any suggestion that they should not be employed when whites are not. Pressure has come rather from Negro leaders, who point to the higher rates of unemployment and the lower ratings of Negroes. George Meany, the President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has criticised A. Phillips Randolph, the major Negro leader in organised labour, for pressing too hard; but concedes the right of Negroes to full and equitable employment under identical work rules.

The review above of the labour history of coloured Americans is, perhaps, suggestive of British parallels. Differences between the two countries will be more instructive in a look towards the future than will be similarities. The history of coloured participation in the work force in Britain covers a scant four decades. The traditions of British trade unionism are, in the large, more liberal than those of much of the American labour movement, although Britain too has had its craft snobbery. More important, perhaps, is the much smaller relative and absolute size of the coloured minority in Britain as contrasted to that in the United States.

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[15] See, Scott Greer, *Last Man In: Racial Access to Union Power*, Glencoe, 1959. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his study is his demonstration of the manner in which organisational structure and environment operate to constrain the anti-discriminatory activities of even those most militantly committed to equality. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that some positions in public transportation in Britain are apparently coming to be defined as 'coloured jobs'.

Coloured workers in Britain first appeared in any numbers at all during the period of the First World War, in response to pressures similar to those which precipitated northward migration of southern American Negroes. They were engaged then, as they are to a certain extent to the present, in the maritime trades and in longshore work. During the period following the war, and through the inter-war years, there were occasional clashes, frequently generated by allegations that coloured workers undercut white wages. The numbers involved were small, the Government acted in what has been labelled a discriminatory manner (Aliens Order of 1920 and Special Restriction Order of 1925) and exposure to conflict was limited, both geographically and socially. With the onset of the Second World War a series of immigration schemes were initiated with the joint purposes of relieving unemployment in the West Indies, providing labour for British war industries, and 'strengthening the bonds between Great Britain and the West Indies'. The workers who came under these schemes, along with post-war immigrants from both the West Indies and West Africa, have been those involved in the tensions and disputes of the last decade and a half. These workers have had more varied participation in the labour force and in some instances have been highly skilled. It is an interaction between claims of discrimination made by these men and claims that they have taken away jobs from British workers that is at the root of current difficulties. That there has been discrimination is clear, both from statements of individual employers and from statistics of unemployment, which consistently show coloured workers to be disproportionately unemployed. British writers have observed that here, as in the case of housing, a complex of factors: personal (prejudice), social (fear of status-deprivation on the part of whites, extreme sensitivity on the part of coloured persons), economic (threats of loss of income), and cultural (lack of preparation for life in England, differences in work and consumption patterns, and the like) interact to contribute to the increase of social tensions.

The discussion above notwithstanding, from an American perspective it seems unlikely that there will be substantial increases in the magnitude of social frictions generated in the area of employment of coloured labour. This will be true even in the event of a major increase in unemployment due to recession, which seems unlikely in the years ahead. The reason for this can be found in the essential powerlessness of the coloured working force in Britain. Even if it were possible for the sub-groups within the coloured minority to come together and agree to act as a bargaining unit, it would not be possible for them to substantially alter current patterns of accommodation. There is no prospect of a war-time labour shortage similar to that of the early forties developing again—and even if there were, a threat by the group to withhold their labour would be an inconvenience rather than a disaster. Similarly, a threat to organise against the trade unions—as strike breakers—would be of little effect outside

of a limited number of industries, which would doubtless reject such offers even if they were made, in fear of long-term consequences. If, as seems to be likely, coloured persons in Britain gain increasingly diversified employment, major attacks on the *status quo* would be even more improbable. Government anti-discrimination legislation might have the effect of temporarily increasing prejudice and tension in the dominant group; this would have little impact on long-range possibilities of overt conflict. If, as seems to be the case, West Indian authorities are more carefully preparing their emigrants to be aware of the hardships which may await them in Britain and if control over dishonest travel agents is asserted, increases in friction will be even less likely. Individual problems will continue, and some muttering from both white and coloured persons can be expected. Major disorders seem very unlikely.

A final area of direct contact should be mentioned. The problem of access to recreational and other public facilities has generated more social tension in Britain than it has in the United States (although recently lunch-counter 'strikes', other 'sit-down', 'wade-ins', and 'Freedom Rides' have shown a changing emphasis in this country). Paradoxically, it has been the smaller size of the community, along with its social-demographic composition, which has been responsible for the greater importance of access to public facilities as a tension-producing factor in England. A consequence of segregation of absolutely large Negro and coloured populations in the urban centres of the northern United States has been the development of autonomous sub-cities, with all-Negro recreational institutions. In England, on the other hand, no cities, except perhaps those with the largest coloured populations, can support such segregated facilities, even were they considered desirable. A result has been that coloured and white persons have been thrown into close contact, frequently in those situations which may be most prone to misunderstandings and conflict. Several of the disturbances which have occurred in Britain since the war have occurred in public houses or in the streets outside public houses at closing time.

Other disturbances have occurred at public dance halls. Problems have been generated here which can be directly traced to the tremendously high sex ratio of the coloured community. It has been only in recent years that whole families and single unattached women have joined in the stream of immigrants to Britain from the West Indies. The West African immigrants have continued to be largely males and the same holds, with some exceptions, for the Pakistani and Indian immigrants. Understandably, these unattached males have sought female companionship. Collins notes that coloured men are resented when they consort with white women as miscegenation is considered a challenge to white supremacy.[16] Richmond claims that, with the possible exception of employment, the area of most intense prejudice against West Indian Negroes is that of sexual

[16] Sydney Collins, *Coloured Minorities in Britain*, London, Lutterworth Press, 1957.

relations.[17] Most students of race relations in Britain have emphasised the low social and economic status of the women who become involved with coloured males. It seems likely that for many of these women, intermarriage and inter-cohabitation serves as a route to security which would otherwise not be available. But both the women and their coloured consorts have been subjected to public vilification and abuse, and occasional physical violence.

It is difficult to determine the precise sources of antipathy over this social mixing of coloured males and white females. While there has been a residue of colonial attitudes reminiscent of Kipling, it seems probable that more direct competition for female companionship is also involved. During the war, and to a lesser extent in the post-war years, American Negro soldiers in Britain have had, because of their somewhat higher incomes, an advantage in competition. The determination of these men to seek out white female companionship was not lessened by the stereotyped expressions which were brought to England by white American soldiers. Several dance halls closed their doors to American Negro soldiers and West Indians alike during the war on the grounds that there would otherwise be violence. There seems to be some element of punitiveness in the response of West Indian males to the discomfort of whites in this area, and there have been expressions which suggest that sexual relations with white women have been interpreted as assault on the *status quo* by the coloured as well as white persons. In spite of all this, and in spite of the occasionally deprived socio-economic backgrounds of white females who become involved with coloured males, many of the relationships show remarkable stability and several students have noted that the women frequently identify with their coloured consorts and in the case of women who have married Muslims have often converted to Islam. As the coloured population grows in size its demographic composition will become more normal and more marriage will take place within the community. Nonetheless, interracial relationships will continue. Whether or not they will be the cause of antipathies which are further heightened can be doubted; it seems probable that when intergroup sexual relations are emphasised as a source of conflict, such attribution may screen more basic economic and social competition.

Two further areas of high direct contact have been influential in patterns of intergroup relations in the United States: public transportation and education. These two areas have been of less impact on relations between coloured and white people in Britain than employment, housing and sexual relations. Nor have areas of indirect contact been of substantial importance in British race relations. In labour and employment, in housing, in recreation, in public transportation, and in the school there is continual evidence of direct assault upon the *status quo*. Another set of factors show the influence of activities either by coloured persons or whites who may not be

[17] *Op. cit.*

involved in any contact whatsoever, or in very little contact. Most whites, in England and to a somewhat lesser extent in the United States, continue to have little contact with Negroes, and the conflicts which occur seem remote.

In the United States several factors have influenced patterns of intergroup relations in ways which have been less evident in Britain. Coloured participation in politics, the treatment of the Negro in the white press and of whites in a Negro press, and Negro involvement in crime and in relations with the police have all contributed to social tension in the two communities.

An apparently unanticipated consequence of segregated Negro housing and a concentration of Negroes in limited geographical areas in the urban north of the United States has been a sharp growth in Negro political power. It has been claimed that if Negroes vote as a bloc they can control national elections. One thing is certain. No administration in a northern city with a sizeable Negro population can ignore the importance of the Negro vote. In the long run, of course, this fact has ramifications in the areas of direct contact already examined.

In the south, particularly in the past but to a certain extent even today, the very act of voting by a Negro was a breach of 'racial etiquette' and a cause for concern and occasional violence. Several major riots in the south grew, either directly or indirectly, out of Negro political activity. Some of the current tension in the American south has developed directly from attempts by Negroes to gain, or regain, the franchise and some Negro leaders feel that the franchise is more important than access to schools, transportation, or other public facilities. The small size and relatively great dispersion of the coloured community in Britain makes unlikely the development of political participation as an issue in intergroup relations.

The role of the press in race relations is problematical. While there is virtually no coloured press in Britain, several authors have emphasised the role of the press in the creation of anxieties and tension and, in the case of the 1958 disturbances, the spread of violence. The study of urban race riots in the United States included conclusions on the role of the press. Both the Negro and the white press have 'slanted' new presentation; however, this may result from a reflection of reader's attitudes, as seen by editors, rather than from conscious policy. Studies in this area frequently fail to study the dimensions of attitudes and fail to make explicit the link between attitude and behaviour. Biased news presentations probably reach already prejudiced individuals and re-inforce rather than mould attitudes. Such re-inforcement may raise levels of social tension; it is doubtful that this alone would create a situation of 'violence-proneness'; there are other networks of communication.[18]

Examination of available British materials suggests no major

[18] Note, however, the discussions of the press, in Wickenden, *op. cit.*, and Glass, *op. cit.*, and the coverage of press reports in the Institute's summaries.

changes in this evaluation of the importance of the press. Wide newspaper (and television) coverage of events in Nottingham and Notting Hill and references to 'Teddy Boys' may have had some influence on suggestible youth. The influence of the mass media, however, was probably more in determining when disturbances took place than in whether they would take place at all. Similarly, agitation, whether by the Ku Klux Klan and the White Defence League or by Communists, can be discounted as having any major influence in creation of social tensions leading to violence. Given sufficiently high social tension a variety of events could precipitate violence. It can be seriously doubted, however, that mass media coverage alone is responsible for major increments in tension. While the role of the mass media might be greater in England because of the reduced impact of other variables, it is also true that the press has taken a generally more responsible and less inflammatory position in Britain than it has historically in the United States.

Negro crime and Negro relations with the police have been major, if unmeasurable, influences in the creation of social tensions between the white and coloured communities in the United States. Richmond and Collins both state that police in England remark on a relative absence of adult crime and juvenile delinquency among the coloured minority in Britain and emphasise that a small segment of the community is responsible for a major portion of law-breaking.[19] This has not been true in the United States. Negro rates of crime, no matter how carefully defined and standardised, are consistently greater than those for whites. The causes may well lie in differential treatment of the Negro and in patterns of widespread social deprivation. The causes, however, are irrelevant and whites respond to reported Negro crime with a generalised fear and antipathy. Negroes, in turn, expect differential and unfair treatment from law-enforcing agencies; are therefore more likely to resist arrest, are therefore more roughly handled—another example of reflexive prophecy. Reports of incidents of racial violence in England suggest that coloured persons have more frequently been arrested and that police have not always acted with complete impartiality. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that there is as widespread distrust and suspicion by the coloured minority—nor as warranted—of the police in Britain as is true in the United States. While the situation may change, it is probably fair to say that these two problems, Negro crime as creating apprehension in the white community and Negro relations with the police as creating social tension among members of the coloured community, will be of great import in race relations in Britain at least for the next few years.

In the pages above an attempt has been made to trace out the influence of several factors involved in the building up of racial

[19] *Op. cit.* The later numbers of the Institute summaries carried a warning that reports of coloured crime and difficulties with the police should be used with great caution.

tensions. No attempt has been made to assess weights of importance for the various factors, though it would seem that in England some of them, for reasons specified, are of less importance than they are in the United States. References have been made to the essential irrelevance of incidents actually precipitating overt conflict—the claim has been made that given a sufficient level of tension almost any incident could serve to set off a disturbance.[20]

In concluding, attention is directed to three problems which cannot be treated here because of limitations of space, but which are nonetheless of considerable importance in an understanding of problems of intergroup relations in Great Britain and in the United States. The first of these has to do with major changes in the form of assaults upon the *status quo* of race relations in the United States which have occurred in the last few years. The second has to do with possible interactions of events and publicity of these events of racial conflict in the two countries—e.g., the coverage of the 1958 disturbances in Nottingham and North Kensington in the American press and British news on American events. Finally, some of the difficulties inherent in forecasting patterns of interracial adjustment and conflict can be noted.

In early 1960 racial conflict in the United States appeared in a previously unexperienced form. Demonstrations by Negro youth, largely students, were directed first against segregation in public eating facilities and then in public transportation. These demonstrations differ from previous patterns in the characteristics of the protestors, who are middle-class and respectable; and in the tremendous restraint with which the Negro participants have acted, even when subjected to considerable physical abuse by white youth (e.g., the dropping of lighted cigarettes down the backs of Negro students seated at lunch counters in a silent request for service) and the quiet acceptance, even courting, of arrest. In view of the historical patterning of race relations in the American south, the restraint and apparent impartiality of *most* municipal officials and police is also remarkable. Almost equal numbers of whites and Negroes, for example, have been taken into custody. The long-range consequences of these activities, along with major and again self-conscious, assaults on the accommodative structure through legal pressures, cannot as yet be discerned. Social tensions have certainly increased, but changes in behaviour are also taking place.[21]

Press coverage, it has been suggested above, has less influence on shaping racial attitudes within a country than is sometimes thought.

[20] It might be noted that a crude dichotomy of sacred and secular has proved heuristically useful in the analysis of immediate events precipitating violent social conflict. Sacred and secular does not mean religious and non-religious, but refers to conflicts which involve assaults on the integrity of deeply rooted value systems as contrasted to those which involve assaults on secular privileges. Problems of jobs and employment can be contrasted, as secular conflict, to problems of sexual relations which violate the ideology of 'white supremacy'.

[21] See, on some of these changes, Allen D. Grimshaw, 'Urban Racial Violence in the United States: Some Changing Ecological Considerations', *American Journal of Sociology*, 66, 2, September 1960: 109–119.

It would be difficult to deny, however, that events of racial conflict in England have gained support for ardent anti-Negroes in the United States (and probably also in South Africa). It seems clear that the American press, including the mass-circulation news weeklies, overplayed the significance of events in Britain. There were substantial tones of 'cast out the mote in thine own eye' in American coverage. *Time* magazine reproduced, apparently with approval, a cartoon by Cummings from the *Daily Express* with the caption, 'Now, perhaps, the English will stop giving us that "More anti-colour bar than thou" stuff'.[22] It is probably true that demonstrations of racialism anywhere in the world will be seized upon by anti-coloured groups wherever they are.

Considerable courage, even foolhardiness, would be required to forecast major racial violence as a result of current events in the American south or north or in England, or even of patterns of continuing tension. It is possible, nonetheless, to note areas of change in the general patterning of race relations which may affect probabilities.[23] The forecasting of racial violence requires knowledge of the history and current status of three factors:

1. The mode and pattern of the assault upon the *status quo*; its direct or indirect nature, the militancy with which it is pressed, and the areas in which it occurs. If, as has been asserted, violence results not from conscious policy of the majority or minority groups, the militancy with which claims for equal treatment are pressed will be of great importance. In England, of course, the size of the communities involved will be important in the perception by the majority of the assault. The appearance of new tactics of non-violence makes even more difficult the forecasting of events in the arena of social conflict.

2. The attitude and actions of agencies of external control. There is no direct relation between the level of social tension and the eruption of social violence. Social tension in England, as in the United States, will continue to be generated by assaults on the *status quo*. In Britain it seems probable that police impartiality will restrain *major* violence. Changes in the attitudes (or at least behaviour) of American police have had an undeniable influence in reducing the possibilities of violence in the current American 'sit-down' and 'Freedom Ride' campaigns, though some large southern cities (e.g., Birmingham, Alabama) could still experience large-scale violence.

3. The nature of the accommodative structure itself. In the United States Negro participation is now grudgingly accepted in areas previously forbidden. At the same time areas considered secure in past interaction are being redefined. Some barriers of the *status quo*, previously unthreatened, are now becoming more rigid. Similarly, changes in the *status quo* will frequently have the effect of raising coloured aspirations, then new rebuffs generate greater tensions.

[22] *The Times*, 8 September 1959.
[23] Grimshaw, 1960, *op. cit.*

The same processes of redefinition can be expected to be important in the further development of patterns of race relations in Britain.

A comparison of coloured and white relations in Britain and in the United States and their potentials for social racial violence seems generally to add support to general interpretations of intergroup relations and to theories of prejudice. Social tensions in Britain, as in the United States, can be seen to be generated by assaults on the *status quo*, *viz.*, to be generated by the social structure itself. Some sources of social tension in intergroup relations in the United States are not found in England; it can be shown that these differences result from the size and historical backgrounds of the communities in the two countries. It seems unlikely, furthermore, that the coloured community in Britain will be able, in the years immediately ahead, to wield sufficient power to threaten the social structure to a point where heightened social tensions make possible the occurrence of major violence. On the other hand, this same impotence makes unlikely major shifts in patterns of intergroup relations without the intervention of government authority. Implications for policy, however, are not properly examined in a paper such as this.

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BANTUSTAN POLICY

J. E. SPENCE

The announcement by Dr. Verwoerd, the South African Prime Minister, that a substantial measure of self-government is to be extended to the Transkei territory seems to have surprised many Western critics of his racial policies. Yet a study of the intricate pattern of the statute book since the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, shows that the 'Bantustan' plan has a considerable legislative history and its intellectual origins are rooted in the period before the Second World War.

Intellectual Origins

Many critics of the Nationalist Government's policy have suggested that the Bantustans are primarily a response to the political changes taking place in Asia and Africa and are at the same time an attempt to mollify criticism that it is seeking to maintain white supremacy at all costs. It is true that Nationalist Ministers have on many occasions insisted that they are aware of the pressure of African nationalism and that the Bantustan programme represents the only feasible method of self-determination for the African within the Republic. Yet a historical examination of the policy of separate development reveals that its intellectual origins pre-date the contemporary African drive against colonialism. For example, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, Professor of Sociology and Social Work from 1933–37, and Dr. W. W. Eiselen, Professor of Social Anthropology from 1933–36, who later became Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development under the Nationalist Government, were in the centre of a group of intellectuals at the University of Stellenbosch who determined to frame a policy that would counteract what they considered to be the fatal drift of Smuts and Hofmeyer towards political and biological assimilation. This concern was shared by several prominent Afrikaner churchmen and newspapers like *Die Burger* and *Die Transvaler*.

Equally important was their conviction that Afrikaner nationalism could not be denied its own right to self-determination. This conviction was strengthened by the reports of the Carnegie Commission of 1932 which focused attention on the plight of the poor white, the majority of whom were Afrikaners forced off the land for a variety of reasons and often unable to adjust to an urban environment where the African had traditionally provided the bulk of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Afrikaner intellectuals faced with this problem concluded that 'only an uncompromising solution to the native question would guarantee that the poor Whites would not

be swamped by the Blacks.'[1] This attitude led several influential Afrikaner spokesmen, notably Dr. Verwoerd and Dr. Eiselen, to withdraw their support from the South African Institute of Race Relations (established in 1929) and establish the Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie (South African Bond for Racial Studies) with Mr. M. D. de Wet Nel, the present Minister for Bantu Administration and Development, as its first Secretary.

Finally, despite the stresses of the Second World War, Afrikaner nationalists settled their internal differences while the *apartheid* policy, once primarily the concern of intellectuals and churchmen, became not only the symbol of the Afrikaner nationalists' determination to survive but also an ideological weapon designed to win Afrikaner electoral support from the rival party of Smuts and Hofmeyer. Thus up to 1948, the energies of nationalist intellectuals and politicians alike were concentrated on winning political power and finding a blueprint to solve the so-called 'native problem'.

The Pattern of Legislation

This blueprint gradually began to take legislative form after 1948. Dr. Verwoerd defined his policy in 1955 as 'a process of continually increasing separation in all the spheres of living and this takes place even when there is no territorial separation . . . The logical end of continually increasing *apartheid* in the social, economic and political fields is indeed territorial separation, but no one can foretell when that point will be reached'.[2]

Indeed for ten years the South African Government concentrated on giving legislative substance to the first part of this definition which it later represented as a necessary first step towards the goal of territorial separation. The Government has acted on the assumption that the African is a 'temporary sojourner' in the 'white' urban areas and to this end has passed a mass of restrictive legislation affecting his status in the urban areas, and in particular his right to seek employment. The policy of job reservation for the protection of white workers against African competition and the severe restriction imposed on the development of non-white trade unions constitute two striking examples of legislation designed to curb the economic freedom of the African population in the so-called 'white areas'. Compulsory social and residential segregation is enforced under the Group Areas Act which has particularly affected the Indian community with its considerable economic stake in many urban areas. There are also strict penalties for any sexual deviation across the colour line.

Nevertheless *territorial separation* remained the ultimate goal of the Nationalist Government and the groundwork for this policy

[1] N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, *Apartheid*, Cape Town, Haum, 1959, p. 144. This is a valuable source for the early history of the *apartheid* policy, particularly in the inter-war period.

[2] Quoted by Ellen Hellman in her article, 'Apartheid or Integration', in *Africa in Transition*, edited by Prudence Smith, New York, Reinhardt, 1958.

was laid as early as 1951 with the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act. This bill provided a hierarchical structure of tribal, regional and ultimately territorial authorities in the African Reserves which traditionally have been set aside for purely African occupation and from which the bulk of South Africa's migrant and unskilled labour force has been drawn. These new authorities were to be based on 'traditional Bantu democracy' in terms of which 'the Tribal Chief, together with his Tribal Council, provides the protective shelter under which the highest and the lowest can feel at home and find self-expression and fulfilment.'[3] (In 1959 one source suggested that more than 340 Bantu tribal authorities and twenty regional authorities had been established.)[4] In 1955 the Transkei chiefs accepted the act and the first Bantu Territorial Authority was established, embracing the smaller tribal and regional authorities in that area. Represented on it were chiefs appointed by and responsible to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and on whom the Minister conferred original taxing powers. Since that date territorial authorities have been established for the Tswana and Ciskei ethnic groups and have been promised for the Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho and the Zulus.

The next stage was reached in 1956 with the publication of the report of the Tomlinson Commission. This document is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand and criticise the *apartheid* policy on a rational basis. The Commission's terms of reference were to report 'on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning'.

In its report the Commission emphasised that South Africa would have to choose between separate development or the complete integration of the two chief racial groups. In the Commission's view the first alternative had the best chance of success and recommended broadly speaking the following measures:

(a) Massive rehabilitation of the African Reserves over a ten year period. This it was estimated would cost £104,000,000.

(b) Individual land tenure based on purchase should replace the traditional tribal tenure.

(c) Industrial advance in the Reserves should be stimulated and to this end white industrialists should be given investment opportunities in them.

(d) The inhabitants of the Reserves should be advanced politically on the basis of the existing Bantu Territorial Authorities and the Reserves themselves should be consolidated into

[3] Quoted by D. V. Cowen in his *Foundations of Freedom*. London, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 35, from the *Official Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1954–57*, p. 49.

[4] Rhoodie and Venter, *op. cit.*

coherent units based on the seven principal ethnic groups. It will be clear from the map* that the Commission also envisaged the ultimate incorporation of the three British High Commission Territories. (This last proposal now seems unlikely in view of South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth and the obvious reluctance of the British Government to cede them.) *[For map, see p. 30.]

Many of the Commission's conclusions were accepted by the Government in a White Paper, although several significant reservations were made. The Government recognised that the Reserves required a massive programme of agricultural rehabilitation but it refused to consider changing the existing basis of land tenure and also voiced its disagreement with the proposal that white industrialists should be given opportunities in the Reserves. The White Paper argued that this would simply create multiracial pockets in areas which it was their express intention to reserve for purely African enterprise.

The most significant item in the report was a prediction about the future population of both white and black areas should the Commission's proposals be carried out. It was estimated that by 1981 40 per cent of the African population (approximately 6 million persons) would still be living in 'white' areas, and would be dependent upon the economy of those areas. The Government's answer to this problem is contained in the twin concept of 'political independence and economic inter-dependence' for separate national units within one South African 'Commonwealth'. In other words, African political aspirations would be satisfied in the Bantustans while the economic well-being of both black and white would still be assured in the white areas. This might also be interpreted as an admission that the whites would still maintain their favourable economic position, whatever political changes occurred in the Bantustans. Furthermore it is difficult to reconcile this prediction with the notion of the African worker as a 'temporary sojourner' in the urban areas.

In 1958 Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister and within a year (January 1959) he made an important announcement on the question of territorial separation. The newly established Territorial Authorities were to serve as a foundation for the establishment of self-government in the areas under their jurisdiction. Under white tuition the Africans in those areas would be taught the elements of self-government with the ultimate prospect of complete independence as an incentive. A heavy programme of land purchase was envisaged to increase the size of the Bantu Investment Corporation (1959).

This in brief is the background to Dr. Verwoerd's most recent pronouncement about the future of the Transkei. His latest proposals (January 1962) are as follows:

(a) A new constitution, the joint product of consultation between the South African Government and the Territorial Authority,

is to be devised. The main feature of this constitution will be a Bantu Cabinet and Parliament to be elected by the African population of the area, together with any members of the same ethnic group who may be living in 'white' areas.

(b) The new Parliament is to have authority to legislate on agriculture, education, welfare services, lands and roads. For the time being the Republican Government will handle external affairs and defence.

(c) African civil servants will be trained by white officials to take over full administrative responsibility within five years.

(d) The Government proposes to spend £57 million on the economic rehabilitation of the Reserves and African businessmen are to be helped by the Bantu Investment Corporation in starting their own local industries. (According to a recent Press report these industries will draw their raw materials from the Transkei itself and will therefore not compete with 'white' industries. Tanneries, shoe and blanket factories are suggested projects.)[5]

(e) White-controlled industry will be established on the borders of the new State, and labour will be drawn from the Transkei. No private white investment will, however, be permitted *within* the area.

Dr. Verwoerd, as has been shown, is adamant on this point. Whether a refusal to allow white private investment within the Transkei can be reconciled with the notion of an ultimately independent Transkei is doubtful. It is significant that the proposals for the Transkei Constitution appear to give the new Parliament no control over future economic development.

Political Implications

This analysis suggests that Dr. Verwoerd's policy is more than just a pragmatic response to hostile criticism inside and outside South Africa. However, critics are on strong ground when they point to the five-year delay between the submission of the Tomlinson Commission's Report in 1954 and the Bantu Self-Government Bill of 1959. Dr. Verwoerd has retorted that he refuses to be rushed into premature legislation and that an adequate economic and political foundation must be laid if self-government is to be a reasonable proposition for the areas concerned. He has pointed to events elsewhere in Africa as a justification for his gradualist approach. It therefore seems fair to conclude that the pace of change elsewhere in Africa has probably influenced the timing of his latest proposals; on the other hand this does not invalidate the notion of a long-term programme dictating each particular step and Dr. Verwoerd would no doubt argue that his 1962 proposals are substantially based on the 1956 White Paper.

[5] *Star*, Johannesburg, 27 January 1962.

Supporters of the Nationalist Party claim that their Bantustan policy is identical with the British policy of a reasonably balanced political and economic advance towards independence for colonial possessions. This equation of the two policies assumes that South Africa is a colonial power with the Reserves regarded as quasi-colonies moving towards independence.[6] But an even more important assumption, and one deeply rooted in the Afrikaner's conviction that he is set apart from other South Africans, white or black, is that the African's values and traditions are the products of a tribal culture. If the African is to develop he must be given opportunities for self-expression on terms which recognise this essential difference between the African and the European.

African Objections: (a) The effect of detribalisation

These assumptions have not been accepted by the African National Congress or the Pan-African Congress (both banned in April 1960). These organisations are the two articulate expressions of African nationalism in South Africa and have consistently repudiated the Bantustan concept. African nationalism in the Republic is essentially an urban phenomenon, the product of an integrated, industrialised society where many African workers have discovered a common economic and political interest. To the educated African, living in a township and feeling the full impact of Western civilisation, tribalism has always been regarded as something to be escaped, not re-discovered. Many such African adults received their training at the hands of missionaries whose aim it was to break down the tribal traditions and to impose instead some form of Christian civilisation. Whatever the merits of such a policy, it was effective and for the urban African to be told that he must now go back to the tribal traditions of his forefathers is impracticable. (It is worth noting here that a current popular joke amongst African students in Durban was that if they went to the new 'tribal college' at Ngoya, instead of to the partially integrated Natal University which was to be closed to them, there awaited them the added attraction of a *lapa* or tribal meeting ground, thoughtfully provided by the Government for their pensive moods.)

The Government's answer to the crucial problem of the urban, detribalised African acknowledging no other home but the township on the edge of the city, is that he will have the right to vote and participate in the Bantu administration of his own particular ethnic group. He will of course have no political or economic rights in the white areas, and this applies equally to whites resident in the Bantustans. The Government is thus attempting a massive re-orientation of African nationalism from the white industrialised areas to the

[6] As one spokesman has put it, the aim is 'an elaborate process of separate nation-building . . . the development of several sovereign peoples, sovereign and democratically experienced in the full sense of the words'. B. P. Erasmus, 'The Policy of Apartheid', *African Affairs*, January 1961.

reserves. This policy is based on the assumption that there are, *inter alia*, Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana nationalisms which effectively cut across and transcend African national feeling.

But the bonds linking African workers with the reserves have in many cases been cut. In the period 1911-57 African population in the urban areas increased from half a million to 2,622,000 (27 per cent of the African population). In the early years of Union, much of this labour was migrant in character but today there is a large settled urban African population. In terms of the Urban Areas Act (as amended) there are stringent provisions to prevent the increase in the size of this urban African population. This has the effect of confining 45 per cent of the African population to reserves and increasing the pressure on the scant resources of those areas.

Yet even the rural African, for whom the Bantu Authorities were designed, have on occasion forcibly resisted the imposition of these new institutions. For example a state of emergency has been operative in Pondoland, part of the eastern Transkei, since late 1960. The local inhabitants have clashed openly with police and the military forces dispatched by the Government. This has been the result of a steady and apparently consistent policy by the Pondos of disrupting the physical symbols of the Bantustans. This 'terror' has ranged from large-scale burning of government supporters' huts, to murder and assault. It is impossible to find out to what extent this resistance is organised from outside the Reserves, though the Government claim that it is the work of political agitators. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that many rural Africans are thoroughly dissatisfied with the operation of the Bantu Authority system. The appointment by the Government of certain chiefs without consultation with the tribesmen is resented, while there appears to be dissatisfaction with the betterment schemes proposed by tribal authorities. To quote the report written for the survey of race relations in South Africa, 'it is probably true to say that governments anywhere in the world who have attempted to introduce widespread agrarian reforms have met with little co-operation from the people most directly affected, the peasant class, who are by tradition averse to anything that spells change. In the Union, the Government policy of appointing its own nominees to Bantu authorities to assist in implementing reforms is making the work immeasurably more difficult . . . When unpopular laws are administered by unpopular leaders the difficulties are multiplied . . .'[7] It is clear that both the Government and the African nationalists attach tremendous importance to the 'battle for the Reserves'. The long-standing assumption that the future of South Africa will be settled in the urban areas may well be overthrown for the view that it is in the vast and barren Reserves that the battle will

[7] 'A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa', 1959–60, compiled by Muriel Horrell, Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1961, p. 45. Pp. 39–50 contain a valuable account of the disturbances which resulted from opposition to the Bantu Authority system in various parts of South Africa during 1960.

be fought out. Both sides are now aware that if they want to create the state they desire for South Africa, they must first 'win' the Reserves and the people who live there. Chief Kaiser Matanzima has stated that when the Transkei achieves self-government there will be no objection to members of the banned African National Congress living in the territory provided they accept the policy of separate development.[8] But it is doubtful whether this offer of legitimate participation in the affairs of the Transkei will meet the needs of the banned African organisations which at this stage are forced and possibly prefer, in the context of the Transkei, to work underground. In any case they remain firmly committed in the eyes of their followers to opposition to the Government's policies.

The Government view seems to rest on a failure to comprehend the sense of identification which many Africans feel with the political revolution sweeping across the rest of the continent. The influence of Pan-African ideas on South Africa must not be overestimated, but on the other hand it is clear that, for many, independent Africa represents a promise of 'liberation' from white domination. There is no reason to believe that this feeling of identification will lessen in the future. African nationalists leaders scorn any suggestion that the position of the 'white' areas will be analagous with that of Irishmen in the United Kingdom, earning a living in British industry and subsidising their families at home. The Government's assumption that the many African workers domiciled in the urban areas will be content to be passive wage earners, subjected to strict discriminatory legislation and uninterested in, for example, militant trade union activity, seems to ignore the experience of industrial societies elsewhere.

Some experts on *apartheid*, notably Rhoodie and Venter, dismiss urban African leaders as 'a handful of agitators'.[9] This is an extraordinary judgement for it ignores the fact that these leaders constitute an élite or creative minority which represents the attitudes of a large number of well-educated middle-class Africans who bitterly resent any suggestion that their future lies in a tribal society. The decision to close Witwatersrand and Cape Town Universities to Africans and to establish 'tribal' colleges was attacked because it implied that Africans ought to receive an education different in kind from that traditionally obtained at the 'open' universities. The same kind of criticism has been levelled at Bantu education.

(b) *White Supervision*

One constant objection to the programme, on the part of the

[8] Quoted from *Star*, Johannesburg, 29 January 1962.

[9] Rhoodie and Venter, *op. cit.*, p. 197. *N.B.* The following crucial admission from this important pro-Bantustan source: 'Support for separate development comes mainly from the ranks of those Bantu who still maintain a relatively close tribal connection and who have not yet lived in our locations and in multi-racial, metropolitan communities where the influence of foreign and pernicious doctrines might have turned them into detribalised, denationalised renegades or quasi-Europeans.' (In any case, the strength of this assertion has been damaged by the recent disturbances in the rural areas to which reference has already been made.) Quotation in this context is justified however, for the revealing light it sheds on one deeply rooted attitude to African nationalism.

African spokesmen whether urban or rural, is the degree of Government supervision over the territorial authorities. The appointment of chiefs by, and their responsibility to, the Bantu Administration Departments indicates to the African a clear desire on the part of the Government to retain ultimate control. This is borne out by a clause in the Tomlinson Report: 'Councillors will be appointed by the chief or headman himself, and not as under the old Local Council System, by popular vote. The idea is to foster strong progressive action by tribal authorities whose councillors should be able to act independently of a less progressive and probably dissatisfied electorate.'

This clause is presented in a different guise in the 1956 handbook elaborating the Bantu Authorities Act: 'The Councillors will perform their task without fear or prejudice *because* they are not elected by the majority votes.'[10]

African leaders therefore find it difficult to accept the notion of a Bantu democracy in which white power bolsters up tribal rule. Nor can they easily accept that this white rule will one day magically wither away in the Bantustans. Indeed, if recent press reports about the future composition of the Transkei Parliament are true, then these leaders will feel the scepticism amply justified.[11] But apart from their distrust of the Government's good intention, many African spokesment point with considerable justification to the mass of restrictive legislation *at present* affecting their status.

(c) *Restrictive Legislation*

The most useful evidence on this aspect of the *apartheid* policy is to be found in a recent book by E. H. Brookes and J. B. Macaulay entitled *Civil Liberties in South Africa*.[12] The authors' painstaking analysis of legislative inroads into the fields of person, opinion, religion and the franchise presents the readers with a catalogue of the damage done to the rule of law in South Africa. Particularly noticeable is the rapid growth of discretionary powers at the disposal of particular Ministries responsible for African affairs. This has led to a corresponding loss of power and status for Parliament and the Supreme Court. It is difficult not to agree with Brookes and Macaulay that 'almost completely in the Reserves and to an increasing extent outside them, he (the African) has no rights against the Government and no real civil liberty'.[13] Is it surprising that Dr. Verwoerd has found it so difficult to convince many politically conscious Africans of the merits of these proposals? Thus the dispassionate critic of

[10] Quoted by D. V. Cowen with considerable irony, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[11] According to the Johannesburg *Star*, 31 March 1962, the Bantu Parliament will consist of a legislative assembly of 109 members—54 chiefs and 45 elected representatives. There will be a Cabinet of 6. This represents an improvement on earlier press reports of the constitution but it is nevertheless heavily weighted in favour of the tribal rulers who, as has been made clear elsewhere in this paper, are resented for their connection with the central Government.

[12] London, Oxford University Press, 1958.

[13] *Ibid*, p. 166.

the *apartheid* programme is forced to conclude that its cost in bitterness and frustration makes success unlikely.

Conclusions

Success for the Bantustan programme would appear to require at least some degree of co-operation on the part of the urban African masses. It is clear that this co-operation has so far been lacking, not least because it has never been sought. This is not a question of the sincerity of Dr. Verwoerd and his Ministers. I have tried to indicate that this programme has been carefully thought out to cater for the legitimate aspirations of the African population as defined by the Nationalist Government. But it is precisely because neither the African nor the Afrikaner can accept the other's definitions of legitimacy in this context that compromise remains remote and increased tension becomes an unfortunate and possibly dangerous by-product.

To the Afrikaner nationalist, however, the seemingly limitless appetite for power of African nationalism is a continual threat to the survival of the white man in South Africa. A policy of appeasing African nationalism by yielding to its demands for political integration, however gradual, inevitably means the ultimate triumph of the 'one man one vote' principle. In these circumstances, it is argued, white civilisation is doomed and with it the Afrikaner's claim to self-determination, on which the seal has barely been placed by the declaration of a Republic in May 1961.

This analysis suggests that South Africa is racked by a conflict of nationalisms. It is this crucial feature which distinguishes South Africa from multi-racial territories elsewhere on the continent and it may help explain why the latter have embarked, however slowly, on a different political course. Until recently African nationalism in the Republic has seemed less exclusive than its counterpart, but there are signs that the two are rapidly driving each other into extreme positions. The recent bomb explosions indicate the impatience on the part of some Africans with the traditional methods of non-violence. Yet, while Dr. Verwoerd commands a substantial Parliamentary majority, his critics stand impotent, draping Cassandra's mantle uneasily about their shoulders. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in the short run present policies may well lead to recurrent states of emergency and the elaboration of more efficient police techniques to handle the rising tide of resentment.



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Note: Area G . . . Transkei

RACIAL TENSION IN BRITISH GUIANA

PETER NEWMAN

The complex society known as British Guiana is in clear and present danger of collapse. How matters came to this pass and what can now be done to improve the situation, are questions which do not allow simple answers. Yet answers must be given, even though one knows that nothing brief is ever right and that there is a real risk—in an article such as this—of producing, not a true picture, but a portrait which is both miniature and caricature. Many strands interweave to produce a complicated pattern, in which political and economic, social and historical factors all play important parts. I have tried here to suppress the natural bias towards economics inherent in my profession; the reader must forgive and allow for those places where excessive bias still shows.

The Physical and Historical Background

All events in British Guiana take place against, and are heavily conditioned by, a physical background of definite and peculiar geography, whose nature must be clearly understood at the outset. Unlike the islands of the West Indies, Guiana is large—roughly of the size of Great Britain—and, equally important, is part of the great land mass of South America. Large rivers originating several hundred miles inland flow northward to the coastal plain, which has been largely built up, along with the coasts of Surinam and French Guiana, by alluvial deposits carried westward from the delta of the Amazon. Dense equatorial rain forest covers much of the surface, which makes its clearance for agriculture arduous and costly.

The early settlers in British Guiana, first mainly of Dutch origin and only later becoming preponderantly British and West Indian, began by cultivating the riparian lands lining such broad rivers as the Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice, for many miles upstream. As these soils depleted in fertility, the difficulties of extending the margin of cultivation into the forests turned the settlers' attention to the rich clays of the coastal belt. With much of this below sea-level, crossed by large rivers and resting on a high water table, problems of drainage and flood control were severe. But the high expense of the complex pattern of irrigation canals and drainage ditches needed was compensated by the high fertility of the soils, at least for the production of sugar cane.

By the 1820s British Guiana had emerged as an important cane producer for the world market, but emancipation a decade later caused a serious loss in the labour force as Negro ex-slaves migrated to the towns or set up in small peasant villages on the plain. Sporadic attempts were made to recruit indentured labour from abroad, in particular from Madeira and China, but the only really successful

source—as so often elsewhere—proved to be India. Beginning in 1851 and ending in 1917 an organised flow of Indian immigration, together with some local supply from the Negro villages, enabled the sugar estates to maintain a satisfactorily increasing labour force. Without this immigration the estate population would have held stationary or even declined in the face of the severe tropical diseases prevalent, particularly malaria, which flourished as the drainage system grew. The very small indigenous population of Amerindians kept mainly to the deep interior, and were (and are) of little importance in the life of the colony.

As with the rest of the Caribbean sugar industry, that of British Guiana suffered severely in the late nineteenth century from the competition of European beet sugar which was at first heavily subsidised and then cheap in its own right, due to the planned effect of the subsidies on technical progress. Estates ran into financial difficulties, leading to abandonment or amalgamation; the latter process was carried to great lengths in British Guiana, where the Liverpool merchant firm of Booker Brothers, McConnell at first indirectly—*via* its acquisition of a local supply firm—and then directly, gained control of two-thirds of the local cane industry. This firm also spread out into shipping, retail distribution and a variety of other local activities. It is not without reason—though perhaps without justice—that 'B.G.' is in the Caribbean held to stand for 'Bookers' Guiana'.

The Spanish-American War improved the outlook for the Spanish sugar islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo, as they gained protected access to the U.S. market; but it proved disastrous for the non-Spanish Caribbean. In 1900 three-quarters of West Indian sugar exports went to the United States, but by 1913 this percentage had dropped almost to zero. The only thing that saved the British Caribbean at this time was the Canadian tariff preference for West Indian sugar introduced in 1898, which kept alive an industry that might otherwise have been extinguished. This actually happened to the sugar industry of Dutch Guiana, which had little such preference and whose production conditions were not quite so favourable. It is arguable that this has in the long run benefited Surinam, as it has been forced to diversify its agriculture to a considerable degree and consequently does not depend, as does British Guiana, on a monoculture produced by a monopoly and dependent on special external protection. The position is somewhat similar to that of the Lancashire cotton industry, where a case can certainly be made that the adaptation to changed world supply and demand conditions has been constrained to be far too slow and protracted for the good of Lancashire's, and England's, own long-run economic prospects.

Whatever the merits of this argument, the facts are that British Guiana held on until 1914, when increased demand for cane sugar brought prosperity and that then the post-war system of Imperial

Preference assured the survival, if not the rapid expansion, of the sugar industry. Aided by the development of bauxite mining by Canadian concerns, British Guiana went through the inter-war period in no worse condition than most of the British Caribbean possessions, and better than some. The Second World War brought another surge of prosperity, which persisted up to and after the Korean conflict.

As their periods of indenture were worked off, many East Indians acquired coastal lands which they devoted mainly to rice cultivation, partly because physical factors favoured the crop, and partly because its care required abilities which they had brought ready-made from India. In this way rice came to play an important part in the colony's cash economy, since it was exported to the rest of the British Caribbean; moreover this part belonged—and belongs—almost exclusively to the Indian population.[1]

The present picture, then, is of a society devoted mainly to agriculture, with cane and rice as the main cash crops, and perched mainly on a coastal strip some three to five miles wide running 200 miles eastward from Georgetown; only one-half of one per cent of the total area of the colony is cultivated. Over 90 per cent of the population lives in the strip, and its Negro component is concentrated in the towns (especially Georgetown and New Amsterdam) and around the estates close to the towns. The smaller minorities of Portuguese (from Madeira), Chinese and Europeans also live mainly in the towns, while the East Indians (some 55 per cent of the whole) are heavily rural. The bauxite industry forms enclaves in the jungle, mainly some fifty miles south of Georgetown, and has been of little national significance, apart from the important revenue it contributes to the Government.

The Social and Racial Background

Many newspaper accounts describe British Guiana as 'desperately poor'. This is a bad and misleading error; her national income per head is in the range $200–$250 (U.S.), which is higher than many Latin American countries, and *very* much higher than most countries of Africa and Asia. Moreover it is fairly clear—though conclusive empirical evidence is not available—that there is not that great gulf between rich and poor that marks so many underdeveloped countries. Conspicuous consumption is conspicuous mainly by its absence, and no shanty towns exist on the scale of West Kingston in Jamaica or of the swamps of Port of Spain in Trinidad.

One may therefore wonder why, since the size and the distribution of the national income are not unbearable and taxation is relatively light by modern standards,[2] there should be so much social and

[1] In modern times, sugar and its products, rice and bauxite together account for over 90 per cent of the territory's exports. About half of this total, in turn, is attributable to the exports of the Booker Group—an indication of the importance and dominance of that firm in the economy.

[2] In 1958 total central government revenue was just over 20 per cent of gross domestic product; Bookers alone directly contributed about 20 per cent of this tax bill.

political unrest. At this point amateur speculation must take over, since there is no thorough professional study of the social dynamics of Guianese society. The answer seems to lie partly in the interplay of three of the basic elements that we have discussed already. The first is the apparently high cost of extending the margin of cultivation into the interior, which has penned the population on the coastal plain; the second is the gulf between African and Indian society, which would no doubt have persisted anyway, but which has been accentuated (in the usual hen-and-egg interaction of cause and effect) by the urban-rural division; and the third has been the domination of the country's economy by a few large companies.

In order to complete this list of basic ingredients for the present-day Guianese polity, I would add the observation that no significant part of the economy has been engaged in modern manufacturing industry, and that in particular this has been true for the East Indian sector. To understand the implications of this, contrast British Guiana with Trinidad, which also has a large Indian population (currently around 37 per cent of the whole). Port of Spain is a major port and this, together with the development of its oil fields and refineries, has resulted in a modest but definite pattern of industrial life in Trinidad. Moreover the oil wells occur in what were (and mostly are) the main centres of Indian population, so that the growth of the industry, especially rapid in recent years, has brought the Indians irreversibly into the central economy. It would be folly to maintain that there are not severe racial problems in Trinidad, but these are greatly eased by the current high rate of growth of income (though not of employment) and, more fundamentally, by the considerable extent to which the African and Indian economies have been knitted together by the overriding role of modern industrialisation.

This is not so in British Guiana. The two cultures have tended to separate out under the impact of the technologies used by the main primary producers. Communications between the two races has been much less than in Trinidad and, partly as a result, the persistence of the original Indian modes of life has been even more marked in British Guiana than in the island colony.[3] Contrariwise, the lack of that direct and straightforward competition with Indians, which is a feature of Trinidad Negro life, has tended to dull the enterprise and incentive of the Guianese African.

Perhaps this is a good place to mention briefly the experience of neighbouring Surinam, which also has large numbers of both Africans and Indians and which has not—at least in recent years—experienced racial tension to the degree that has British Guiana. An important factor has been the greater interest shown, and capital invested, by the Netherlands Government, compared to that of

[3] A gay, perceptive and deeply moving account of the changing pattern of Indian life in Trinidad is to be found in V. S. Naipaul's recent novel, *A House for Mr. Biswas*, London, André Deutsch, 1961.

Britain. Agriculture, as we have already seen, has not been saddled with monopoly production, and there is some evidence that Surinamers have played a more important role in the management of foreign companies than has been the case in Guiana. Further—and this is an interesting theoretical problem that would repay further study—the presence of many thousands of Indonesians, who can tip the balance in favour of whichever side they choose, may well have tended to prevent the polarisation of interests and policies that has occurred in the more evenly-balanced bi-racial society of British Guiana. But all these are suggestions only and a good comparative study would prove fascinating and fruitful.

Let us now assemble our pieces and examine how they might have interacted to produce the modern situation. First we have the confinement of the scene of action to the coastal plain, where extensions of agricultural acreage require heavy investment in canals and ditches and sea defences, investments largely out of reach of the individual farmer. The domination of the economy by a few companies was bound to produce a domestic view of the 'free enterprise' system at odds with the highly competitive property-owning democracy idealised by Western moderates, even though in recent years the larger companies have had some enlightened leadership (not always effectively implemented at the operational level). The point is not that the companies are exploiting monopoly capitalists —which is true in some senses and not in others—but that they are so *large* relative to the society that individual Guianese can feel little identification with the main economic life of the country. Bookers in particular are trying hard to become relatively less important in the Guianese economy, but to shrink deliberately is not a simple thing to do in a society laying emphasis on the need for economic expansion.

It is scarcely surprising that the past forms of social and economic organisation—in essence that of one large plantation—should have stimulated many Guianese to seek radical solutions to the deep and stultifying problems which faced them. This common left-wing direction, together with the fact that many of them were trained abroad, where communal differences were often sunk—as with so many West Indian students—in the face of the strangeness of their British or North American environment, acted to bring together the young Indian and African politicians in a united front against the colonial regime. This identification of interests was reinforced by the conservative tendencies of the urban European and Portuguese middle class, who had for many years tried to maintain a deep social gulf between themselves and the mass of the urban Negro population (here, as everywhere else in the West Indies, the Chinese have tended to keep aloof, concentrating on purely commercial pursuits). The fact that this section of the middle class were in favour of the *status quo* was in itself a force making for Negro opposition to it and for alliance with the Indian left. The large, prosperous and mainly rural

Indian middle class was not in sympathy with the extremist tendencies of the latter group, but followed it from racial affinity and because Jagan was easily the most able and effective political leader of the Indian population.

So far we have been discussing the strategic factors that have influenced the current scene in British Guiana. But we are now approaching the tactical considerations, as it were, that in the last few years have operated within the strategic framework to produce the present explosive situation. For purposes of analysis it will be helpful to separate economic aspects from political, although they are of course completely interwoven in reality.

Economics

British Guiana's growth is influenced chiefly by the growth of income from sugar, rice and bauxite on the one hand and government investment on the other.[4] The net result of these since the political turning-point of 1953 has not been very satisfactory. The rate of population growth of 3 per cent a year requires a high rate of income growth if people are to experience a rise in their real incomes. As nearly as one can calculate, real income per head did not rise—and may even have fallen slightly—from 1953 to 1959. Some of even this small increase in aggregate income was due to a favourable movement in the terms of trade, a movement which may not continue. Comparing 1953/5 averages with 1956/8 averages, sugar production showed an annual increase of 5 per cent, rice an annual increase of 2 per cent, and bauxite a rate of decline (in physical output) of 12 per cent per annum. These figures are cited here not as a basis for extrapolation (which would be very dangerous), but to indicate that Guiana's economic growth in recent years has not maintained the fast pace of 1948–53, nor has it been comparable with that of Jamaica or, especially, of Trinidad. Indeed the figures indicate an outright stagnation in national income for the three or four year prior to 1960, with income *per capita* actually falling.

These movements are mainly due to trends in foreign demand for Guiana's exports, over which she has no control. But now let us look at that which can be influenced to a large degree, namely the size and level of the public investment programme. From 1956 to 1959 this ran at an average level of $19·3 million (W.I.) which was 8·8 per cent of average gross domestic product (at factor cost and in current prices). The planned rate for 1960–64 was $22·1 million, beginning around $25 million in 1960 and tailing off to $19 million by 1964; but underspending has kept the rate down closer to the old level. Whether this level is too low is a question that really cannot be answered, since in the absence of an economic planning

[4] This section draws heavily on the facts and analysis contained in my paper in *Social and Economic Studies* (University College of the West Indies, Institute of Social and Economic Research), vol. 9, September 1960; see also the symposium on this paper in the same journal, vol. 10, March 1961.

staff, there is little firm information on prospective investment projects. The sluggish rate of economic growth seems *prima facie* evidence, however, that it *is* too low.

Even this low level apparently constituted so great a burden on the economy, that the Government felt itself unable to finance more than a fraction of the planned expenditure. During 1955–59 only $10 million was raised from revenue surpluses, out of a total public development expenditure of almost $100 million. For 1960–64, it was planned to raise $15 million from revenue surpluses, and $10 million from local borrowing, in order to help finance a total of $110 million; of the balance, $23 million was to be in outright grants from the British Government, and about $38 million was to be in the form of Exchequer Loans. It was hoped that the gap of $23 million would be filled by international grants and loans, and by underspending. This announced reluctance to tax adequately was even more marked in practice, for the 1960–64 programme began with a revenue surplus of only $1·1 million, which was merely a third of what was planned. The first budget of the new Jagan Government, under the influence of the distinguished British economist Nicholas Kaldor, seriously attempted to increase substantially the amount of locally provided funds, to a degree beyond that envisaged by the original plan. A package consisting of higher rates for old taxes (e.g., import duties), new taxes (e.g., capital gains taxes), and a scheme for compulsory private saving, was introduced. As we shall see, the timing of these admirable self-help proposals laid them open to misinterpretation. It is ironic that the grave riots in February of this year were sparked by the first serious attempt to make the Guianese responsible for their own economic development.

Quite apart from matters of size and finance, however, the distribution of the public investment programmes has been of major importance. In my paper of 1960, a detailed case was made that the allocation of funds has not been such as to promote rapid economic growth; and it would be inappropriate to repeat that argument here. But I now wish to stress, in this context, a point that was deliberately underplayed there. In the investment programme before 1960, about 43 per cent was devoted to agriculture, 25 per cent to transport and communications, and 19 per cent to housing. Now most agricultural expenditure is on sea defences, drainage and irrigation, especially for large new tracts of lands suitable for rice; and this expenditure therefore benefits mainly the East Indian population. The percentage allocated to transport was probably fairly neutral in its racial effects, while a good deal of housing expenditure benefited the towns and hence the Negroes.

On balance, the investment programme probably represented some transfer of resources from African to Indian, though no study exists by which one might quantify the amounts involved. It would be wrong to suppose that this allocation of investment was carried out on racial grounds. Undoubtedly there was pressure by Indian

constituents on the predominantly Indian administration, but a much more important factor was that these paddy-land projects *appeared* to be the obvious lines for investment expenditure, even though rational calculations of rates of return indicate magnitudes below the rate of interest at which the money is borrowed. Planning in British Guiana has suffered severely from the absence of an economic planning staff; this is now—most belatedly—being remedied to some extent.

All these considerations were intensified by the 1960–64 Programme, which raised the agricultural percentage to 53 per cent of the plan, kept transport at roughly the old level and cut housing to 7 per cent. From a strict economic point of view the cut in housing was probably justified, but should have been made up for by increased investment in urban areas, rather than by a large increase in the already dominant paddy-lands projects. Whatever the truth concerning the earlier programme, this new plan clearly represented a marked (though as yet unquantified) transfer from the urban to the rural population compared with the previous programme and hence from mainly Negro areas to mainly Indian. Again faulty planning rather than racial self-interest appears to be the main culprit, although the latter factor was certainly present. Negro resentment at the alleged bias of the Government usually runs at the unsophisticated level of favouritism in jobs and in law enforcement; but there are signs that this more fundamental aspect is beginning to loom large in the thoughts of the more intelligent Africans.

These indications that, even within the general context of rather slow economic growth, Africans have suffered more than Indians, is borne out by such employment statistics as we have, which unfortunately are rather out of date. An International Labour Office survey carried out by Mr. McGale, and published in 1957, gave fairly good estimates of the extent and incidence of unemployment as of mid-July 1956. Total unemployment was estimated at 18 per cent of the labour force, with Georgetown and New Amsterdam having rates of 22 per cent and 20 per cent; it concluded that 'long-term unemployment was concentrated in the age-group 21–40 and amongst Africans' (p. 47). No doubt the greater ease of collecting information in the towns and the prevalence of underemployment rather than unemployment in rural occupations lessen the impact of these figures, but one aspect of them is very significant. This is the unemployment rate among juveniles, who are often the main raw material for street mobs and political gangs. Of the labour force in Georgetown at this time between the ages of 14 and 18, 54 per cent were unemployed compared to a national average of 41 per cent; 38 per cent of the Georgetown group between 18 and 20 were also unemployed. Of the total of unemployed young (14–18) persons in British Guiana, 63 per cent had never worked at all.

Now in order to be in the labour force in 1956, one had to have been born in 1942 or earlier; in order to be there now, one has to

have been born before 1949. The birth rate in 1943 was 33·5 per thousand and the infant mortality rate 141·0; the corresponding rates for 1953 were 44·1 and 79·3, and for 1958 were 43·8 and 62·8. Crude death rates fell from 24·7 in 1943 to 13·3 ten years later, and to 10·5 in 1958. This enormous and sudden increase in the rate of population growth has of course been due mainly to advances in the techniques of public health, especially through the anti-malaria campaign, which began in early 1945 and which was concluded, with the—at least temporary—eradication of malaria, in 1950. Thus in the late 1940s there began a great increase in the number of live births and these children are now coming on to the labour market. Considering the already very high unemployment rates for the pre-1943 cohorts of juveniles, one is staggered by the probable extent of this juvenile urban unemployment now, especially as the economy has grown less rapidly since 1956 than it did prior to that date. The problem is very serious. Two years ago, in the article already cited, I wrote that 'what could be a real source of rising national production may well degenerate—quite quickly—into a disaffected and explosive mob' (p. 296). It is seldom that one's own predictions turn out to be so accurate and even more seldom that one bitterly regrets the accuracy.

Politics

The web of Guianese politics is woven from the warp of racial conflict and the weft of ideology. Their interplay makes elucidation difficult and simple explanation impossible. All that one can do in a small space is to emphasise a few apparently dominant themes at the expense of minor variations. This account will be impressionistic, partly because it is amateur and partly because an excellent factual account by a political scientist (at the University of Michigan) has recently appeared.[5]

It is always easy to claim the wisdom of Professor Hindsight, but in retrospect it does appear that the supersession of the constitution in 1953 went too far and stayed too long, in this respect being reminiscent of the similar abrogation in Jamaica in 1865 after the Morant Bay riots. It led directly in early 1955 to the split between the Jaganite and Burnhamite factions of the People's Progressive Party and so ended the possibility that British Guiana could find a racially united solution to her problems, without first undergoing a period of racial strife. Perhaps a break between Burnham and Jagan would have occurred in any case, but it might have been delayed until a time when the habits and the advantages of working together had become so apparent to each side that the loss of one leader would not have meant the defection of most of his fellow Indians or Africans. The net effect of the 1953 intervention was to postpone the

[5] C. Paul Bradley: 'The Party System in British Guiana and the General Election of 1961', *Caribbean Studies* (University of Puerto Rico, Institute of Caribbean Studies), vol. 1, October 1961.

development of responsible thought about the real economic and social problems of the country and therefore to move the locus of discussion back to the problems of independence and to problems of racial division.

Once the split in the P.P.P. occurred, the logic of the situation drove the protagonists ever farther apart on the racial issue. The Jaganite faction continued to maintain a fairly intransigent Marxist position on economic policy; not all the party was entirely happy with this, but many were and the leadership and organisation of Dr. and Mrs. Jagan were efficient and inspiring. Even its re-entry into Government in 1957 did not seriously moderate this position, since its power was not sufficiently real for the day-to-day responsibilities of administration to temper the doctrinaire party approach, though Jagan proved a good administrator within his restricted opportunities. Inconsistencies and ambiguities in the party platform were allowed to remain and still do, so that on many important questions the electorate is unsure about what the party intends. This is not surprising, for many of the leaders themselves seem not clear as to the type of society and economy which they wish to bring about. Too many of the leaders, including even on occasion Jagan himself, are given to making off-the-cuff speeches which are not consistent with the image of a vigorous-but-fair, Marxist-but-democratic, socialist Government, which they seem to wish to project among the electors at large.

The public ideology of the Burnhamite faction, which became the People's National Congress after the elections of 1957, was close to that of the Jaganites, apart from doctrinal disputes of the Stalin-Trotsky type. This adherence of both factions to the left end of the spectrum stemmed from personal conviction, from electoral considerations and from the lack of any serious responsibility—as Government or Opposition—for important policy decisions, which allowed quite unrealistic ideas on the matter to persist unchanged.

The overt positions of the two factions in the 1957 elections were both sternly against racial issues but in the grass-roots campaign these issues became very important on both sides. The defeat of the Burnham-led party resulted in its increased emphasis on African race-consciousness. Haunted by the fact of a higher rate of Indian population growth (with birth-rates, at least for the estate population, around 50 per 1000), which will soon place Africans permanently into an electoral as well as population minority, it tried to create a Negro solidarity that would prevail at the polls against the existing very slight Indian electoral majority, which—it hoped—might splinter over the appropriate brand of socialism. The P.N.C. approach to the latter issue began to drift rightward as it merged for electoral and racial reasons with the moderate (and mainly African) United Democratic Party; but the rate of drift was checked by the accession to the party from the Jagans' group of Sidney King, a Simon-pure Marxist and militant Negro leader, who became

general secretary of the P.N.C. There was also an ultimate barrier to the extent to which the P.N.C. could move right, formed by the political views of the Portuguese and light-skinned middle classes; any identification of the P.N.C. with this group would at this period have meant the alienation of many poor, urban Negro voters, in addition to being personally objectionable to the Negro leaders of the party.

Not surprisingly, this attention to a unified African front led to a need for a common enemy, a role which was filled by the East Indians. Operating within the restricted social and economic framework that I have discussed, the main animus of the party was focused on the racial issue, and even official party pronouncements began to take on a racial tinge. Since the P.P.P. continued to maintain a public image of non-partisanship (although its local support was often less unbiased), many African intellectuals, especially among the younger group, began to feel dissatisfied with the racial policies of the P.N.C. Except in a few cases, this did not lead them to the P.P.P., but it did cause them to withhold active participation from the African party ; partly as a result, the second-rank leadership of the P.N.C. is distinctly less able than the corresponding echelons of Jagan's party.

Apart from isolated groups, such as the National Labour Front of Lionel Luckhoo (most conservative parties in the West Indies have a 'Labour' label), the mercantile middle classes had not had effective political representation before 1960. Many members of the Indian middle class followed the P.P.P., and most of the darker African middle class, especially the civil servants, inclined to Burnham. But the various merchant classes in Georgetown and elsewhere relied mainly on the protection afforded by the nominated members of the Legislative Council and on the strong residual powers of the Governor and the colonial Civil Service officials.

The prospect of a new interim constitution to take effect in 1961, which granted larger powers to the party which would be successful in the August election and to be followed probably by a constitution ensuring more thorough-going independence, spurred the formation in November 1960 of a new middle class party, the United Force. This was mainly the creation of an energetic Georgetown businessman of Portuguese descent, Peter D'Aguiar, and drew to itself the multi-racial but heavily *bourgeois* conservative elements in British Guiana. Because of the position of the P.P.P. and P.N.C. out on the left, there was 'an opening to the centre', which the basically right-wing U.F. hastened to fill; its announced programme of economic development was very vague in its details, and was probably farther to the left than its architects and main supporters had any real intention of being if and when they attained office. Although few of its candidates were of any stature, the U.F. fought each constituency with a lavishly equipped campaign; the sources of its funds are obscure, although D'Aguiar is himself fairly wealthy, as are many of his supporters. His strong anti-Communist line may have attracted

private funds from abroad, though it is unlikely that this was on an organised scale. Despite support from the press (one of the papers was owned by the D'Aguiar interests), and strong though unofficial support from the Catholic and Anglican churches, D'Aguiar could count on few popular votes, except in the middle-class districts of Georgetown and among the Amerindian population, where the influence of Catholic missions was important.

The question arises, why did the United Force fight the election when it had such small chance of success? It is strongly arguable that the diverting effects it created, by forcing the P.N.C. to fight hard in its normal Georgetown stronghold and thus to lessen its efforts in marginal areas, resulted in the anti-P.P.P. vote being split seriously enough to allow Jagan to come to office. Since the P.N.C. was less extremist on economic policy that the P.P.P., and increasingly so, why did the U.F. not settle for the African party as the lesser evil? It is understandable that a centre party might try to get votes from either wing, as the Liberals try to do in England; but the U.F. is not a centre party.

Three probable reasons can be distinguished; the fact that they are largely inconsistent with each other need not, in this context, lessen their validity. The first is that D'Aguiar genuinely believed that his party would triumph (twenty-three of its thirty-five candidates lost their deposits, and only four of them, including D'Aguiar, won seats); in the heat of the emotional fervour accompanying the birth of the party, this dream might not have seemed unrealistic. The second reason lies in the traditional disdain in which the urban middle class holds the African proletariat, and in its more defensible dislike of the racialism of the P.N.C. Seen in this light, the People's National Congress was not a lesser evil than the People's Progressive Party, in spite of the former's less extreme economic radicalism. Many people in Georgetown who voted U.F. prefer the P.P.P. to the P.N.C.; and conversely, the United Force embodies, for many Africans, social attitudes which are far worse than those of the less ideologically distant party led by Jagan.

The third reason is simply that the United Force probably did not initially envisage fighting the election alone at all. Early in the campaign there were negotiations to bring together the U.F. and the P.N.C. on one solid anti-Jagan ticket; but these foundered mainly on the question of the distribution of office should the coalition be successful. By the time these negotiations failed, the U.F. had to fight or be considered not a serious party. Its campaign forced the P.N.C. to move farther to the right, and probably precipitated the expulsion of Sidney King, who had pursued an increasingly bitter racial line against both Indian and white, culminating in a remarkable proposal for the partition of British Guiana (like Gaul) into three parts, one for Indians, one for Africans and one for those who 'wish to live with other races'. King became an independent candidate and then withdrew, but the fracas undoubtedly reduced the

effectiveness of the P.N.C.'s drive for Negro solidarity, even though it freed the party to move farther to the right than before.

Now, however, it was too late to make a thorough-going revision of its economic programme, and its espousal of democratic socialism of the British Labour Party type did not make an impact on the voters. It was caught by its previous emphasis on racialism and so forced to concentrate on this as the campaign progressed. The P.N.C. fought on two fronts, the Indian-African fight familiar from the past, and the even older but now explicitly African–light middle-class struggle, with its strong class undertones. It is not surprising that the party lost and since the U.F. was never a serious contender that the P.P.P. should gain twenty seats to the P.N.C.'s eleven, although the discrepancy in the popular vote was much narrower.

There was much uncertainty among the electorate as the P.P.P. assumed the considerably greater powers of the new constitution, with the prospect of essentially complete independence in the near future. There was a tendency in some circles to give the new Government the benefit of the doubt (the large foreign companies had carefully avoided taking sides in the campaign), but the other two parties were smarting from their defeat. This was especially true in the P.N.C., where it was feared—with good reason—that in future elections the East Indian component of the electorate would be in such a strong majority that no African-based party would stand a chance of coming to power. The strategy which this indicated to them was to seek the support of the middle classes on the right, in the process hoping to destroy the base of D'Aguiar's party.

The new P.P.P. Government might have stood by, as in a very restricted sense it did in the election, while the other two parties destroyed each other; but much to its credit, it embarked immediately on a serious programme of economic development. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the party had not been able to reassure the mass of the population that its aims were not the immediate sovietisation of the economy. Much economic and social thinking in British Guiana is on the same level as that of the radical right in the U.S.A., and such measures as state control of most of the primary schools, vigorous exchange control, and capital gains taxation—all features of conservative Anglo-Saxon societies—were seen as portents of imminent Communism. This misinterpretation was aided by the excessive class-war content of some of the speeches of some of the Ministers; and there is little doubt that some party members had been encouraged by the success of Castro in Cuba to believe that they could bring about a similar change in Guiana.

But if one pays attention to what the new Government has actually done, rather than to what some of its members have said, many of its measures seem quite sensible. While it is still true that its present and prospective programmes of economic development are naïve and badly articulated, at least in the essential field of deflecting resources from consumption to investment it was beginning at long

last to take sound action. Indeed this action should (but probably will not) receive the approbation of U.S. aid officials, since it conforms—unlike that of most of Central America—to the self-help proposals of the Alliance for Progress.

Although the measures themselves are sound, however, they involve a radical departure from previous practice and coupled with the perhaps excessive fear of the 'Communist' aims of the P.P.P., it would have been the path of wisdom for Jagan to have attempted to seek as much co-operation as possible—at the least in terms of constructive opposition—from the other parties in securing their passage into law. Even within his own party, many of the most capable leaders are avowedly not Marxists, and it would certainly have strengthened his hand to have secured as broad-based support as possible for the urgently needed increase in economic development.

The precise sequence of events in February 1962 can only be guessed at, without an on-the-spot investigation; but they appear not to be a direct outcome of racial tension. The author last visited Georgetown at Christmas 1961, when Negro feeling was certainly running high against Jagan and against the U.F.; but the situation, though very bad, did not look immediately explosive. From the accounts available it appears that the United Force, together with the conservative trade unions, began to use extra-parliamentary means to counter the new budget, and that the P.N.C., at first reluctant, then joined for fear of being thought not sufficiently anti-Jagan. Whether the U.F. embarked on its course hoping that the troubles would demonstrate that the present Administration cannot govern, or for other reasons, is not clear. What is clear is that the demonstrations got out of hand and that the long-continued racialism of Georgetown's politics, acting on the urban mobs, began to pay dividends in the form of attacks not only on P.P.P. supporters and property, but also on the property of Portuguese and Indian supporters of the United Force. The situation has now cooled from boiling to simmering point but, at the time of writing (early March) there are as yet no signs of any reconciliation between any of the parties. It seems probable that none will occur and that a stalemate has been reached. More satisfactory solutions are not easy to evolve and will not be described in this essay; but it would clearly be irresponsible for Britain to grant independence unconditionally while the present, tense situation continues; and equally irresponsible not to press hard for a solution which would enable independence to be granted in the near future.

Conclusion

It is important to be clear about the issues presently at stake in British Guiana. Her past history has been such that no democratic government that was not markedly socialist could have come to power in the last few years. Such administrations have a tendency to drift to the right as they stay in power, but in any event they would

have to start out as radical. It would be wrong to believe that a programme less socialist than, say, the more radical wing of the British Labour Party, would have commanded electoral support.

Many people in the West, especially in the United States, worry about a 'Communist take-over'. To the extent that they think about this phrase at all, these people probably mean the possibility that Guiana might be used as a Soviet base. Since Cuba already fills this role much better, being close to the United States, larger and more viable, more racially homogeneous and—most important of all for penetration purposes—an integral part of *Latin* America (unlike British Guiana), this possibility seems remote. It might have some use to the Russians as purely nuisance value, but considerations of geography seem to preclude any more serious role; on the other hand, if the Soviet-Chinese conflict develops, perhaps it could be useful as a base for Chinese penetration of Latin America, which in turn would stimulate Russian interest.

But this is merely fanciful speculation; the danger in British Guiana is far more serious and immediate than the small risk of a 'take-over'. It is simply the prospect of breakdown of any effective government at all. The non-Indians are apparently not willing to accept the present choices of the electoral majorities of the Indian voters and this refusal to abide by the rules of the parliamentary game is effective since they control the capital city, without which the society cannot function. But they lack the wherewithal to enforce their will by other means. Either complete stalemate and stagnation must then ensue, leading to more and increasingly bitter quarrels, or both sides will set out to build their own armed force (as Jagan is doing), to assert and to defend their respective positions. Both 'solutions' will lead to a breakdown in organised society and both are unbearably tragic.

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE AND RACE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEANS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

CHARLES FRANTZ and CYRIL A. ROGERS

Several studies have shown that white people living in regions or societies having a relatively high percentage of non-whites become more conservative in their attitudes about non-whites the longer they live among them. Such a relation is suggested by Pettigrew[1] in his study of 'European' students in the University of Natal. In the United States of America, individuals consistently tend to have more unfavourable attitudes about Negroes the longer they live in the south.[2] This is not invariably true, however, among whites who reside in racially mixed housing projects or in other mixed residential areas in the northern United States.[3] We know of no studies in the United Kingdom which analyse white attitudes to coloured people in relation to the length of their residence in 'white' areas, an omission that is understandable because of a relatively low rate of immigration of whites in comparison, say, to the Negro movement from the southern United States to the northern cities.

Such findings suggest the hypothesis that in Southern Rhodesia the attitudes of 'Europeans' about 'Africans' will be inversely correlated: as length of residence increases, 'race' attitudes will become more conservative. This hypothesis may be stated alternatively in various forms: the strength of European feeling for changing the racially differentiated society diminishes with longer periods of residence; integration with existing European attitudinal norms about Africans is positively correlated with increasing length of residence; or, European 'newcomers' gradually become more acculturated to the beliefs, feelings, and policy orientations of the 'old-timers'. 'Conservatism' in this context means that there is little or no desire to discontinue selected practices in which Europeans and Africans have different rights, or are treated in a differential manner, irrespective of whether the sanctions are primarily legal, moral, social, or supernatural.

[1] T. F. Pettigrew, 'Personality and Socio-Cultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 2, 1958, pp. 29–42. In interpreting Pettigrew's data it is necessary, however, to assume that students born outside Africa have lived in the Union of South Africa for a shorter period than have the students born in Africa.

[2] L. M. Killian and J. L. Haer, 'Variables Relating to Attitudes Regarding School Desegregation Among White Southerners', *Sociometry*, vol. 21, 1958, pp. 159–64; V. M. Sims and J. R. Patrick, 'Attitude toward the Negro of Northern and Southern College Students', *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 7, 1936, pp. 192–204; W. T. Liu, 'The Community Reference System, Religiosity, and Race Attitudes', *Social Forces*, vol. 39, 1961, pp. 324–28.

[3] J. Harding, B. Kutner, H. Proshansky, and I. Chein, 'Prejudice and Ethnic Relations', in *Handbook of Social Psychology*; C. Lindzey, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Press, 1954), vol. II, pp. 1021–61; H. Blumer, 'United States of America', *International Social Science Bulletin*, vol. 10, 1958, pp. 403–47.

The research reported here is drawn from a larger study[4] of European attitudes about Africans in Southern Rhodesia undertaken in 1959. Before turning to test the hypothesis on the correlation between 'race' attitudes and length of residence, a brief discussion of the whole project will provide a useful context for the particular focus of this article.

The larger study embraces several interrelated aims: (1) to ascertain the attitudes of the entire adult European population, and of various sub-populations within it, about maintaining or changing the *status quo*; (2) to discover which customs or laws these populations wish to maintain or to discontinue; and (3) to test for correlations between the findings of (1) and (2). It is not expected that a general theory of race relations and race attitudes will thereby be established, although the results may make a modest contribution to this distant and desirable goal. Rather, the focus is primarily upon the understanding of various social and personal correlates of attitudes among Europeans within the *milieu* of Southern Rhodesia.

The major research tool being used to ascertain European race attitudes is a questionnaire containing sixty-six examples of laws and customs in which Africans and Europeans were differentiated. These examples have been selected to provide a coverage of the major aspects of social life: personal courtesies and etiquette, the use of racially segregated lands, civil order and political control, the use of social, recreational and public facilities, cross-racial sexual relations, and so on. Four response choices are provided on each item, and these are scaled as follows: '0' is assigned to responses in which a person feels it is *very important* to *maintain* a given law or practice; '2' is for a weaker feeling, *important* to *maintain*; '4' is for *important* to *discontinue* the custom; and '6' is for a response of *very important* to *discontinue*. Thus, a Likert-type continuum has been established that involves two elements: strength of feeling, and policy orientation. In this way, a *person* who wishes to maintain one-half and to discontinue the other half of the sixty-six practices, and who feel equally strongly about them all, has a score of 3.00. Similarly, an *item* or *category* of items which receives this score indicates that the European population is equally divided in its orientations. Persons whose scores fall below this theoretical mean favour the retention of the *status quo* in varying degrees, while those scoring between 3.00 and 6.00 generally favour changes in the racially differentiating laws and customs of Southern Rhodesia.

The mean score of the sample is 2.45 (S.D. = 1.12), illustrating that the majority of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia generally favour the retention of the *status quo*. Statistically,[5] this figure varies sufficiently from normal expectations for us to conclude that the

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[4] C. A. Rogers and C. Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behaviour of the White Population* (London, Yale University Press, 1962).

[5] $\chi^2 = 25{\cdot}86$ and, with fourteen degrees of freedom, falls at the 3 per cent level of confidence. See further discussion in Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*, Chapter 7.

population has a clearly conservative bias in its race attitudes. This is illustrated further by the fact that of the sixty-six statements in the questionnaire, forty-two receive scores below the hypothetical mean of 3.00. Finally, of the 500 persons in the sample, 348 have scores which fall somewhere on the 'maintain' side of the continuum.

The questionnaire has been administered to a sample of 500 Southern Rhodesian Europeans aged twenty and over. By using two major principles—stratification and randomisation—and 108 minor controls, we feel that the findings of the sample are representative of the entire adult population. Various tests also prove the questionnaire to have high validity and reliability.[6] Although several of the laws and customs cited in the questionnaire have changed since the study was initiated, such changes should pose no challenge to our conclusions. Rather, they raise the important question of the relevance of attitudinal data for an understanding of the dynamic nature of social relations between Africans and Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, i.e., what relevance the changes in the attitudes of discrete *individuals* may have for changes in the *social system.*

The research procedure has involved the selection of a sample which is representative of the total European population in terms of twelve selected personal and social characteristics. Some of these characteristics are discontinuous variates, such as sex and country of birth, while others are continuous variables having an underlying metric, as with age and length of residence. The approach has continued with an enquiry into what relations, if any, exist between Europeans' race attitudes and their personal and social characteristics. Four of the twelve characteristics—age, sex, (census) district of residence, and income—are not found to be related to attitudes in a statistically significant way,[7] although there are small and consistent differences. Significant statistical relations[8] are found to exist between the Europeans' race attitudes and the eight remaining characteristics: their country of birth, national or ethnic origin (self-identified), occupation, type of industry in which employed, length of schooling, religious affiliation or preference, political party preference, and length of residence in Southern Rhodesia.

Three of the twelve characteristics are based upon the time dimension: age, length of schooling, and length of residence. The first of

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[6] Methodology and general research procedure are discussed at length in Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*, Chapters 3–6. Attention is called to the fact that the sample (1959) differs from the population (census, 1956) in a statistically significant manner. In our sample the mean length of residence for Europeans aged twenty and above is 17·3 years, whereas three years earlier the census figures gave a mean of 15·8 years, a difference of 1·5 years. It can be argued that it is best to err in this direction. Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5, discuss this variation in greater detail.

[7] Using Gosset's test to determine the significance of the difference between the mean scores of the sub-populations, the level of confidence falls at 8 per cent or above. Therefore the null hypothesis is supported. See Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9.

[8] The null hypothesis is rejected in all eight cases, as the value is signficant beyond the 0·1 per cent level of confidence. This signifies that differences in the attitudes of contrasting sub-populations (e.g., persons born in the United Kingdom and Eire and those born in the Union of South Africa) may be taken as genuine rather than as the result of chance fluctuations in the sampling. Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*

these, however, has no significant relation to race attitudes—the older Europeans are not significantly more conservative than their counterparts—and the significance of the length of schooling will be analysed elsewhere.[9] In this report, then, we are concerned primarily with the last of these three variables.

We may now return to our major hypothesis. The data in Table 1 show that adult Europeans who support the *status quo* least strongly are those who have been resident in Southern Rhodesia for fewer than five years. Thereafter, the attitudes are inversely related to increasing length of residence until the period 30–39 years is reached. Gosset's t formula to test the difference (0·71) between the two most contrasting sub-populations in terms of mean scores (0–4 years and 30–39 years) reveals that the difference is very significant.[10] But the standard

Table 1

Length of Residence and Attitude Score by Category of Differentiating Laws and Customs

Rank	Category	Years of Residence 0–4 (N=112)	5–9 (N=103)	10–19 (N=84)	20–29 (N=92)	30–39 (N=54)	40 & above (N=55)	Mean	S.D.
1	Legal Justice	4·78	4·29	4·67	4·46	4·32	4·52	4·52	2·07
2	Educational & Training Opportunities	4·09	3·81	3·99	3·52	3·08	3·22	3·71	2·02
3	Opportunities on African Lands	3·97	3·64	3·73	3·48	3·34	3·32	3·63	1·90
4	Personal Courtesies & Etiquette	3·73	3·43	3·49	3·20	3·26	3·17	3·42	1·95
5	Public Facilities, Type 'A'	3·32	2·98	2·90	2·84	2·61	2·34	2·89	2·09
6	Employment	2·59	2·16	2·25	2·14	1·79	2·03	2·21	1·95
7	Opportunities on European Lands	2·27	1·76	1·81	1·67	1·49	1·49	1·80	1·93
8	Civil Order & Political Control	2·09	1·63	1·50	1·38	1·39	1·39	1·57	1·74
9	Public Facilities, Type 'B'	1·47	1·23	1·10	1·13	1·05	1·07	1·20	1·59
10	Social & Recreational Facilities	1·47	1·07	1·06	1·04	1·06	1·15	1·17	1·63
11	Sexual Relations	1·29	1·10	0·84	0·95	0·61	0·85	0·98	1·70
—	Unclassified	3·54	3·31	3·35	3·08	2·90	2·88	3·24	2·04
	Mean	2·82	2·46	2·47	2·32	2·11	2·18	2·45	1·87
	S.D.	1·28	1·05	1·06	1·07	0·94	1·03	1·12	

deviation scores also show there is much overlap between the length of residence intervals. Thus it may be inferred that some individuals who have recently arrived in Southern Rhodesia hold attitudes that are as conservative as those held by other persons after forty or more years of residence. In general, though, the hypothesis finds considerable support from the data.

The obtained product-moment correlation between attitude and length of residence is 0·17. It is significant at beyond the 0·1 per cent level of confidence and indicates that such a relation can be obtained through the vagaries of sampling less than once in a thousand times. Although the correlation is highly significant, it is still modest. Additional findings indicate that other factors—such as country of birth, amount of schooling, and religious affiliation—play complementary and important roles in moulding attitudes about racial differentiation in Southern Rhodesia.

[9] See also Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*, and C. Frantz, 'Race Attitudes and Race Relations in Southern Rhodesia', *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 13, no. 2, 1961.

[10] t equals 3·62, and being significant at the 0·1 per cent level of confidence the null hypothesis is rejected.

Table 1 also shows the twelve categories into which the sixty-six questionnaire items have been classified, as well as the Europeans' mean scores on each of these categories according to their length of residence in Southern Rhodesia.[11] The least conservative class (0–4 years) consistently score higher than the most conservative class (30–39 years) on all twelve categories. This also occurs on every one of the questionnaire items; in fact, length of residence proves to be the only social and personal characteristic on which this total consistency is displayed. The maximum variation in the category scores is found in regard to changes in the laws and customs about the educational and training opportunities available for Africans (difference = 1·01).

A relatively sharp drop may be noted in the scores of individuals who have lived in Southern Rhodesia 5–9 years (M = 2·46) compared to those in the 0–4 years class (M = 2·82). Thereafter only a relatively slow increase in conservatism occurs as the period of residence is extended. Further, the standard deviation scores of persons falling in the 0–4 years interval (S.D. = 1·28) is somewhat greater than in all the remaining residence intervals which, in fact, have quite similar standard deviations (ranging from 0·94 to 1·07). This indicates that not only does conservatism increase with greater length of residence; but also that after 5–9 years the homogeneity of European attitudes about racially differentiating laws and customs remains rather constant.

The relatively sudden increase in conservatism among European immigrants invites further examination. If the differences in scores between classes according to length of residence are valid, they imply that new arrivals will inevitably change their attitudes through time. They will, in other words, tend to modify their beliefs, feelings, and attitudes in the direction of the norms for the entire European population. However, since ours is not a longitudinal study, we cannot say whether the race attitudes of *discrete and named individuals* have changed from one year to the next. The question of attitudinal change can only be approached rather more obliquely, by comparing classes of people according to some variable of time.

Table 2 indicates the attitudinal differences between 'newcomers' and 'oldtimers' in Southern Rhodesia when analysed by a third characteristic.[12] Some interesting observations emerge from such analyses. The results presented in Table 2 indicate that the subpopulations whose attitudes are least affected by length of residence are the Dutch Reformed, the South African born, the Afrikaners, and the Anglicans (especially those born in the Union of South Africa). Except for the Anglicans, these groupings are also among those having the most conservative attitudes *regardless of length of*

[11] The social and statistical significance of these scores serve as the basis for extended discussion in the principal report of the research study, Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.* For a briefer outline of the major findings of the study, see Frantz, *op. cit.*

[12] 'Type of business or industry' is omitted since the scores of all the industrial classes are, except for persons in the 'government and business services' class, quite similar.

residence. These findings suggest that the persons least likely to alter their attitudes about Africans with an increasing length of residence are those born in South Africa who identify with the largest ethnic and religious groups in the Union. Given the similarities in the social and cultural *milieu* of Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, this finding is not unexpected.

On the other hand, the 'newcomer' and 'oldtimer' craftsmen show a greater difference in scores than do the professional and technical

Table 2

Length of Residence and Attitudes Among Contrasting Sub-Populations

Characteristic	*Contrasting Sub-Populations*	*No.*	*% More Conservative, 'Oldtimers' Compared to 'Newcomers'** (Mean difference = 20%)
Political Party Preference	United Federal	290	24
	Dominion	177	23
National or Ethnic Origin	English	302	22
	Afrikaners	70	13
Religious Affiliation	Anglican	194	13
or Preference ..	Dutch Reformed	47	8
Length of Schooling ..	15 & above years	69	19
	0–8 years	56	15
Country of Birth ..	U.K. & Eire	190	21
	Union of South Africa	177	11
Occupation	Professional & technical	68	16
	Craftsmen	36	33

* 'Oldtimers' have lived in Southern Rhodesia for twenty or more years, and 'Newcomers' have resided 0–4 years in the Colony.

persons, even though the craftsmen have significantly more conservative race attitudes than individuals in the latter class. This anomalous finding may result from very small numbers in the 'cells': a total of only sixteen craftsmen are included in these two length of residence classes.[13] This illustrates the difficulties of subdividing relatively small groupings into so many 'cells' that the resulting number of cases may be too small to permit conclusive generalisations, especially on statistical grounds. Fortunately, this complication seldom arises in regard to the above data.

The data also permit an examination of the differences in attitudes and length of residence in relation to the *categories* of differentiating laws and customs in the questionnaire. In this manner, the social characteristics other than length of residence are held constant while the categories of items become the variables.

It was observed earlier that the sharpest drop in attitude scores seems to occur relatively early in the experience of European immigrants. Table 3 presents a further analysis of this general finding. Persons who have lived in Southern Rhodesia 5–9 years are 13 per cent more conservative in their scores than are the individuals with fewer years of residence.

When the difference in the attitude of these two groupings is examined on the *categories* of items, rather than on the entire questionnaire, some interesting findings emerge. In contrast to the 13 per

[13] See the brief discussion on this point in Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*

cent decline in scores for the whole scale, the largest change is a 27 per cent more conservative score about maintaining segregated social and recreational facilities. If the conservatism is analysed in relation to the five highest and the five lowest categories, Europeans in the 5–9 year period of residence show more willingness to preserve the *status quo* in the order of 9 per cent and 21 per cent respectively. This clearly suggests that the more *personal and intimate* are the situations in which interaction between Europeans and Africans might occur, the quicker is the 'change' in attitude in the conservative direction—in the direction, it may be noted,that is characteristic of Europeans born in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa who have had longer periods of contact with Africans.

Table 3

Length of Residence and Attitudes About Categories of Items

Rank	Category (and No. Items)	Years of Residence			% More Conservative compared to 0–4 yrs.			
		0–4 (N=112)	5–9 (N=103)	40 & above (N=55)	5–9 yrs.		40 & above	
1	Legal Justice (3)	4·78	4·29	4·52	10		5	
2	Educational & Training Opportunities (4)	4·09	3·81	3·22	7	9	21	18
3	Opportunities on African Lands (4)	3·97	3·64	3·32	8		16	
4	Personal Courtesies & Etiquette (9)	3·73	3·43	3·17	8		15	
5	Public Facilities, Type 'A' (7)	3·32	2·98	2·34	10		30	
6	Employment (4)	2·59	2·16	2·03	17		22	
7	Opportunities on European Lands (6)	2·27	1·76	1·49	22		34	
8	Civil Order & Political Control (9)	2·09	1·63	1·39	22		33	
9	Public Facilities, Type 'B' (7)	1·47	1·23	1·07	16	21	27	31
10	Social & Recreational Facilities (5)	1·47	1·07	1·15	27		22	
11	Sexual Relations (3)	1·29	1·10	0·85	15		34	
—	Unclassified (5)	3·54	3·31	2·88	6		19	
	Means (66)	2·82	2·46	2·18	13		22	

If we proceed to compare classes based upon 0–4 and 40 and above years (rather then 0-4 and 5–9 years) of residence, the 'total effect' of the cultural *milieu* may be gauged. The old-timers' attitudes are now 22 per cent more conservative than the newcomers'. But in regard to particular categories, the old-timers have scores that are about 33 per cent lower on the opportunities (for Africans) on European lands, cross-racial sexual relations, and civil order and political control. Finally, if the scores on the five top and the five bottom categories are examined, they receive 18 per cent and 31 per cent less change-tolerant scores, respectively, among the older residents. Thus, the same inference can be made: the longer the residence in Southern Rhodesia, the greater the conservatism in race attitudes. However, this is especially true about the areas of behaviour in which *social contact* with Africans is likely to occur, rather than in attitudes about the segregated opportunities and facilities on reserved lands, personal courtesies and etiquette, and the morality of legal justice.

These data clearly suggest that there are important environmental influences upon attitudes which are primarily non-individual. Society and culture are, in fact, supra-individual; they exist largely outside the direct or conscious experiences and interests of individuals. As discussed in our larger study, these supra-individual influences in Southern Rhodesia include various systems of socialisation, education, communication, and propaganda; common

geographical and climatic features; the judicial system; particular methods by which elections are held; land apportionment; a dual administration for many African and European affairs; segregated services and facilities; and differentials in economic and political power.

Although undergoing modification continually, the social system and the European values that sanction it generally seem to encourage the desire to preserve the *status quo*. Otherwise, it is feared, all that has been attained may be lost. Institutional dualism, which has pervaded Southern Rhodesian society for the past seventy years, has created a radically different type of social system than the new immigrants generally knew in their homelands. Certainly, the racial and cultural diversity of Southern Rhodesia is likely to be greater than that experienced elsewhere by the majority of the immigrants. This generalisation is least applicable, of course, to immigrants born in the Union of South Africa.

Thus, it becomes clear why European attitudes about Africans turn out to be related to length of residence in Southern Rhodesia—related to what may be termed 'social age' rather than to chronological or 'biological' age. The pervasive influence of the new *milieu* is reflected in the fact that virtually all the sub-populations seem to show a progressive increase in conservatism the longer they live in the new society. Those who seem to change their attitudes *most* are the ones who initially were among the *least* conservative, and therefore, the least acculturated to the traditional norms of the European population. Contrariwise, individuals reared in southern Africa usually show smaller changes in the conservative direction, presumably because of their greater familiarity and identification with a social system quite similar to that in Southern Rhodesia. For them, emigration to Southern Rhodesia involves no sharp change in *milieu* as it does for the majority of emigrants from Europe.

Our further analyses, however, suggest that it is not individuals, but rather groups and associations, which are the principal active agents in instituting changes in the racially bifurcated social system of Southern Rhodesia.[14] In particular, the Government may—as in Great Britain and elsewhere—create and hasten the rate of social change if it is believed to be worthwhile or necessary. The traditional and symbolic sanctions for making decisions and implementing policy, 'in partial remove' from the electorate and in the name of the Crown, are important elements in the British system of government and the 'rule of law' which, in our analysis, facilitate whatever changes may be thought desirable.[15]

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[14] Rogers and Frantz, *op. cit.*, Chapters 18 *et seq.*; Frantz, *op. cit.*

[15] See M. Banton, *White and Coloured: The Behaviour of British People towards Coloured Immigrants* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1959); E. A. Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (London, Heinemann, 1956); D. E. Apter and R. A. Lystad, 'Bureaucracy, Party, and Constitutional Democracy: An Examination of Political Role Systems in Ghana', in *Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation*, G. M. Carter and W. O. Brown, eds. (Boston University Press, 1958), pp. 16–43.

If the Southern Rhodesian Government were required to wait for all individuals—and especially the predominantly European electorate—to alter their attitudes, the likelihood of substantially changing the present social system would be small. The direction of change also would be, in many cases, towards an increasing amount of racial differentiation and segregation.

PENTECOSTAL SECTS AMONG WEST INDIAN MIGRANTS

MALCOLM J. C. CALLEY

This paper is a preliminary report* on a research project I am conducting under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations (and with the generous financial assistance of the Rowntree Trust, for which I am most grateful) into the part played by ecstatic religious groups in the assimilation of West Indian migrants to Britain. The project has been divided into three parts: 1, A general survey of the part played by West Indians in the religious life of the community generally; 2, A general survey of the ecstatic Pentecostal sects that attract large numbers of West Indians; 3, A detailed study of one of these sects, with special reference to the way in which it assists, hinders or buffers assimilation. The first and second parts of the project have been completed, but before final publication of results the second part will have to be brought up to date, as the situation is expected to have changed somewhat while I have been engaged on the third part, the detailed study of one sect.

1. Participation of West Indians in English Congregations

This part of the project is thought of as being subsidiary. From it, it was hoped to get enough information about membership in religious groups generally to be able to estimate the importance of the Pentecostal sects with which the main project is concerned. Those towns in Britain known to have large West Indian populations were selected and, as it would have been too lengthy and costly to investigate all denominations, I decided to concentrate on the Church of England, Congregationalists and Seventh Day Adventists. The Church of England was chosen because its parish organisation made it possible to locate the clergymen in areas known to have dense West Indian populations, the Congregationalists because, being more evangelical than the Church of England, they could reasonably be expected to attract West Indians, the Seventh Day Adventists because I already knew them to have a considerable West Indian following. Clergy in London were interviewed, those in other cities were sent a postal questionnaire. Respondents were asked whether any other churches of their own or other denominations in their districts had West Indian members, and questionnaires were sent to the ministers of these churches where it seemed worth while.

As the Seventh Day Adventists have relatively few churches in England it was possible to write to the pastors of all those in towns with large West Indian populations, whereas a smaller and unknown proportion of Church of England and Congregationalist clergy were

* Written in May 1961.

contacted. It is possible that some Church of England and Congregationalist congregations with many West Indian members were missed, but I doubt that this would alter the picture appreciably.

Clergymen were asked 1, the average attendance at services in their churches; 2, the average attendance of West Indians; 3, the number of faithful West Indian members; 4, whether any West Indians held office in the church. Of ninety-one questionnaires sent out, fifty-two were returned. Of these fifty-two questionnaires, thirty-eight reported some West Indian members though 'some' often amounted to only one. Table 1 shows the approximate number and percentages reported in the three denominations investigated.

Table 1

Town	*Density of W.I. Population*	*Church of England*		*Congregationalists*		*Seventh Day Adventists*	
		No.	*Dens.*	*No.*	*Dens.*	*No.*	*Dens.*
Bedford	0·67%	4	1%	5	2·5%	150	60%
Birmingham	1·82%	10	3·2%	0	0%	150	60%
Bristol	0·46%	—	—	2	2·5%	—	—
Coventry	0·14%	8	3·2%	—	—	7	11%
Derby	0·75%	—	—	—	—	18	33%
Gloucester	0·88%	6	2%	0	0%	10	20%
Huddersfield	2·35%	5	2·5%	—	—	30	75%
Ipswich	0·26%	—	—	—	—	9	11%
Leeds	0·39%	—	—	41	2·3%	14	18%
Leicester	0·14%	22	1·9%	—	—	—	—
Liverpool	0·13%	14	3·5%	1	2%	3	6%
London	0·49%	69	6·3%	32	?	183	70%
Luton	0·21%	4	1%	12	4%	50	83%
Manchester	0·66%	20	10%	3	2·5%	—	—
Nottingham	0·96%	—	—	4	2%	—	—
Oxford	0·25%	—	—	—	—	4	10%
Reading	0·3%	—	—	—	—	8	13%
Sheffield	0·6%	4	3·5%	—	—	—	—
Slough	0·41%	—	—	—	—	23	35%
Southampton	0·38%	0	0%	0	0%	2	5%
Totals		148	3·6%	100	1·78%	511	32%

A dash (—) indicates that the clergy written to in these towns failed to answer or (with Seventh Day Adventists only) that there is no congregation in this town.

The disparity between West Indian membership in the Church of England and Congregationalists on the one hand and the Seventh Day Adventist church on the other, is almost entirely due to the proselytising zeal of the Adventists. Any stranger at a service, be he white or coloured, is warmly welcomed not only by the pastor but by the members of the congregation as well. Proselytisation is very systematic; handbills are delivered to every house in a chosen area and these are followed by personal calls. Every Adventist is expected to evangelise, and in one congregation I visited over 30 per cent were actually doing so at the time. West Indian members are particularly zealous. They participate much more fully in the life of the Adventist church than they do in the life of the other two churches. Practically no West Indians held office in the Church of England and Congregationalist churches but almost every Adventist church had some

West Indian office-holders, though none of the pastors were West Indian. This is brought out in Table 2. Many West Indians who have joined Adventist congregations in England were Adventist in the West Indies; the tendency to transfer membership is much stronger among Adventists than in the other two denominations. The Adventist West Indian, moreover, does not seem to lose interest after being in England for a while, whereas both Congregationalist and Anglican clergy complain bitterly of this in their churches.

Table 2

Offices held by West Indians in Adventist Congregations

Town	*Youth Leader*	*Deacon*	*Mission Leader*	*Sabbath School Teacher*	*Church Board*	*Total*
Bedford	0	0	0	0	0	0
Birmingham		1/5 of all church offices				20
Coventry	0	0	0	1	0	1
Derby	1	1	0	1	1	4
Gloucester	0	1	0	0	0	1
Huddersfield	1	3	0	1	2	7
Ipswich	1	1	1	0	0	3
Leeds	1	2	0	1	0	4
Liverpool	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luton	0	2	0	0	0	2
Oxford	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reading	0	0	0	0	0	0
Southampton	0	0	0	0	0	0

In London three congregations have a large West Indian membership: Brixton (nearly 100% West Indian), Regent Street (very large West Indian congregations but fewer members) and Chiswick (about 48% West Indian members). Brixton has nearly all West Indian office-holders, Chiswick two or three. Regent Street is in a peculiar position, being the central Adventist church for England.

Some churches other than the Adventists attract large numbers of West Indians by using much the same techniques as the Adventists, above all by every effort to make the newcomer feel welcome. A clerical handshake at the church door is not enough; a welcome from the members of the congregation is even more important than a welcome from the clergyman. The West Indian wants to feel that he is a member of a *church*, a congregation of worshippers and a fellowship of Christians.

2. Distribution of West Indians among Pentecostal Sects

Pentecostal sects were investigated by interviewing knowledgeable informants and by attending services. Some sects were found to have many West Indian members or to be almost exclusively West Indian, while others had few or none. It is unlikely that differences in belief and ritual among sects can account for West Indians being attracted to one rather than another, as the differences are too slight to be appreciated by rank-and-file members. I have found that even sect leaders often have only hazy ideas of how they differ from other, similar sects. Locality cannot account for this either; in one district I found two congregations meeting in the same block; one was almost

entirely West Indian whereas the other had only the occasional West Indian visitor. Nor does the fact that a Pentecostal church has branches in the West Indies necessarily mean that it will have a large following in England; the Foursquare Gospel Association (Elim Church) has branches in the West Indies, but only one of its congregations in England has many West Indian members. West Indians join sects led by West Indians; the clergy of the three sects with the largest following are predominantly West Indian; in two they are all West Indian. The most successful sects were established by immigrant West Indian preachers; those established by Englishmen before the great influx of West Indians are much less successful. West Indians have imported their preachers and their sects ready-made; they have not joined sects they found already operating in England.

Table 3

Pentecostal Churches with large W.I. congregations outside London

Town	*New Testament Church of God*		*Church of God in Christ*		*Church of God of Prophecy*	
	Members	*Nos. attend.*	*Members*	*Nos. attend.*	*Members*	*Nos. attend.*
Basil Heath	42	100	—	—	—	—
Bedford	—	—	—	—	25	?
Birmingham	139	300	?	?	8 congregations	
Bristol	—	—	—	—	1 congregation	
Coventry	36	c100	—	—	—	—
Derby	—	—	—	—	1 congregation	
Dudley	12	50	—	—	—	—
Gloucester	30	100	—	—	—	—
Leeds	62	100–150	—	—	—	—
Liverpool	Very new congregation		—	—	—	—
Luton	—	—	20	50–60	—	—
Manchester	42	c150	—	—	—	—
Nottingham	18	50+	—	—	1 congregation	
Reading	—	—	10–20	?	—	—
Rugby	30	100	—	—	—	—
Sheffield	45	c150	—	—	1 congregation	
Slough	—	—	10?	—	—	—
Walsall	23	50?	—	—	1 congregation	
West Bromwich	21	40?	—	—	—	—
Wolverhampton	46	200?	—	—	?	?

Tables 3 and 4 give the distribution of the West Indians among the three most popular sects, the New Testament Church of God, the Church of God in Christ and the Church of God of Prophecy. The figures given are not strictly comparable because the New Testament Church of God thinks in terms of 'members', 'prospective members' and 'fellowshippers', the Church of God in Christ in terms of members only, while the Church of God of Prophecy makes little distinction between those who are officially members and those who attend their meetings frequently. It seems fairly clear, however, that the largest group is the New Testament Church of God and the smallest the Church of God in Christ, which is virtually restricted to London. Of the major sects the Church of God in Christ is the only one to have lost ground in recent years. The others are expanding rapidly, one or two new congregations being added every year.

Besides these large groups there are many smaller West Indian Pentecostal sects; in London there are at least seventeen and in other cities at least eight. In all, at least sixty-five congregations meet in England and the number is still increasing. It is difficult to estimate at this stage of the enquiry the number of West Indians in England

Table 4

Pentecostal Sects in London

District	*New Testament Church of God*		*Church of God in Christ*		*Church of God of Prophecy*	
	Nos. Members	*Congre-gation*	*Nos. Members*	*Congre-gation*	*Nos. Members*	*Congre-gation*
Brixton	57	150?	?	80–100	—	—
Camberwell	—	—	?	—	—	c100
Dalston	—	—	?	100	—	—
Forest Gate	—	—	?	20–50	—	—
Hackney	14	50	—	—	—	—
Hammersmith	10	50	—	—	—	—
Harlesden	—	—	?	20	—	—
Hyde Park	?	?	—	—	—	—
Kilburn	64	100+	—	—	—	—
Letchworth	9	?	—	—	—	—
South Croydon	29	100+	—	—	—	—
Stoke Newington	59	c200	—	—	—	—
Tottenham	—	—	?	10–40	—	—
Willesden Green	just started		?	—	—	—
Willesden	—	—	—	—	—	c70

involved in Pentecostal worship because, besides 'hard-core' members, a much larger number attend only infrequently. There were four hundred people at one meeting I attended at Easter and two hundred at another. One or two hundred people will attend a rally or convention held by a sect with no more than twenty or thirty hard-core members.

History and Inter-relationship of the Sects

The three sects attracting most West Indians in England started in Tennessee. The New Testament Church of God and the Church of God of Prophecy were, and I gather still are, 'poor white' churches in the United States. The Church of God in Christ was started by an American Negro who, at the age of ninety-two, still leads it; it has a predominantly Negro following. In the West Indies all three churches are predominantly Negro. Although there is a fairly close link with the parent church in the United States, it seems unlikely that the English branches are subsidised from there. The leader of the Church of God in Christ denies vehemently that they receive any financial help at all. Many pastors have been trained at the Bible College of the parent church in America and some have sent their children to America for similar training.

None of these sects existed in England before the war, and each is still led by the immigrant preacher who started 'the work of God' in England. Some of them have been operating in England for

as long as twelve years but it is only quite recently that they have attracted large numbers of adherents. Very few of the small independent congregations are more than three years old. In the early days of immigration there seems to have been little religious activity; only when the community started to become established did religious groups form. I receive the impression that members are drawn from the stable, married section of the immigrants, those who are content to make England their home and who do not expect to return to the West Indies. Most members have been here more than five years.

Most congregations have equal numbers of men and women. As many more men than women have immigrated it appears that, as in the West Indies, Pentecostal sects appeal most strongly to women. Probably quite a high proportion of West Indian women in England attend Pentecostal services. The proportion of men is certainly very much lower; those who do attend appear to be nearly all married with young families. It is likely that married women persuade their husbands to join the sects in which they are interested.

Many more than half the members of the sects come from Jamaica, although about half of the immigrants have come from Jamaica and half from the other islands. In view of the long Pentecostal tradition in Jamaica this is more or less what one would expect.

Pentecostal churches everywhere are beset by schism. In Diagram 1 I have set out the major schisms in genealogical form. It will be seen that whereas the Church of God in Christ is an independent foundation, the New Testament Church of God and the Church of God of Prophecy are the result of a split in 1922. Schisms are frequent among the sects in England; at least two have occurred during 1961. There are two types of schism; in the first a disgruntled individual breaks away from the sect and sets to work to gather a following. In the second the congregation itself splits in two; one half remains with the parent body and the other starts meeting separately and takes a new name. Each sect considers itself to be the one and only 'true' Church of God, so the name selected nearly always has 'Church of God' as one of its elements.

Of the many schisms recorded I select one as an example as it illustrates both types. The pastor of a Church of God in Christ congregation in London broke away because (he says) the services were too emotional, and went to live in Reading where he started his own Church of God. The early tracts issued by this church used the name 'Church of God' but the more recent ones bear the name 'Victorious Church of God'. His congregation is recruited from among the West Indians in Reading where previously there had been no West Indian Pentecostal sect. A hiving evangelist often goes to another city to gather a congregation, very often a city which he knows has no West Indian sect.

In late 1960 a youthful evangelist living in east London began to attend meetings of the 'Victorious Church of God'. By early 1961 he had started to hold meetings of his own which were attended by

FISSION & FUSION OF SOME PENTECOSTAL GROUPS



the pastor of the 'Victorious Church of God'; a month later the pastor and some of his followers ceased attending these meetings and another schism had taken place. At about the same time I noticed that tambourines used by the new sect were marked 'Church of the Living God'. I have recorded other, similar acts of evangelistic piracy in other cities.

Members of the three large sects pay tithes; a tithe is an actual tenth of the member's income. Besides this they are expected to make 'free-will offerings' at meetings. A free-will offering seldom amounts to less than two shillings and at one Easter meeting in London the collection plate was flooded with banknotes; thirty-eight pounds was collected from a congregation of about three hundred men, women and children. One congregation in London paid more than £900 in tithes during 1960 and, in addition, free-will offerings of about £250. Tithes do not appear to be used for the support of the clergy, nearly all of whom have jobs, but for the hire of halls, the printing of tracts and circulars and sometimes the purchase of buildings.

All congregations have difficulty in finding somewhere to meet; they hire halls or use converted basements. As the meetings are always very noisy, local residents are likely to complain and the owner of the hall often stipulates that meetings must not go on late into the night. This is unsatisfactory from the point of view of the sect members, who believe that a meeting should be conducted 'as the Holy Spirit leads', which often involves going on into the early hours of the morning. For this reason all the religious leaders I have talked to dream of having a hall of their own; many sects already have quite large sums of money for buying a hall when they can find one for sale. One independent congregation in London has raised over £1,000 during 1961 and collected just over £100 at one rally in August.

Beliefs and Rituals

The beliefs of these sects vary very little. In so short a treatment as this I propose not to discuss the minor differences but to outline the beliefs they have in common. They are all fundamentalists in the sense that they believe that every word in the Bible is inspired truth and not to be questioned. It is held that the Old Testament provided The Law before the birth of Christ but that much of it has been superseded by the teachings of the New Testament. They believe in the necessity of total-immersion baptism and also in the 'Baptism of Fire' or 'Baptism of the Spirit' which is nearly always manifested in 'speaking with tongues'. A member is thought to be actually possessed by the Holy Spirit when speaking with tongues.

Members observe taboos on smoking, drinking, swearing, attending the theatre or cinema, and dancing. There appear to be taboos on sex relationships outside marriage; the initiate must 'lead a clean life'. This appears to conflict with what we already know about the sexual behaviour and domestic organisation of West Indians both

in the West Indies and in England. Until I have more detailed information I cannot say definitely just how 'living a clean life' is interpreted, or what effect membership of a sect has on family organisation.

A typical meeting consists of prayers, testimonies from members, hymns and, less frequently, conversions and 'speaking with tongues'. All elements of the service are strictly patterned and I have detected little variation from sect to sect. Every service is designed to rouse the enthusiasm of those present and it is only considered really satisfactory if some have ecstatic experiences. Most sects hold meetings twice on Sunday and once in the middle of the week but this is largely determined by the availability of halls.

Special communion services are held and it is in these that the strict adherence to the Bible is most clearly shown. A loaf of bread (often an ordinary cottage loaf) is blessed and then torn in half (because the Bible speaks of the 'breaking of bread' not of its being cut). Communicants then tear little pieces from the loaf as it is carried round. Communion wine is often replaced by some non-alcoholic drink (that tastes like cola) and is administered from a common cup. The ceremony of the members of the congregation washing one another's feet in commemoration of Christ's washing the feet of the Disciples, is observed in at least some, and probably all, of these sects. This is seen by members as an important difference from other Protestant churches.

3. The Detailed Study of One Sect

Since May 1961 I have been engaged on a detailed study of one sect in London. I tried to select one which has characteristics both of the big nationally organised ones with many congregations and of the small local ones with a handful of members. I finally selected the Kingston City Mission which meets in north-east London. This, like the big nationally organised sects, has branches in Jamaica and the United States but, unlike them, has so far only one branch in England. As it is new in England it provides an opportunity of studying the development of a sect from its inception, the birth of new congregations in other cities and the hiving-off of congregations and individuals to form independent sects.

Research Problems

What part does the Pentecostal sect play in the process of assimilation of the West Indian minority? On the information I have so far, it seems to impede assimilation. This is because the sects are exclusively West Indian in membership and look as if they will remain so. They emphasise a solidarity based on a manner of worship which is typical of some of the larger West Indian islands but appears exotic to Englishmen. The very few white people joining these sects appear to be those whose views are too extreme for even the English Pentecostal churches; some of them are definitely unbalanced. None

of these sects is anti-white and all are prepared to accept white worshippers.

Because the sects take up a great deal of their members' time and specifically forbid their taking part in the 'affairs of the world', members are prevented from participating in English social life; nearly all time not spent working, sleeping or eating is devoted to religion in the company of other West Indians. On the other hand the insistence of the sects on members leading a clean life, and on their being legally married and faithful to their spouses, might be expected to engender respect for them in the white community and so assist assimilation. Unfortunately hardly any white people are aware of, or interested in, the beliefs of West Indian sects.

Certainly membership in a sect compensates the individual for the inferior status assigned to him in English society: the *Godless* English have all the things of this world but the *pious* West Indian has his eyes firmly fixed on the next. The sect seeks to establish a little society within the society-at-large, in which many of the values of the society-at-large are rejected. The 'turning away from this world' is an important aspect of sect formation, not only among West Indian immigrants. Because he is uneducated and often inferior in techical training to English workers the West Indian finds it difficult to reach a position of authority and leadership in the society-at-large. But in a Pentecostal sect a leader need not be educated; he need only be holy. Even if he does not aspire to being leader of an independent sect or pastor of a congregation of one of the large national ones the individual can feel important and be respected by the congregation by becoming one of the congregation's many officers, of whom there are sometimes as many as there are members; elders, evangelists, Sunday School teachers, youth leaders. Those who do not aspire to leadership or who lack the necessary abilities can still achieve respect and feel important by being singled out by the Holy Ghost for ecstatic experience. Probably some kind of ecstatic experience is within the reach of most members; certainly nearly every member of the City Mission congregation (the subject of my detailed study) has been observed to 'talk with tongues' or 'dance in the spirit' during the four months I have been observing them. Possibly those incapable of ecstatic behaviour do not join Pentecostal sects.

THE PLURAL SOCIETY IN MAURITIUS

BURTON BENEDICT

Mauritius is a small island in the Indian Ocean, some 500 miles east of Madagascar and 20 degrees below the equator. In its 720 square miles (an area roughly one-tenth the size of Wales) are crammed upwards of 630,000 people increasing at the rate of over 3 per cent per annum, one of the highest rates in the world. Economically this British island colony is almost entirely dependent on sugar which with its by-products makes up 99 per cent of exports. Basic foodstuffs must be imported. Over-population is the most serious problem Mauritians have to face and has recently been the subject of a painstaking enquiry.[1] The economic structure too has been subjected to analysis and recommendations for reform.[2] But Mauritians have another problem, the heterogeneity of the population and the question of whether a population of such diverse origins, religions and cultures can coalesce to form a unified society capable of tackling its economic and political problems.

Sixty-seven per cent of the population of Mauritius are of Indian origin; 28 per cent are Creole, i.e., of African or mixed African and/or Indian and European descent; 3 per cent are Chinese; and 2 per cent are European or of European descent.[3] Each of these ethnic categories can be further subdivided, the Indians into Hindus and Muslims and into five linguistic groups, the Creoles according to colour and economic and social class, the Chinese into Christian and non-Christian, and the Europeans into English and French. Mauritius is a plural or multi-racial society, but the principles in general use to mark off the sections within it are varied. Thus I have just used ethnic origin, language, colour, national origin, and religion to differentiate sections of the population. When we use the term 'plural society', we presuppose not only a number of different sections or communities, but also some way in which they fit together to make a society. We look not only for criteria and activities which separate one section of the society from another, but also for activities in which there is contact between communities. Furnival, to whom we owe the term 'plural society', saw such activities principally in the economic sphere,[4] but they are also to be found in the political, religious, recreational and other social spheres. It will be the task of this paper to show the ways in which Mauritian society is divided and to examine factors which maintain the division. It is also an attempt to

[1] R. M. Titmuss and B. Abel-Smith, assisted by Tony Lynes, *Social Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius*, London, 1961.

[2] J. E. Meade and others, *The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius*, London, 1961.

[3] *Census 1952 of Mauritius and of its Dependencies*, 3 vols., Port Louis, 1953. Percentages for Creoles and Europeans are approximate as the census does not distinguish these categories.

[4] J. S. Furnival, 'The Political Economy of the Tropical Far East', *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vol. XXIX, 1942.

examine factors which break down or cross the barriers between communities and tend to unify the society.

National Origin

National origin is perhaps the primary index of differentiation in Mauritius, though it is often fused with the notion of colour. By national origin one can distinguish groups stemming from France, Great Britain, Africa, India, and China. There is, however, a large mixed group whose antecedents were both African and European which it is difficult to place in such a simple classificatory system. A further difficulty is the long residence of all groups (except the Britons) in Mauritius, so that strictly speaking nearly all are of Mauritian birth and nationality. Yet except to foreigners or when they are overseas, few Mauritians identify themselves or others as Mauritians. Instead they use either an appellation of nationality (*Indien*, *Chinois*), of religion (*catholique*, *mussulman*), of colour (*blanc*, *gens de couleur*), or some finer distinction of caste, sect, or linguistic origin (*Maraz*, i.e., Maharajah, *adventiste*, i.e., Seventh Day Adventist, *Tamoul*). Thus primary identification is with groups other than the total national group. Individuals look for their identities not to Mauritius but overseas to Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, or China. An important exception to this generalisation is the Creoles—those Mauritians descended from mixed African and European stock. They are the least homogeneous of any group in the island and it is not easy to generalise about them, except to note that unlike the other groups they do not identify with their country of origin, if we take this to be Africa. Indians, Chinese, French and British have all made more or less successful attempts to preserve their cultures of origin in Mauritius, but the Creole has shed his African ancestry and what culture traits may survive are not perceived or identified by him as African. The more educated Creoles identify with France and outdo the Franco-Mauritians in championing French culture, but considerations of colour and the long political tradition of opposition to the Franco-Mauritian militate against their incorporation with the Franco-Mauritian. Creole culture with its strong French bias is nevertheless the nearest to a specifically Mauritian culture which can be found in the island.

The separateness of each of the five main groups can be seen by their stereotypes of each other. Each regards the other as undifferentiated.[5] The Franco-Mauritian refers to the 'Indians' and is scarcely aware of the many differences of caste, sect, and linguistic and ethnic origin which differentiate this group. Similarly the Indian is unaware of the many social gradations among 'les blancs'. Both groups regard the Chinese as similarly undifferentiated. Of course much depends on context. The Chinese shopkeeper will be aware of many of the distinctions among the Indians and Creoles of the village

[5] c.f. S. Morris, 'Indians in East Africa. A Study in Plural Society', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VII, no. 3, 1956.

in which he has a shop. The Franco-Mauritian estate manager may be similarly aware of the distinctions among the labourers inhabiting his estate camp. In a Franco-Mauritian drawing-room white and black are adequate distinctions, but in politics Hindu and Muslim may be more significant while in the occupational sphere Indian and Creole may become the important categories. The tendency of each group to look on the other as undifferentiated appears to be a function of lack of communication between groups. It is most pronounced where the social distance is greatest. From the Franco-Mauritian drawing-room the Indian village is socially far removed. (Physically it may be only quarter of a mile away) and its inhabitants appear undifferentiated. Where social contact is more frequent and sustained, this undifferentiated stereotype breaks down. The Chinese village shopkeeper knows not only the ethnic and religious differences of his clientele but their individual positions, wealth and power in the village.

Language

The multiplicity of languages found in Mauritius is a factor emphasising and reinforcing the separateness of groups. In general each ethnic group has a language or group of languages associated with it. Yet within groups finer distinctions can be made on the basis of linguistic origin. Conversely, several languages transverse linguistic and ethnic origins and provide links between communities.

Notable among the latter is Creole, the French *patois* spoken by nearly everyone. The importance of Creole as a lingua franca can be judged from the census of 1952. Twenty per cent of Indo-Mauritians listed Creole as their mother tongue, i.e., the language spoken in the home in early childhood. Thirty per cent declared it was the language currently spoken, and 64 per cent declared it was an additional language occasionally spoken. Among Creoles and Franco-Mauritians the knowledge of the Creole language is almost universal. Yet the language is held in contempt and most Mauritians would probably agree with the Royal Commissioners of 1872 who described it as 'a barbarous and corrupt jargon, utterly useless to anyone beyond the narrow limits of Mauritius, and wholly unsuited as a medium of instruction'.[6] Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that Creole is one of the chief unifying cultural features of Mauritius.

If Creole can be said to be unifying because nearly everyone speaks it yet no one wants to, English can be said to be unifying because hardly anybody speaks it, yet nearly everyone wants to. English is the mother tongue or language currently spoken of less than 700 Mauritians. Under 3 per cent of the total population claim it as a language occasionally spoken, yet over 20 per cent of the population claim to be able to read and write it, an eloquent testimony to the differences in the techniques of speaking and reading and writing a

[6] W. E. Frere, and V. A. Williamson, *Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to enquire into the treatment of immigrants in Mauritius*, p. 499, London, 1875.

language. There are, perhaps, 500 Britons on the island, a very small percentage of whom are permanent residents. English, unlike the other languages of Mauritius, cannot be identified with any large permanently resident group. It ranks very high as a prestige symbol. It stands for Western education in a way that even French does not and is closely identified with the governing power. These are strong incentives for the almost universal desire to acquire it.

Recently the question of the position of French in the school curriculum has flared up in the press. Both English and French are compulsory in the schools. Certain Indian politicians have been agitating for the adoption of English as the sole compulsory language in the schools, with French and the Indian languages as elective, using as one of their arguments that English is foreign to all and hence all would have an equal chance. An Indian, under the present system, they claim, had to learn two foreign languages whereas a Franco-Mauritian has to learn but one.

In spite of its privileged position and long establishment in the island, French has not become the language of Mauritius but only one of its languages identified with a single ethnic group. This group has long been the dominant one. Its dominance, politically if not economically, is being usurped chiefly by the Indians. The symbols of that dominance are under attack. The privileged position of the French language is one of those symbols. The Indians wish to place French on the same plane as the Indian languages, as an elective subject in the schools.

Indo-Mauritians can be divided linguistically into Hindi and Urdu speakers, Tamils, Telugus, Marathis, and Gujeratis. These linguistic differences are often co-incident with differences in religion, kinship structure, and other customs. The northern Indians speak, by and large, a corrupt Hindi dialect probably deriving from Bihari and known locally as *Bhojpuri* or *Hindi patois*. With the recent Indian revival, efforts are being made to teach a purer Hindi among Hindus and Urdu among Muslims, but there is little difference in the ordinary spoken language of Hindus and Muslims as yet. Literacy in either Hindi or Urdu among Indo-Mauritians is less than half their literacy in either English or French. Hindi and Urdu have become cultural symbols for Hindus and Muslims in much the same way that French is a cultural symbol for Franco-Mauritians and educated Creoles. They are associated with pride in the culture and civilisation of the mother country. It is more than likely that the Hindi and Urdu speakers who returned themselves as such in the census were recording a political rather than a linguistic fact. The two languages symbolise Hindu and Muslim separateness. The other Indian languages: Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, and Gujerati have relatively few adherents. Indian political awareness has led Tamils and Telugus to stress their languages as cultural symbols which become political in some contexts.

The positions of the various languages as unifying (Creole and English) and diversifying (French and the Indian and Chinese

languages) is reflected in the educational system both official and non-official.[7] The children of all communities pick up Creole around the home and from their age mates. Creole is the language of the school yard and the shop and of most jobs as well. In the towns it is almost universal but in some villages Indian language may be used in the home. Government schools in Mauritius are free but not compulsory. A majority of Mauritian children attend them at least in the early school years. Here English and French are taught but Creole remains the language of communication. In certain schools Hindi, Urdu, and/or Tamil teachers are provided and parents may opt to have their children instructed in these languages as well. Outside the government schools there are vernacular schools run by Hindu, Muslim, and Chinese socio-religious associations where language instruction is given. Thus the Mauritian child is subjected to a battery of languages. An Indo-Mauritian once told me sadly, 'I know four languages and can speak none of them properly.'

Vernacular schools tend to preserve and promote communal differentiation. They build a sense of solidarity within the ethnic group and inculcate customs and language peculiar to that group. The Hindi, Tamil, and Urdu classes in government schools work to the same end as do the 'exclusive' Franco-Mauritian schools in the island. On the other hand government schools bring pupils of all communities together in the same classrooms. They are taught the same facts and principles, slowly building up a body of knowledge which is common to them all. The Indian is to some extent faced with alternatives. He may choose Western values which are brought to him through Western education or he may choose traditional Indian values brought to him through vernacular education. The former involves learning English and French and leads him into closer contact with other communities. The latter involves learning an Indian language and leads him to more intensive contact with his own community and inhibits contacts with other communities.

Religion

The visitor to Mauritius is at once struck by the variety of religions to be found in the island. Temples, pagodas, mosques, and churches as well as numerous distinctive shrines are to be seen along the roads. The fezes, turbans, dhotis, pyjamas, cotton dresses, and styles of saris mark off the adherents of various religions. Perhaps most striking of all are the various festivals: fire-walking and sword-climbing among the Tamils, the annual pilgrimage of 15–20,000 northern Hindus to a sacred lake, the Chinese New Year procession, the Muslim procession at Muharam with its giant decorated floats, the island-wide pilgrimage of thousands of Roman Catholics to the tomb of a local saint. Each of these is distinctive and colourful and draws attention to the plurality of religions found in Mauritius.

[7] B. Benedict, 'Education Without Opportunity: Education, Economics and Communalism in Mauritius', *Human Relations*, vol. XI, no. 4, 1958.

The principal religions of the island are Christianity, Hinduism and Islam. Within each of these religions there are sectarian as well as customary and ritualistic differences. Religious affiliation is sometimes coincident with the other criteria of the plural society such as language and ethnic origin but several religions transverse these criteria and certain forms of ritual are common to several religions.

Only the Christian religions have representation in each of the major ethnic groups and Roman Catholicism is by far the most prevalent. Virtually all Franco-Mauritians and Creoles are Roman Catholic. The figures for Christians among the Indo-Mauritian and Chinese populations are open to some question.[8] They appear to have been classified in the census as Indian or Chinese chiefly on the basis of the surname, but very often converts change their surname and thus slip into another population category. Announcements such as the following frequently appear in the local press:

'Notice is hereby given that Issop Khan Aumer has applied to His Excellency the Governor to have his name and surname changed into those of Marcel Marchand. Objections, if any, should be filed in the Council office . . .' (*Advance*, 1 August 1955).

'Li Yook Li Shin San, of Belle Vue (Maurel) Rivière du Rempart has applied to His Excellency the Governor in Executive Council for leave to change his names and surname into those of Rajendra Kumar Kassee . . .' (*Cerneen*, 19 September 1955).

'Notice is hereby given that Joseph Marie has applied to His Excellency the Governor in Executive Council for leave to change his name and surname into those of Sadalingum Rangasamy . . .' (*Advance*, 28 July 1956).

It is probable that in the next census M. Marchand will be returned as a Creole Christian instead of an Indian Muslim, Mr. Kassee as an Indian instead of a Chinese, and Mr. Rangasamy as a Tamil instead of a Creole. Change of religion often accompanies change of name and this in turn leads to change of community.

There are, on the other hand, Christian Indians of long standing in Mauritius. The immigration records show Indian Christians from the earliest times. Particularly among the Tamils there are many Roman Catholics. The Chinese have inter-married with Creoles and in Port Louis their offspring are sometimes referred to as 'Creole Chinois'. Nearly one-half the total Chinese population is Christian. The Creoles are for the most part of mixed ancestry, the European element of which was Christian. In addition, conversion of ex-slaves to Christianity was a marked feature of the 1840s and 1850s. Much of this is credited to Père Laval (1803–1864), a French missionary whose cult has almost become national in Mauritius.

The Church of England has a relatively small following. In

[8] H. C. Brookfield, 'Mauritius: Demographic Upsurge and Prospects', *Population Studies*, vol. XI, no. 2, 1957.

addition to members of the overseas British community there are Creole, Chinese, and Indian Anglicans, but this church has never made much headway in Mauritius despite early missionary activity. The only other Christian church of importance is the Seventh Day Adventist. It proselytises actively and has established its own schools. It has made some progress, notably among Creoles.

A knowledge of Christianity, particularly in its Roman Catholic form, is widespread in Mauritius. Muslims, Hindus, and Chinese frequently rationalise some of their own beliefs and customs in Christian terms, and there are borrowings of Christian elements in their rituals. Thus I have seen black stone images in Tamil temples identified as Saint Theresa and the Virgin Mary. Hindus and ocasionally Muslims are to be seen at Christian churches and shrines and participating in Catholic pilgrimages and processions. Hindus sometimes make vows to Christian saints to undergo conversion to Christianity if a favour or request is granted. This universal knowledge and respect for the power of Christian saints is a unifying feature of Mauritian society, for it provides one kind of communication between communities.

Hinduism is virtually confined to the Indo-Mauritian population. The vast majority of Hindus (210,677 or 87 per cent) returned themselves as Sanatani or orthodox, but the forms of Hinduism practised by northern Hindus, Tamils, Telugus, Marathis, and Gujeratis differ considerably. Each has distinctive temples, ceremonies and favourite deities.

In addition to the different forms of Hinduism associated with various ethnic and linguistic origins, there are often special rituals or deities associated with various castes within a single ethnic or linguistic group. Thus many distinctions within the Hindu community are reflected in the forms of Hinduism itself. The importance of these differences varies locally. In one village in which I lived village factions centred around differences between northern and southern Hindus. In a second village such differences were much less marked, and northern and southern Hindus shared the same temple and participated in each other's rituals.[9] It is significant that in the former village 83 per cent of the population was Hindu and only 10 per cent Muslim. In the latter village the population was only 37 per cent Hindu and over 50 per cent Muslim. In this village the distinction between Muslim and Hindu far outweighed distinctions within the Hindu group itself.

As with the Hindus the Muslims are to be found almost entirely within the Indo-Mauritian population. The vast majority of Muslims (90 per cent) are Sunni or orthodox. Although Muslim indentured labourers, like Hindus, came from both northern and southern India, this distinction no longer obtains among them. We do not find Tamil or Telugu Muslims being distinguished in any way from the

[9] B. Benedict, 'Factionalism in Mauritian Villages', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VIII, no. 4, 1957.

Muslims of northern India. All espouse the same form of Islam and Urdu as a common language. The significant difference is between this group, comprising by far the majority of Muslims in the island, and a small influential group of Muslim traders whose forbears came from the Gujerati-speaking areas of western India.

The non-Christian Chinese are returned in the census as Buddhist or Confucian but it is clear that these are not adequate labels, as many Chinese could be described as both Buddhist and Confucian.[10] Distinctions within the Chinese community are based on language (Cantonese, Hakka, Creole), clan, and political sympathies (Nationalist or Communist) rather than religion.

As with languages so the religions of Mauritius symbolise the various communities. Roman Catholicism, like the French language, is identified with the Franco-Mauritians. The Roman Catholic Church like the Church of England and the Church of Scotland receives a government subsidy in Mauritius. Certain Indian politicians have been agitating for similar subsidies to be paid to Hinduism, Islam and other unsubsidised religions.[11] As in the case of language the symbols of Franco-Mauritian dominance are under attack and one of these is the privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church.

Awareness of other religions is one of the characteristics of the plural society in Mauritius. This means not only awareness of differences but of similarities. Mauritians remark that each of the major religions of the island has its orthodox and its reformist sect, the Adventists for the Christians, the Arya Samajis for the Hindus and the Ahmadis for the Muslims. It is sometimes claimed that all are striving for similar reformations. One rarely finds the adherent of one religion dismissing another religion as idle superstitition. Instead, especially on a popular level, there is a belief in the possible efficacy of other religions, particularly of certain saints or deities and of certain rituals. Adherents of one religion frequently seek favours from and make vows to the 'saints' of other religions.[12] On the other hand, religious and political leaders preach return to an original or purified faith. The plural society as found in Mauritius is not a static arrangement of communities, but one in which the positions of communities in relation to each other are undergoing change. Religion can be seen as a factor which both diversifies the society by marking off one community from another, and unifies it, on a popular and unorganised level, by providing inter-communal contacts based on shared beliefs. From the point of view of political action its divisive tendencies easily overcome its unifying tendencies. Religious differences are effective political symbols.

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[10] A. J. A. Elliott, *Chinese Spirit-Medium Cults in Singapore*, London, 1955, and M. Freedman, *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore*, H.M.S.O., 1957.

[11] *Report of the Commission appointed to examine the possibility of subsidising Religions which are not being subsidised at present in Mauritius.* Mauritius Legislative Council, Sessional Paper No. 9, Port Louis, 1956.

[12] For a further discussion of these practices see the author's *Indians in a Plural Society*, H.M.S.O., 1962.

Occupation

One of the chief criteria for a plural society is the economic specialisation of the groups within it. In Mauritius there is a tendency for certain ethnic groups to be associated with certain occupations. Thus there is a predominance of Chinese among sales workers, a predominance of Indians in agricultural pursuits and a predominance of Creoles among craftsmen and related workers. Nevertheless no ethnic group is exclusively confined to a single set of occupations, and this indicates that there are possibilities for mobility from one sort of occupation to another. Indeed a striking feature of Mauritius as compared with traditional Indian society in India is the awareness of all sections of the population of a wide range of occupations and the readiness and ability with which they are able to transfer from one sort of occupation to another. Economically and occupationally Mauritius appears to be undergoing a change from a society which is ethnically stratified with each ethnic group confined to a single set of occupations to a society which is economically stratified with each ethnic group pursuing a whole range of occupations. This transformation does not necessarily abolish the plurality of the society. It may, for example, create several upper classes, not a single one embracing all communities. Nevertheless the possibility exists for the *rapprochement* of communities on class lines rather than on purely ethnic, linguistic, or religious ones. Something of this can be seen in Mauritius in the political alliance of Creole dock workers with Hindu and Muslim agricultural labourers in the Mauritius Labour Party and with the political alliance of Franco-Mauritian estate owners and businessmen with Gujerati Muslim importers and wholesalers in the *Parti Mauricien.*

Contact between communities in a plural society is concentrated in the economic and occupational sphere, though it is by no means confined to this sphere. Within the framework of a changing society we can still discern the traditional occupations of each ethnic group and note the kinds of contacts these occupations foster with other communities.

The small group of Britons on the island can be divided occupationally into those in government service and those in commerce. The Britons, especially those in government service, are characterised by their transient status. They are oriented toward the United Kingdom where leaves are spent and expect to transfer 'home' or to other colonies. Britons occupy the highest positions in government service and a number of technical or expert posts. In their work they are brought into contact with a highly selected group of members of other communities who are in government service themselves. These individuals, by and large, represent an élite in their own communities, though this may not be apparent to a British overseas officer. Communication is generally in English, in itself selecting out a very small proportion of Mauritians and contact rarely extends beyond the working relationship. Members overseas of the British

Government service group interact socially largely among themselves, though there is some contact with the British overseas commercial group. There is relatively little social contact with Mauritian civil servants.

The commercial group of Britons includes a few Anglo-Mauritians established in businesses or in one or two British-owned estates. The majority, however, are posted to Mauritius by the large commercial enterprises for which they work on tours of duty similar to those for government service. On the whole they are much more highly paid than the government service workers, and this is sometimes cited by the latter as inhibiting social contact. In business the commercial group is brought chiefly into contact with large-scale Mauritian businessmen. Most of these are Franco-Mauritian estate owners and big businessmen, although there is some contact with a very few wealthy Indian and Chinese businessmen. Socially, members of this group interact primarily among themselves but they have more contact with Franco-Mauritians than do the government set. The wives in the British community have less contact with other communities than their husbands. Indeed their contacts may be confined to servants and shopkeepers. As a whole the small but very powerful and important British community is characterised by its lack of contact with other communities.

The Franco-Mauritians are characterised occupationally by their ownership and management of most of the sugar estates in the island. They also own and manage a number of large business concerns in Port Louis. The extensive kinship ties which Franco-Mauritian families have with each other helps preserve their dominance in the sugar industry. They are continually able to recruit, train and install members in the top positions in the dominant industry in the island. Not all Franco-Mauritians are rich and powerful. Many families lead an existence of precarious gentility behind the bamboo hedges of their houses in the residential area of Curepipe, but few would associate themselves with jobs below the management level. Some are in the professions and a number emigrate overseas, notably to South Africa and Kenya. In their working relationships Franco-Mauritians are brought into contact with members of all communities. Most have been raised by Creole or Indian servants and are perfectly acquainted with the Creole language. On estates, managers have to deal with clerks and artisans, most of whom are Creoles. In Port Louis business clerks and assistants also tend to be Creoles, though Indian messengers and orderlies are also engaged. Socially there is virtually no contact between Franco-Mauritians and members of other communities, with the occasional exception of the commercial British set already mentioned. Franco-Mauritians interact among themselves and are very sensitiue to imputations of colour in their ancestry. This makes it extremely difficult for a Creole, no matter what his actual pigmentation, to pass. Franco-Mauritians are genealogical experts and the histories of families are well known. Like

the Britons the Franco-Mauritians are an extremely isolated group having little contact with other communities. Their wives, like the British, form a closed social circle having little contact with other groups. Like them also they live in residential isolation high on the central plateau or make the weekend dash to their seaside bungalows ('campements') on the coast.

Occupationally, as in other respects, the Creoles are the most heterogeneous community in Mauritius. For convenience they may be divided into three strata of occupations. The upper stratum includes a number of higher civil servants, teachers, professional men, businessmen, politicians, clerks and assistants of various kinds. In their work they are brought into contact with British and Franco-Mauritian superiors and Creole and Indian inferiors, with both of whom they have rather easier relations than do Britons and Franco-Mauritians. Outside work they are a very exclusive group, interacting largely among themselves and resident in the lower towns of the district of Plaines Wilhems: Quatre Bornes, Rose Hill and Beau Bassin. This group is characterised by extreme colour consciousness. Light colour is very highly prized. They also identify with French culture and have formed a number of literary and cultural clubs. Though they do not mix with Franco-Mauritians they adopt many of their ways of living. Politically some members of this group have formed an intelligentsia with Indian intellectuals in the Mauritius Labour Party, but the group as a whole is strongly anti-Indian. In the occupational sphere their most severe competitors for jobs are the Indians.

The middle stratum of Creoles are the artisans, the carpenters, masons, mechanics, engine drivers, factory workers and dockers. Their work brings them into contact with all communities. Some work for estates, others for the Government, or by the job for a casual employer. Socially they are almost completely cut off from the upper stratum of Creoles and of course from the Europeans. They do have contacts with Indians. Many of this stratum of Creole live in villages or in estate camps or in mixed residential urban areas. These areas are also inhabited by Indians, many of whom are fellow workers. They are thus part of a multi-racial community whose children attend the same school and whose youths play football together. The working relationship carries over into other relationships with a resultant breakdown of exclusiveness though, of course, Creoles maintain their own religion, customs and attitudes which differentiate them from the Indians.

The lower stratum of Creoles comprises the fishermen and unskilled labourers, many of whom live in coastal villages and in the arid region of Black River. Whereas the other Creole groups are generally economically better off than the Indian agricultural labourer, this group is decidedly worse off. It is probably the most economically depressed group in the island. The work of the fisherman brings him mostly into contact with other members of his group. The fish are

sold to a middleman who may be a Creole of the upper or middle stratum or an Indian. Outside their work they interact mostly among themselves though like all villages they have contact with the Chinese shopkeeper and the Indians resident in their village, but other groups generally avoid them.

The Chinese are overwhelmingly engaged in retail trade. Scarcely a village or residential area exists in Mauritius which does not have a Chinese general store and most villages have several. In the capital are a number of large Chinese wholesalers and importers, many of whom supply shops all over the island. Chinese are also engaged in small manufacturing enterprises such as the making of wine and rum from local products. The Chinese have an extensive clan and kinship network and business enterprises are laid out along these traditional lines. Their occupations, especially as shopkeepers, bring them into contact with members of all communities. Since much buying is done on credit, they must be able to assess their customers' ability to pay. Outside business, the Chinese interact principally among themselves. Even in the outlying country districts where there may be only one or two Chinese families in a village, there is little non-occupational contact with other villagers. The Chinese community resides chiefly in one area of Port Louis and it is to this Chinese quarter that the Chinese are oriented. Village shops are sometimes run by one or two members of a family, the rest of whom reside in Port Louis, or a Chinese may spend part of the week in a village and the rest in Port Louis. They take little or no part in village affairs and not a very active part in island politics. There is evidence that the aloofness of the Chinese shopkeeper from village life may assist him in maintaining credit relations. An Indian shopkeeper is bound to other villagers by personal ties including, of course, kin ties. He cannot give and withhold credit disinterestedly for he must live in his village. The Chinese has his personal ties in Port Louis. He rarely owns the building in which his shop is housed. He is in a position to be more disinterested.[13]

The Chinese in Port Louis, especially the second and third generations, tend to mix more with other communities, particularly with the Creoles. Intermarriage is not infrequent and the offspring of such unions often pass partially at least into the general population taking employment in white collar jobs.

When dealing with the Indians occupationally, a distinction must be made between the small group of Gujerati traders and the vast body of Indians who are the descendants of indentured labourers. The Gujerati traders are largely Muslims. Their places of business are in Port Louis and they live there and in the residential towns of Rose Hill and Beau Bassin. The importance of rice, the staple food of Mauritius, is virtually all in the hands of the Kutchi Maimens. The Sunni Surtis are large importers of cloth from Europe and the

[13] B. Benedict, 'Cash and Credit in Mauritius', *The South African Journal of Economics*, vol. 26, no. 3, 1958.

Orient. Both these groups are Gujerati Muslims but there are a few families of Gujerati Hindus who are also importers. In business the Gujeratis are brought into contact with all communities, with the British and French commercial set as well as with Chinese and Indian shopkeepers whom they supply, and the casual customer who buys from them retail. Socially, the Gujeratis are highly endogamous but some of them mix with the élites of other communities, notably with the non-Gujerati Indian élite which has risen in the island. Parties are occasionally given which British and rarely Franco-Mauritian and upper stratum Creoles attend. The group has considerable wealth and both Sunni Surtis and Kutchi Maimens have their own societies and schools. All are able to speak Creole and many speak French and English. A number have entered the professions as doctors and lawyers.

The vast body of Indians, both Hindu and Muslim, are agricultural labourers living in villages, extra-urban areas of the towns and estate camps. From among these a number have risen economically and occupationally. Many have entered government service and the professions, but their wealth basically rests on the ownership of cane land unlike the Gujeratis whose wealth rests on trade. This élite has moved to the towns. Its members interact chiefly among themselves but occasionally with the Gujeratis. A few of the wealthiest have imported wives from India. Others have taken English or French (from France) or upper Creole wives, but nearly all maintain greater or less contact with relatives still living in villages. A few have gone into trade.

Among Hindus there is little differentiation of occupation on the basis of caste. Certain ritually unclean occupations such as butcher and shoemaker are left to other communities, usually Muslims or Creoles, and a few occupations in the ritual sphere, such as priest and priest's assistant, still follow caste lines, but caste as a determinant of occupation is unimportant. The labourer's chief occupational contacts are with other labourers who are Muslims and Hindus of all castes, linguistic and sectarian categories. His sirdar or overseer and his job contractor are also Indians though there may be contact with Creole or Franco-Mauritian managers and sub-managers. Within the village contacts are chiefly with other Indians but also with Creoles and Chinese shopkeepers.

The plural society as found in Mauritius is complex. There is no congruence between ethnic group, linguistic group, religious group, and occupational group. This lack of congruence is a factor holding together Mauritian society and tending toward unification of it. I might have used yet other criteria such as endogamy or political affiliation, but these would not mark off groups which exactly correspond with an ethnic or religious classification of the population. Thus there are many endogamous groups among the Indians, yet even within a single linguistic Hindu group endogamy follows caste lines. The Chinese on the other hand are often not endogamous

and among the Creoles there are several classes or strata, as I have called them above, which tend toward endogamy. In politics both Creoles and Indians are to be found in both major political parties, and village politics do not necessarily follow ethnic, religious, or linguistic affiliations, but may be based on the sharing of a common territory or neighbourhood.

I have emphasised this lack of congruence among groups to counteract the superficial impression of a society rigidly divided into ethnic groups and to show that the relations of one group to another are dynamic ones constantly undergoing change. An important problem for Mauritius is whether these groups can co-operate and interact to form a strong interlocking society or whether they will withdraw one from the other to weaken the total fabric of the society. The above survey has shown, I believe, that there are tendencies in both directions. Tendencies drawing the sections of the plural society together are the use of a common language, knowledge of each other's religions, customs and beliefs, and opportunities for upward mobility in the economic, occupational, and political fields. Tendencies separating the sections and causing each to withdraw into its own social and cultural *milieu* are the multiplicity of languages, ignorance and intolerance of each other's religious practices and customs, and the inhibition of political and economic opportunity.

BOOK REVIEWS

TOWNSMEN OR TRIBESMEN: CONSERVATISM AND THE PROCESS OF URBANISATION IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CITY

By PHILIP MAYER

Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1961. 293 pp. 45s.

A 'Red' in East London is about as far from being a Communist as the management committee of the Institute of Directors. He is, in fact, a Xhosa migrant who takes with him to the town his tribal culture, cast of mind and habits of living. In squalid shanty-towns, packed into shabby little rooms holding one bed and three, four or more lodgers, he holds on to his human dignity by his obstinate refusal to sever the links binding him to his home, family and tribal authority. He becomes, and remains, 'incapsulated' in Xhosa custom.

His opposite number is the 'School' man. (Women, of course, are also 'Red' or 'School'—the first term is derived from the red ochre which dyes the tribesman's blanket or smears his limbs.) What is remarkable is the tenacity, after a full century of urbanisation, of tribal custom as revealed by Professor Mayer's skilled and thorough field-work, and the positive belief in Xhosa values, in tribal culture *as* a culture, held alike by young men fully capable of seeing that all personal advantages, all the wealth and prospects, lie on the School side of the fence, and by older men who after twenty years in the town still refuse to accept its values.

'Redness' demands a lot of self-denial. A Red sends home about half his meagre wages (86·4 per cent of East London's males earn less than seventy shillings a week) and denies himself most town pleasures, renounces smart clothes and prestige with women. Instead of these he keeps his self-respect, the security derived from group membership, and comradeship shared with his *amakhaya* group, defined as 'the whole body of home men present in town at a given time'.

Reds live together in a corporate unit composed of room-mates who migrated from the same location. Observing many unwritten rules, they share beer and meat, fine each other for small transgressions, get each other out of trouble, talk of home, save money, conduct sacrifices, accumulate livestock in their kraals and visit their families at Christmas, when they beget children. To them School people appear less as Jones's to be kept up with than simply as traitors, quislings who have gone over to the White enemy. Elsewhere, and in another context, it was young Kikuyu Reds who made Mau Mau. Red Xhosa say: 'School people are like bats who are neither birds nor animals.'

Of East London's 65,000 Bantu, Professor Mayer estimates that between one-third and one-half are Red. The drift from Red to School —Reds sometimes, as their kraal families say sadly, 'melt away'—is probably about balanced by the drift of new Reds from country to town, desperately seeking money. Intermarriage is still rare. To join a church is probably the most decisive step a Red can take towards the School camp, but although East London has twenty-three recognised churches and at least ten unofficial ones, Christianity is not making many converts. It is a White religion. An exception is Bhengu's Church, a semi-autonomous member of the (American) Assemblies of God, founded in 1950 by Nicholas Bhengu, a Zulu with outstanding gifts of oratory and leadership. Even so, 29 per cent of a congregation sampled by Professor Mayer proved to be Red.

Professor Mayer, who holds the Chair of Social Anthropology at Rhodes University, sticks to facts and mercifully eschews elaborate theories clothed in jargon. Anyone can understand what he writes and he quotes many vivid, telling remarks—speaking of the municipal type of house dear to School Xhosa, one man said: 'It whispers to you that it needs more furniture.' (School people spend far more on selfish needs and pleasures than Reds.)

This is the second volume of a trilogy dealing with Xhosas in East London, the fruits of probably as thorough a study of urban Africans as has yet been made. East London is atypical in that practically the whole Bantu population is drawn

from one ethnic group. It therefore lacks the inter-tribal mingling—or failure to mingle—found almost everywhere else. Nor does the law allow trade unions, which elsewhere offer alternative focii of loyalty; nor has East London the economic opportunities provided by mining enterprise.

Finally, Professor Mayer asks the question 'why?'—why do some men stay Red while others turn School?—only to answer, honestly, that he does not know. It is as mysterious a choice as A's for bird-watching while B prefers football, as the parsnip-hating X's for the oysters abhorred by the parsnip-prone Y. But the political and social implications are profound. No longer can we comfortably assume that, in towns, the modern, urban, 'progressive' outlook will obliterate tribal custom and beliefs in a few years. After five generations, about half South Africa's three million Xhosas are still Red. Professor Mayer's is a study not only for specialists to read but for all who are fascinated by the great African enigma. Here is a ray of light, perhaps, on that great dark territory of the 'African personality'.

ELSPETH HUXLEY

THE NINE GUARDIANS

By ROSARIO CASTELLANOS

London, Faber, 1959. 272 pp. 18s.

This novel is of special interest to all subscribers to *Race*. The story is set in a remote district of the state of Chiapas, in Southern Mexico, on the borders of Guatemala, an area which is at present being studied by a team of linguists and anthropologists from Chicago University; the anthropological part of this project is under the general direction of Dr. Julian Pitt-Rivers. Dr. Pitt-Rivers has undertaken the Latin American section of the very wide project entrusted to the Institute of Race Relations by the Ford Foundation and the Chicago project in Chiapas will naturally provide him with some of the experience on which he will draw in his work for the Institute of Race Relations.

Without its historical and anthropological interest the plot might just fail to carry the reader along, because it suffers from some failure to master completely the difficult technical problem of making switches in the narrator. But in fact these ostensibly secondary interests make up for this. The period is the 1930s, when President Cardenas instituted reforms meant to carry the revolution one stage further, break up the big ranches and end the state of peonage or serfdom in which the Indians on the ranches lived. The picture drawn of the ranch-owners (the class to which the author belongs) is one that most readers will find familiar; although I was told in Chiapas by the author's uncle that he was not fair to his grandfathers, it rings true. We have read of this situation in Tolstoy and Olive Schreiner. There is the ranch-owner who loves the home of his fathers, who loves the life of the ranch, who knows the Indians and their language, but with whom it is hardly possible to converse as an equal, because his sentences are all commands or questions; there is the wife whose heart is not in the ranch and who flames up at a crisis in sudden fear and hate for the Indians; there is the clever and half-educated bastard son of the great house, desperately anxious to find roots with his father's class but too sensitive and insecure about his bastardy to succeed. There is the Indian leader of revolt who turns coward at the last minute. Yet to say these are characters off the peg is to miss the flavour of the novel and its success, which lies in the Indian background.

The Indians are stupid and they smell; they are drunken, superstitious and dirty; they can do nothing worth doing without the directing will of a *ladino*. (This means broadly any Mexican who is not an Indian; Indian means anyone who lives as an Indian and speaks an Indian tongue; both are terms more cultural than biological.) Yet to the *ladino* the Indians are mysterious and obscurely to be feared, not on the conscious level, and perhaps not so much because they may refuse to work or may rise in rebellion as because no one—that is, no true *ladino*—knows what they are thinking and because they have the key to ancient secrets.

Indeed, in a sense, the theme of the novel is what Dr. Toynbee calls cultural revenge. The *ladinos* hear whispered tales from their nurses; as adults they

laugh at Catashaná, the devil with seven cords, and at the *dzulūm*, which comes from the forest to prowl round a human settlement, leaving sick animals and withered plants in its wake until a maiden is lured to follow it and never seen again—but they laugh uneasily and invest the saints with a greater readiness to punish than to protect. Devils tempt little boys to bring them a morsel of the Host—and if they obey, a whole community may be punished. At the time of this story, the Mass may be said only in secret, because the Church has been the vehicle of superstition as well as the ally of the old regime, but the only priest who plays a part can face persecution with a courage and patience he cannot find for those who treat him as a witch-doctor. Just as an Indian, if he learns Spanish, goes to a town and earns good money, may become a *ladino*, so the memory of an Indian belief can take on a Catholic dress. The *ladinos* know that Indian sorcery can affect Indians, but they try to think it cannot touch them.

There are so many points in this book about the relations between people in the hills of Chiapas that are confirmed by the anthropologists that it can be confidently recommended as background reading to anyone interested in Latin America.

PHILIP MASON

A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 1839-1889

By RICHARD GRAY

London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 219 pp. 35s.

The Egyptian thrust between 1839 and 1889 into the region of the Upper Nile was for most of that period 'the sole attempt', as Dr. Gray very rightly affirms, 'to establish a wide framework of law and order in the depths of tropical Africa'. To trace its story he has scoured the archives of Europe in a most pertinacious manner, and he has now written a crisp and lucid study based upon them. There have been several accounts of Sir Samuel Baker's expedition up the White Nile in 1869–73, and endless books on his successor General Gordon. But here, for the first time, their exploits are set properly in their context, while at the same time very effective use has been made of the new material which has now been made available from the Baker and Gordon papers. Dr. Gray discusses three aspects of the whole story particularly well. First, he demonstrates most perceptively how the Khartoum slave traders (who wrought such havoc in the southern Sudan that their memory has not been erased in a hundred years) began as ivory traders who failed to establish satisfactory trading relations with the peoples of the southern Sudan and in consequence were gradually sucked into a maelstrom of raids and rapine to secure their profits. His analysis of this process provides an excellent measuring-rod for the study of other nineteenth-century African trade routes, whose own particular features can be high-lighted by contrast. Secondly Dr. Gray does justice, for the first time in English, to Gessi's efforts in the Bahr el-Ghazal in 1879–81. Gessi was a far more enterprising pioneering administrator than his contemporary Emin and he appears to have had a far clearer perception of the possibilities possessed by the Upper Nile region than either Baker or Gordon. All four men can now be included in any comparative study of nineteenth-century European administrators in Africa. Thirdly, Dr. Gray has made a most valuable study of British official interests in the southern Sudan, which, for all its shorter compass, should be placed alongside Professor Coupland's study of contemporary British interests in Zanzibar. Between 1839 and about 1880 the Nile, as Dr. Gray rightly insists, was perhaps the most important highway into the heart of tropical Africa and British concern with it 'was one of the most important events which caused a change in Europe's attitude to Africa'.

Here, then, is an authoritative study of an important, and hitherto only partially recorded, episode in modern African history. It should be noted, however, that it is very strictly a 'history of the southern Sudan', or in other words a study of the southern extension of the Egyptian Sudanese empire. Africans appear in its pages, but as object, not subject. Scattered through the book there are illuminating paragraphs on the Nuer, the Shilluk, the Dinka, the

Azande and others. Dr. Gray even touches on the fascinating phenomenon of the Nuer and Dinka prophets; but such themes are not pursued, as in due course historians of modern Africa must learn to pursue them. An historical study of the Upper Nile region which treats its African inhabitants as its subject has, therefore, still to be written.

D. A. Low

THE HISTORY OF THE WEST INDIAN ISLANDS OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

By GERTRUDE CARMICHAEL

London, Alvin Redman, 1961. 463 pp. 42s.

A mystery of West Indian historiography is that no general history of Trinidad, the second largest British West Indian island and the most cosmopolitan, has been produced during this century until the recent appearance of Mrs. Carmichael's book. This has been a gap, not only for historians, but for West Indians themselves in their search for roots, for some kind of awareness of themselves, as colonialism comes to an end. Some spade work has been done by the Trinidad Historical Society which has published many documents and articles, and Mrs. Carmichael, for many years its Librarian, has a tight grasp of the kind of local detail that such a Society can discover.

The sweep of the book in time is wide—from the discovery of the island by Columbus on his third voyage over the Western Ocean, through three indolent Spanish centuries to its capture by Abercromby's squadron in 1797 and the growth, by the end of the nineteenth century, of a multi-racial community of 270,000 people which had lived through emancipation, the tribulations of sugar and the effects of a large immigration from four continents. There is also a separate chapter on the history of Tobago which was joined to Trinidad in 1889.

Twelve of the eighteen chapters however are concerned with nineteenth-century Trinidad and these deal with domestic events under successive Governors. This approach has pitfalls. The arrival of a fresh occupant of Government House rarely meant a new twist to events or a slate wiped clean. Trinidad in the nineteenth century had only one Lord Harris and he was ham-strung by an empty Colonial Chest. Most Governors came, served their time, and went; while the ground-swell moulding a new society rolled on indifferently. Moreover it is difficult to pick out in this strictly chronological approach what is merely ephemeral and what is formative and significant. It would have been better if the author had concentrated on some important parts of the story such as racial prejudice, the demand for representative government or East Indian and African immigration and followed them through.

Nevertheless this is a most useful book, well documented and clearly written, with some important documents in the appendices. Some spelling errors have, however, slipped past the proof-reader.

Donald Wood

AFRICA—THE LION AWAKES

By JACK WODDIS

London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1961. 301 pp. 21s.

In his book, *Africa—The Lion Awakes*, Mr. Woddis has approached the problem of Africa along the same lines as he followed in his previous book, *Africa—The Roots of a Revolt*, and he is still running up against the same problem of describing events in Africa from a Marxist standpoint. In this respect it is obvious that his conclusions are slanted and that certain aspects of African development, particularly the role the trade unions have played in the liberation movements, are overstated and in some cases oversimplified. Mr. Woddis's other failing is that while he condemns imperialism, e.g., in the shape

of investment from America and western Europe in Africa, which he describes as one form of imperialism, he does not really offer a clear alternative as to how newly-independent countries are to raise financial resources to instigate the large-scale industrialisation which is necessary for their future prosperity. Mr. Woddis does not accept the fact that newly-independent countries need large amounts of foreign aid as well as foreign investment; that for the moment this money is most readily available in the West and has perhaps fewer strings attached to it than money from the Eastern bloc. There is no doubt that Mr. Woddis has read deeply in his subject and that he is particularly well versed in the trade union movements in Africa; anyone who wishes to study the evolution of African trade unions and the role they have played would do well to read this book, but he must be exceptionally careful to note Mr. Woddis's oversimplification of a very complex situation. There is the Marxist distrust of any African middle class that might develop; he strongly implies that such a middle class would serve only the interests of the Europeans, since it would provide a buffer for African nationalism and European entrenched privileges, both economic and social.

In summary, Mr. Woddis fails to give a correct picture of the economic and social forces at work in Africa today. The basic point is that he presents one side of the case only, and this side considered from within the bounds of his Marxist philosophy.

PETER SILVERMAN

INDONESIA AND THE DUTCH

By LESLIE PALMIER

London, Oxford University Press for The Institute of Race Relations, 1962. 194 pp. 18s.

Few newly-independent countries have had to face such obstacles to unity and progress as has Indonesia since Sukarno became her first President.

To begin with she is a nation of over 90 million people, divided into scores of different clans and tribes and living on over 8,000 islands which cover 5 million square miles of the earth's surface. Secondly the Dutch, who ruled for over three centuries, did so paternalistically and made little effort to encourage Indonesians to share in administration. Indeed, the Dutch flooded the islands with officials, businessmen and shopkeepers, many of whom bore children there and produced an indigenous Dutch East Indian community. Indonesians were largely excluded from higher office and the privileges of Western education. At the same time the Dutch fostered regionalism in the familiar belief that to divide was to conquer.

When they finally left the islands that had lined their pockets and haunted their imagination for so long, they took their experts with them and bequeathed an administrative vacuum, which was rapidly filled by inexperienced Indonesians who were eager for the glory and spoils of political power.

The administration fell to pieces and authority became increasingly to mean the man on the spot—the resistance leader, the local tough guy, the religious head, or, more often than not, the local army commander. The tactless, grasping efforts of Javanese-dominated Governments to impose economic discipline on the provinces drove local army leaders into the arms of disgruntled local civilians. These compacts were the seeds that flowered later into civil war.

In his book *Indonesia and the Dutch*, Leslie Palmier describes briefly but lucidly how Indonesia won her freedom from a grudging Netherlands and explains the ill-feeling that has poisoned relations between the two states and until recently has made it so difficult for either side to compromise over the future of West New Guinea.

Palmier gives scant credit—perhaps too little, in fact—to the Dutch claim to feel responsible for West New Guinea. When I was in Hollandia three years ago I was struck by the strange blend of anti-Indonesian cynicism and moral responsibility of the officials, most of whom feared even then that the Dutch public and political parties would soon tire of the burden. What Palmier shows very

clearly is the extent to which Sukarno and his Javanese henchmen have used the New Guinea issue as a weapon against dissidents in the rich provinces which Java has tried to milk since independence.

I was sorry that Palmier's terms of reference prevented a more detailed account of guided democracy, the concept with which Sukarno has clothed his personal rule. It was also a pity that the author said so little about the effect on Dutch-Indonesian relations of Sukarno's own struggle to obtain greater power and his efforts to play off the various forces in Indonesian political life against one another.

But in general the book will be invaluable for reference and was long overdue. There is an excellent index for which, these days, you cannot be too thankful.

JAMES MOSSMAN

BELGIAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE CONGO

By GEORGES BRAUSCH

London, Oxford University Press for The Institute of Race Relations, 1961. 100 pp. 6s.

Two things about the Congo have puzzled even the experts. How did the Belgians manage to combine quick, profitable and large-scale economic growth with political stagnation and paternalism? And why were they inept and precipitate in handing over to the Congolese?

M. Brausch does not try to spell out the answers, but he supplies a great deal of the basic information needed for drawing conclusions. Combining a distinguished career in the Belgian colonial service with academic experience, and as a well-known writer on colonial policy, he is extraordinarily well-equipped to write this survey.

His analysis supports the view that the fatal weakness in the Belgian system was the failure to set up and foster a central legislative and administrative apparatus in which Congolese would participate. The Belgians ruled out politics on the 'national level' (and for this purpose used an appreciable amount of 'colonial repression' which M. Brausch does not mention) to forestall the growth of black nationalism. They appeared to have achieved a high degree of political tranquillity.

It turned out to be spurious. When the break-through came, there was no solid structure of government in the Congo to absorb the new rulers and maintain continuity with the past. The Government in Brussels panicked; the Congo administration, bewildered by ideas alien to their tradition, lost heart; and the political apparatus collapsed.

M. Brausch attributes much of the responsibility for the collapse to political parties in Belgium. He has an excellent note on the vacillations in colonial policy after the war, in which he shows that short-term electoral interests, and not the needs of the Congo, were the dominating consideration. But the entanglement with home politics was an inevitable result of the failure to develop a legislative council system in the Congo and to allow it an increasing measure of autonomy.

When the Liberal-Socialist coalition of 1954–58 did speed up the programme of preparing Congolese for self-rule, they were obstructed by the Social Christians and the Catholic hierarchy who, in Brausch's judgement, must accept much of the blame for the timidity and tardiness shown in meeting the Africans' claims. He also accuses the Catholic parties of undermining chieftainship and attempting to force tribesmen into the Europeans' Christian mould with the aim of creating 'a Congolese State loyal to the Church, where the priests would be the shepherds of the population'.

Whether one describes their policy as religious or political paternalism, the Belgians never succeeded in creating a common society consisting of black and white people. M. Brausch denies that the Belgians practised racial discrimination, but it is true that no white South African ever felt ill at ease or out of place in the Belgian Congo. He scarcely noticed the presence of the Congolese who were doing 'white men's work'.

M. Brausch strikes me as being plausible rather than penetrating in his chapter on race relations. In parts his book reads like one of Mr. Eric Louw's defences of South African policy before the United Nations. It was necessary to point out that the Belgians had done more than most African administrations to raise standards of living and provide adequate housing, education and social services. M. Brausch makes the point very well, with adequate statistical backing.

But I can't believe that the Congolese workers preferred 'traditional "Bantu" paternalism' to trade unions for the regulations of their relations with employers; or that in the past Africans and Europeans met as 'alien groups with no desire to mix'; or that racial and cultural differences 'obliged the governing powers to create a dual system of education'; or that racial segregation in cafés, shops, cinemas and hotels resulted from an economic factor and not colour prejudice on the part of whites. Such arguments have been used too frequently in South Africa for them to carry weight.

The Belgians, whether by law or administrative practice, segregated the Congolese in 'locations', excluded them from senior posts in the public service, and kept them out of supervisory posts in commerce and industry. This is racial discrimination of a high order. No matter how prosperous Africans may be—and how prosperous can they become when so excluded?—they will never identify themselves with the hopes and aspirations of a ruling caste which retains a monopoly of power in its hands. The Belgians fell because they did not succeed in creating a common society with the Congolese. M. Brausch helps us to understand the reasons for this failure.

H. J. Simons

AFRICA: A HANDBOOK TO THE CONTINENT

Edited by COLIN LEGUM

London, Anthony Blond, 1962. 553 pp. 84s.

The first 400 pages of this book consist of over fifty short articles, varying from a page to sixteen pages on each territory in Africa; the last 100 pages include articles on Great Power attitudes to Africa, economics, art and culture, religion, and the United Nations. There is a specially drawn map for each country (a few place names only) to place it in relation to its neighbours and to the continent. The territorial sections each contain some basic facts (area, population, etc.) and a short list of 'Who's Who' entries for leading personalities. Over forty authors have contributed, mainly journalists such as Clyde Sanger, Hella Pick, Tom Stacey, with some academics and some administrators. Despite a few misprints, the book is attractively produced with a long index and very short bibliographies for each section. It is certainly a feat of organisation to have collected this mass of material, much of which relates to 1961, and to have it on the market by January 1962.

It is impossible to review the quality of all these articles; one can only ask for what purpose the book is intended and how well it meets that purpose. For a limited journalistic purpose it has obvious uses—to look up quickly the population of Gabon, the Prime Minister of Chad, the name of the ruling party in Somalia, the date of independence; moreover, annual supplements are to be issued to keep ephemeral information up to date. At this level, some rather strange travel bureau information is included, such as the names of air lines and hotels serving the country, which most travellers discover when booking. The inclusion of this material, with the kind of writing which goes with it ('first-class cuisine,' etc.) heightens the contrast in the whole volume between journalism, a Baedeker, and scholarly contributions. These contrasts include both style and content; we move from Tom Stacey ('Dodo Island—as Mauritius has often been called—is about the size of Surrey, set in the midst of the Indian Ocean . . .') to the triple mandarin of William Fagg ('the exponential principle may be used in a more subtle and intuitive way, to govern (in a quasi-mathematical manner) the augmentation or diminution of the features of the human (or animal) body as part of the process of artistic stylisation or conceptualisation'). Some of the essays such as that by Nevill Barbour on Algeria, are thoughtful and illuminating studies, while others are composed of the barest generalisations with all

their inevitable inaccuracy. Some authors have managed to stand away from their subject, some are still enmeshed in the newspaper headlines of yesterday—for example, the Belgian Congo article gives a blow-by-blow account of the Congo chaos 1960–61 ('Nine days later a column of 600 Lumumbists reached Manono in North Katanga, affecting a junction with Balubakat rebels . . .').

This points to the main weakness of the book, if it is to be judged (as a book costing 84s. perhaps should be judged) as a whole. There seems to be a weakness in editorial policy in deciding just what purpose the book should serve and just how much comment, at what level, should be included in addition to the facts. While in some cases balanced comment, in a historical perspective, makes a valuable article (the whole North African section is of first quality) in others the level is trivial or partisan.

Criticism of such a formidable enterprise is easy: it remains to be said that this is a very useful book to have on the shelf, for quick reference and here and there for stimulating comment. No one can hope to carry in his head the multifarious details of modern Africa; as a quick introduction to any country and a reference book for elementary statistics, this handsome publication has a place to fill, and many people will be grateful to Mr. Legum for undertaking it.

GUY HUNTER

THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES: ETHNIC AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL

By D'ARCY McNICKLE

London, Oxford University Press for The Institute of Race Relations, 1962. 79 pp. 7s. 6d.

Not many years ago there was common among those with a professional interest in non-Western societies a conviction that the cultures which made these societies distinctive were disappearing in the general march of 'progress' that is, of Western civilisation. Today it is becoming almost a truism that while time marches on, all that moves with it does not necessarily march in the same direction. Change, while omnipresent, is not everywhere leading to convergence with Western institutions and values. This appears brutally plain today in many of the 'newly emergent' nations. It has also become clear, however, that this is true of many non-Western enclaves in Western countries, in particular of the Indian populations in parts of the Americas. Mr. McNickle in this work surveys this question among the Indians of the United States.

The book is essentially a short handbook for the historical and demographic facts of the case. Mr. McNickle orders his historical material well, with a useful selective bibliography for each chapter. The historical treatment is completely lacking in any polemical tone. The coverage reaches from the beginning of Spanish colonial rule north of the Rio Grande to the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. There is in particular an excellent analysis of the conflict of interests in British North America between the local settlers and the Government in London that carries a poignant familiarity for today. By carrying his history down to the present, he is able to register what is perhaps the most significant of recent developments, the increasing willingness of the Indians to organise themselves nationally for the defence of their interests. There is an appendix containing the present population size and geographical distribution of the principal Indian tribes in the United States, which by itself will probably greatly inform the reader who still thinks of the American Indian as the vanishing redskin at the end of the trail.

ROBERT R. JAY

THE PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION OF MAN IN AFRICA

By L. S. B. LEAKEY

London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 50 pp. 9s. 6d.

This small book contains two lectures delivered by Dr. Leakey in this country in 1961. In the first lecture he attempts to place the history of Africa, with its

present political upheavals, in a broad evolutionary perspective and he starts with some of the discoveries in palaeontology and prehistory to which he himself has made such notable contributions. Following on the discovery of the fossil Australopithecines by Dart and Broom in South Africa, and the evidence that they were capable of erect locomotion, Leakey has described a similar creature from Olduvai associated with crude stone tools. It is a plausible speculation that this critical early tool-making phase of human evolution took place in Africa and, as he argues, much of the later development of Lower Palaeolithic stone artefacts may also have occurred in that continent. At present the fossil evidence suggests that hominid evolution may have been particularly rapid in the early part of the Pleistocene but Dr. Leakey appears to speak with diminished authority when he considers the genetical mechanisms which may have been involved. He says for example that mutation rates are unusually high during such 'explosive' evolutionary episodes, but there is no evidence for this and it is an assumption which is neither necessary nor probable on theoretical grounds. Like many scholars he rejects the view that the cultural inertia of Africa in Neolithic and later times was due to a 'racial factor' and he attributes it to climatic change which hindered contact with centres of invention. Nevertheless he believes that these are 'major differences, both mental and psychological, which separate the different races of mankind'. Moreover he seems to think that these differences are insensitive to cultural environment and that failure to recognise this has led colonial administrators into the error of believing 'that they could, therefore, by means of classroom "education", turn men of the black races of Africa into model Europeans, albeit with black skins and curly hair'. He does not, however, tell us what the differences in question are, nor whether they apply to Africans in general or only to the ones with whom he is personally acquainted. Although he is at pains to disavow crude 'racist' notions of inferiority and superiority and gives some good examples of African tribal wisdom in regulating their social affairs, he certainly leaves the impression that they are inferior when it comes to acquiring western European culture. Whether his criticisms are really directed against a false optimism which expects too rapid results or whether he thinks that educational methods are essentially powerless in this sphere is hardly clear due to a certain evasiveness and ambiguity in his presentation. Dr. Leakey has a long and intimate acquaintance with the Kikuyu and his views therefore deserve attention; but it is unfortunate that he thinks it sufficient to merely assert an opinion and that his lecture shows no evidence that he is aware of any scientific studies on the psychology of non-European peoples, nor of the difficulties which arise in interpreting comparative data. This unsophisticated approach is unlikely to carry much weight in professional circles, but in view of the author's scientific reputation it may not be recognised as such by the general public.

The second lecture is more strictly zoological and in surveying primate palaeontology in Africa dwells much on questions of taxonomy and nomenclature. Proof-reading seems to have been ineffective or absent since on a single page we find Broconsulidae for Pronconsulidae, Faynum for Fayum and Hylobitidae for Hylobatidae (an error repeated throughout). At the very end there is a brief account of Leakey's most recent and very interesting discoveries at Olduvai which include a braincase associated with Chellean implements and in some ways resembling the skulls of Pithecanthropus from the Far East.

N. A. Barnicot

CASTE TODAY

By TAYA ZINKIN

London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1962. 69 pp. 6s.

The essay is one in a series of short books which are 'not to be the works of profound scholarship' (foreword) but are intended for the general reader. Mrs. Zinkin's book will certainly add to the layman's picture of caste derived from fragmentary reports and anecdotes in newspapers. He may, it is true, stumble over innumerable proper names (castes, places and persons), but his interest will be held and he will be entertained.

However, students of caste and human behaviour will find many contradictions and misleading generalisations. To the reviewer, several deductions seem unfortunate. One case is that of the Oxford graduate (a Brahman) 'who *cannot bring himself to be fond of his son* because he feels that the child is Untouchable, since he and his wife are not of the same caste' (emphasis added) (p. 55). This man, though 'he *thinks* like' an Oxford graduate, 'deep down, he *feels* that *his child is born polluted* because of his love for a lower caste wife' (p. 55) (emphasis added). One would like to ask the author what technique she employed to get at the feelings of this man. Was it intuition? Surely she has taken a joke too literally. Otherwise, the father's lack of love for his son may be understood better in terms of deviant personality rather than in terms of caste. The author's optimism that 'caste is being brought nearer its end' (p. 69) is misplaced. From her own description, caste seems to have acquired new dimensions in cities and villages, in politics and everyday life, and even appears to govern the lives of India's 'progressive' élite.

Nevertheless we are grateful for this book. So long as academics refuse or do not have the skill to write popular versions of their studies, then the task must be left to enlightened amateurs, like Mrs. Zinkin.

RAM P. SRIVASTAVA

CASTE IN INDIA

By J. H. HUTTON

London, Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 1961. 191 pp. 22s. 6d.

Professor Hutton's range of experience must be unique. He has done practical anthropological work amongst the Nagas; he has run a census; he has been an administrator; and he finished as a Cambridge professor.

This range of experience reflects itself in his work. His scholarship is great; he has read all the books, he knows all the theories. But he is also never at a loss for an apt illustration from his experience in the census or the Assam Hills.

His main interest is not, in the modern way, in the practical working of caste from day to day, but in its origins. He sees caste as a very special institution, made possible only by the fact that invaders could always get into India but could then go no farther (but could we not say the same of Great Britain?). He does not accept the castes of Ceylon or Fiji as being institutions more than remotely of the same order.

What nobody knows is how caste began. Professor Hutton considers all the theories, and is completely satisfied with none of them. He attaches some importance to primitive ideas of soul-force and taboo, ideas which one can still see operating fairly vigorously amongst the Nagas. He realises that the idea of pollution, through touch and through the taking of food and water, is central. He believes that caste goes back in very considerable part to the pre-Aryan civilisation of Mohenjo Daro, to which he attributes the magical ideas and the splitting up of society into small groups which lie behind the pervading fear of pollution. The Aryans, on this theory, added only a class stratification of already existing groups.

He further ventures the theory that many of India's early societies must have been matrilineal, as so much of Kerala still is, and that some of the lowest castes may have been the consequence of the meeting of matrilineal and patrilineal societies, though the untouchables may have more often been degraded by their pursuit of either unclean occupations—the washerman who handles menstrual clothes for instance—or occupations which involve the taking of life, the fisherman, for instance.

There are still other causes for caste, notably occupation and geography. Each job has tended to become a caste, each area to have its own sub-caste. But what is striking in Professor Hutton's exposition is not that there are so many explanations for caste but that the evidence for any one of them is so weak. It is clear that the classical explanations are not true, the Varna are little more than a nonsense, difference of race and conquest of quite unproven importance. What the immense apparatus of Professor Hutton's scholarship really proves is that there are no answers to be got this way. We may find out by adequate study how caste works today; we are unlikely ever to find out how it came to be that way.

MAURICE ZINKIN

SOCIAL CLASS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN PUERTO RICO

By MELVIN M. TUMIN with ARNOLD FELDMAN

Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961. 549 pp. $10.

Operation Bootstrap is bringing radical changes to the economic and social life of Puerto Rico. Industries, enticed from the United States, help to provide the highest standard of living in the Caribbean and the Government of the island, unlike those of its neighbours, can afford to spend money on advanced schemes of social welfare and education. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is well worthy of study because of this unusual and happy state of things; it is, as it were, a mirror of what some underdeveloped countries might possibly be like a decade or two decades hence.

This painstaking book is the result of a seven years' sociological enquiry. For the authors, education is now the main criterion of class in this changing island and it is helping to create a middle class in a society which has traditionally regarded itself as divided only into the poor and the rich. But the ancient yardsticks for measuring a person, good family and land, are being replaced by those of education, wealth and even luxury. As educational and occupational mobility increases, there is left, however, an unresolved tension between the traditional concept of *dignidad*, of the basic equality of all men and the new idea of measuring a man's worth by his possessions.

How refreshing it is to read that no section of the Puerto Rican community considers that race has much to do with this. In very few contemporary multi-racial societies would just over 10 per cent of the 608 people of the sample, considered to be white by the interviewers, insist on calling themselves mulattos? The authors of the book believe that in fact colour is slightly more important than Puerto Ricans think, but it is nevertheless a minor factor.

This is a long and detailed work with many tables and a sophisticated sociological analysis for professionals but it is also worthy of study by the general reader who is concerned with the impact of the West on a society that was undeveloped and sleepy a short time ago.

DONALD WOOD

BANTU PROPHETS IN SOUTH AFRICA

By B. G. M. SUNDKLER

Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, London, 1961. 337 pp. 30s.

This book, by the Director of the Sweden Institute of Missionary Research in Uppsala, was first published in 1948. It has long been recognised as the standard work on the conditions in the Separatist churches among the Zulu people for it deals most thoroughly and sympathetically with the various aspects of Separatist church life on the Rand, in Natal and in Zululand proper.

Since these Separatist churches began their number has increased to well over 2,000. Today census figures show that they have 1,600,000 adherents and together comprise the single largest group of African Christians in South Africa. As Dr. E. H. Brookes says in his preface, 'European Christianity in South Africa must face the fact that it is partly responsible for these phenomena . . . even where separatism has sprung from worldly motives of hurt pride or ambitions, it is to be remembered that European missionary superintendents have not infrequently, through an overbearing manner or through lack of understanding and imagination, contributed to secession'. At the same time, as Dr. Sundkler shows clearly, the rise of these churches among the Zulus has also in fact been due to their desire to find some synthesis between their tribal religion and Christianity. But the tremendous growth of these churches means that this book has an added significance at the present time. It ought to be compulsory reading for all missionaries and leaders in these churches which have established themselves in South Africa from overseas, as indeed it will be valuable to any who are concerned with the religious life of Africans.

This new edition contains an additional chapter in which Dr. Sundkler discusses the Separatist churches in the age of *apartheid*, the relation of both the tribe and the chief to the church, and the emergence and significance of the Bantu Messiah. This chapter is especially interesting, and it is unfortunate that considerations of space have compelled the author to limit it to thirty-five pages. Of necessity there are many questions that are not considered in any detail and some that are only hinted at. However, in his preface, Dr. Sundkler tells us that this is only a preliminary report on the present situation in the Separatist churches. It is only the forerunner of another volume in which he hopes to analyse in some detail 'our group and personality cases from 1958, together with relevant tenets'. One can only hope that this promised volume will not be too long delayed and that then or elsewhere he will discuss more fully than has been possible in this present volume the questions both of the relation of these Separatist churches to one another and also to those churches which they frequently describe as 'white-dominated' churches, as well as the relation of the Separatist churches to Pan-Africanism. Meanwhile we must be grateful to Dr. Sundkler for this objective and painstaking study of one sector of these churches.

AMBROSE REEVES

EVOLUTION POLITIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE: LA COMMUNAUTE FRANÇAISE, LA REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE, L'INDEPENDANCE DE LA SOMALIE

in *Chronique de Politique Etrangere*, volume XIV, number 1–3, January to May 1961.

By P. PIERSON-MATHY

Brussels, Institut Royal des Relations Internationales. 485 pp. 300 fr.

This is a book for students of government and constitutional practice rather than for the reader with a general interest in colonial affairs. Having sounded this mild preliminary note of warning, let me at once say how valuable a book this is, for there is nothing like it on the subject in French and certainly not in English.

The first half of the book provides an analysis of the Community as it was constituted under the terms of the Fifth Republic's Constitution of 4 October 1958, together with a study of the organic laws and presidential rulings completing the new regime's organisational structure. The author also traces the political developments in each constituent member-state overseas which led the French Community to become what President Senghor has termed a 'Commonwealth à la française', in which the member-states are sovereign, while sharing together common institutions of a purely consultative character.

The second half contains first a very useful description of the juridical basis and political evolution of the Republic of Guinea, as regards both internal and foreign policy, with pages on the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (affiliated to the R.D.A.) before the 1958 Referendum. Secondly, two excellent chapters on former Italian Somalia as a United Nation's trust territory under Italy from 1950 (although Italy herself only became a member of the United Nations as late as 14 December 1955) until its simultaneous independence and fusion with ex-British Somaliland, on 26 June 1960. The plan for a 'Greater Somalia', which would affect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, Kenya and French Somaliland, is discussed with skill.

The book also contains some 150 pages of documents, among the most curious of which is the text of a congratulatory cable sent in 1960 by Nkrumah to Hamani Diori, President of the Conseil de l'Entente, after the four member-states of the Entente had requested full independence from France. Nkrumah's tone is even more patronising than usual.

PHILIP NERES

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: INDIAN CULTURES AND THE PROTESTANT ETHIC IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

By FORREST E. LaVIOLETTE

London, Oxford University Press for Toronto University Press, 1961. 187 pp. 44s.

The author of this work comes to the scene with a considerable background of research and publishing. Concerning minority groups, his studies of American and Canadian Japanese peoples during and following the Second World War are well known. And with regard to dependent peoples he has done research both with the Mohawk of Caughnawaga and the Indians of Lorette, Quebec. In 1946 as Chairman of the Indian Research Committee appointed by the Canadian Social Science Research Council, he engaged in summer fieldwork in the north-west coast (the area of the work under review). Moreover the author was able to study the 'Potlatch File' of the Indian Affairs Branch at Ottawa.

The work is an historical description of Indian experiences and relations with the changing frontier environment of British Columbia as well as the two Governments, provincial and federal. The main emphasis is upon the history of the potlatch and the land title question. It is well documented, based on a competent bibliography and presented throughout in an objective way while remaining sympathetic to the Indian situation. The author indicates that his emphasis has been on the 'processes of institutional origin'. The picture revealed is that of a growing use by the Indians of acceptable and legal forms for seeking their goals. The Indians have demanded recognition of modern training, their aspirations and rights based upon natural law. And the demand formulated was a 'contemporary conception of the secular form of the Protestant Ethic . . . through years of engagement in the struggle for survival'. Doubtless this is a fair statement. The book as a whole presents a history of judicial and political interaction between Indian and Government.

In the reviewer's opinion, however, something more seems to be required. Is this an assessment of Indian development in British Columbia or is it restricted to the legal battles of a few literate Indians who possessed both ability and foresight? This question seems particularly pertinent since Drucker's study of the Native Brotherhoods on the north-west coast (1958), which has presented an over-all view of the Indian situation.

To be specific, LaViolette concludes his study by suggesting that the Indians desire first understanding and tolerance, and secondly political equality and participation (p. 186). If these concepts are the core of the 'struggle for survival', then current developments are likely to resolve the situation. The public are being made aware of Indians through media of communication, government agencies and voluntary organisations. And more important, between the writing and publication of the book under review the federal Government has amended the Indian Act to give the federal vote to Indian status persons without loss of special rights. Also the Government had previously appointed a part-Indian person to the Senate.

Many would not agree with LaViolette's conclusions. The author himself appears to have doubts. He suggests that 'the further one goes with examples [political atomisation of the Caughnawaga Mohawk and the unwillingness of Indian Lorette to become a municipality] the more incomprehensible the whole system becomes' (p. 163).

To Drucker, on the contrary, the system is meaningful. The granting of special rights to Indians as well as the enormous funds expended in recent years on health, welfare and education have made it worthwhile continuing to be an Indian (p. 158). Moreover with regard to the Makah Indians of Washington, Elizabeth Colson suggests that federal government policy has tended to create a separate and permanent identity (1953, pp. 144–5). Both Drucker and Colson explain political activity in a balanced way, as only an aspect of the total situation.

If, as in the reviewer's opinion therefore, the book fails to comprehend the Indian situation in general terms, it is nonetheless a good history of Indian *versus* Government in matters concerning the potlatch and the land title question.

R. W. DUNNING

BLACK MOTHER

By BASIL DAVIDSON

London, Victor Gollancz, 1961. 269 pp. 25s.

Like its predecessor, this is a work of unashamed propaganda: a study of African history written with the specific purpose of destroying certain common myths which have coloured, and still partially influence, our ideas about Africa. In *Old Africa Rediscovered* Mr. Davidson attacked the belief that Africans, before the coming of the Europeans, had proved incapable of progress. Given the fact that the peoples of Africa were largely deprived by their isolation from benefiting from the experiences of ancient Greece and Rome, the achievements of medieval Europe and medieval Africa were, he maintained, roughly comparable—and though such a comparison can rarely be scholarly it can, as he brilliantly demonstrated, be instructive and stimulating.

Black Mother surveys the subsequent history of the pre-colonial contact between Europe and Africa: the first encounters between a still largely feudal Portugal and African societies with similar interpersonal bonds; the development of the slave trade and its impact on Africa; the causes of the gulf which grew steadily greater between a rich, acquisitive, powerful Europe and an Africa gradually becoming paralysed and in places stagnant. In particular this volume attacks two related fallacies: the belief that the states of West Africa owed their emergence as 'organised kingdoms' to the influence of European enterprise; and, secondly, 'the central myth of European expansion that first took shape on the deck of a slaving ship', the belief in the 'natural inferiority' of the African, and in his incapacity to govern or protect himself. For it was this myth that led some Europeans first to deduce that the slave trade was little more than an inevitable consequence of this 'inferiority' and, later, that the African could emerge from this degradation only under European control.

With a wealth of illuminating detail drawn from a wide range of sources, Mr. Davidson finds little difficulty in demonstrating how different was the actual course of events. Justifiably he commands a large public; to many of his readers his story will come as a complete revelation and its impact in eradicating these misconceptions can surely be regarded as salutary. Yet one's pleasure in this volume is marred by the author's excess of zeal which leads him on several occasions to overstate his case and to disregard the complexity of the events with which he is dealing.

One example of overstatement must suffice: having berated Johnston for propagating these and other fallacies in 1910, Mr. Davidson comments 'only at the end of the imperial epoch, still many years ahead when Johnston wrote his books, would Europeans and Americans begin to look at Africa systematically, and as a subject in its own right rather than a mere object of pity, amazement or contempt'. Yet even at that date the Seligmans in the Sudan, Roscoe in Buganda and Junod in South Africa were heralding the imminent invasion of the anthropologists, Randall-MacIver had published a scholarly, archaeological investigation into medieval Rhodesia and Johnston himself was after all an enthusiastic pioneer in the search for linguistic clues to early Bantu history. More serious is the author's neglect of evidence which might tend to modify the blame and evil which he almost invariably assigns to Europeans. While referring, for example, to the role of the baptismal tax on slaves in priestly revenues in the Congo, he neglects to mention the numerous efforts throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the part of some Portuguese bishops, the Italian Capuchin missionaries and the Papal Curia to mitigate the worst excesses of the trade. In his account of the factors leading to the decline of the kingdom of the Congo, there is no mention of the Jaga invasions and the subsequent internal convulsions of the area; Europe apparently is the sole villain of the piece. And one wonders whether the basic contrast which he makes, between the Portuguese failure in the Congo and the relative success of the Arabs on the east coast in achieving 'a genuine and fruitful marriage of cultures' during the medieval period, is in fact valid: for it is too early yet to estimate the nature of Arab influence on the kingdom of Monomotapa, which is surely more comparable than what they achieved at Kilwa or Mombasa. Finally one need not consider the British conflict with the Ashanti to have been a noble and edifying story to hold that it

was a far more complex process than Mr. Davidson seems to think, and one in which mutual misunderstandings and vacillations played perhaps as large a part as the 'tide of imperialism'.

Time is needed before a balanced, reliable reassessment of Europe's pre-colonial contact with Africa can be written: time to enable scholars to bring a far greater range of facts to light and time to allow both guilt and inferiority complexes to grow less strong. As interim reports and as a death-blow to certain popular, out-dated false assumptions, Mr. Davidson's works are most welcome; but one hopes they will not establish a new and blinkered orthodoxy.

RICHARD GRAY

THE COLOUR PROBLEM

By ANTHONY RICHMOND

Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1961. 374 pp. 4s.

Mr. Richmond's book should have the sub-title, The Political and Economic Conflicts produced by Racial Discrimination in the Commonwealth. For this is what his book is—a discussion of the intertwining of politics, economics and the problem of colour where colour is a visible mark of a cultural heritage different from that of the European. One is aware when reading books of this type that discrimination generally starts with the Europeans; that it inevitably leads to reaction in the form of, for example, African nationalism, which completes the circle of bigotry. The best chapters of Mr. Richmond's book are the Introduction, where he tries to explain in a few words the 'why' of colour discrimination, and the last which examines the colour problem in Britain. The greater portion of the remaining chapters are in effect a political survey of the areas where politics are affected by the presence of a colour problem. It is therefore natural that the emphasis is on the African scene and there is a lucid account of the influence of 'race relations' on the political and economic evolution of British Africa, including South Africa. Though the revised edition is an attempt to bring the account up to date, the book even after two years is in many cases already out of date. Africa is changing so rapidly that this is inevitable. The expression 'when in Africa go slowly' does not necessarily apply to African politics. This book, therefore, is still a must for anyone wishing to grasp the essentials of what constitutes the 'colour problem'.

PETER SILVERMAN

THE LIGHT CONTINENT

Editor's note: This is a rejoinder by Professor U. R. Ehrenfels to Dr. L. P. Mair's review of his book *The Light Continent*, which appeared in *Race*, Volume III, Number 1, November 1961.

Dr. L. P. Mair states in the review of my book *The Light Continent*:

'Dr. Ehrenfels believes, with the famous ethnologists of the nineteenth century, that this' [matrilineal inheritance] 'is one of the earliest forms of social organisation, but he does not share their view that father-right is more advanced.'

In two references, also mentioned in the book's index under 'Matriarchal' and in thirty-six, mentioned in 'Matrilineal', there is not one passage which refers either to 'the famous ethnologists of the nineteenth century'—much less anything that could be interpreted as an attempt to support their culture-evolutionary trends of thought. There are, on the other hand, several references to contemporary anthropologists whose views are quoted as valuable sources (Leakey, p. 41; Richards, p. 12; Southall, p. 9 ff; Whiteley, 11, 65).

The reviewer continues to state that I take as 'Literal truth the Kikuyu legend' when in fact I point out that Kenyatta '. . . narrates the old . . . story which his aged father told him . . .' (p. 39) and continue to write: '. . . there is no reason to doubt that the tribal legend, testifying to a matrilineal origin of the Kikuyu

is correctly restated and that the Kikuyu had in fact once been organised in a matrilineal social system. This is indeed the conclusion at which Western anthropologists also arrived from their studies' (Leakey, 1958). Though Dr. L. S. B. Leakey may be described as a famous anthropologist, he can hardly pass as one of the nineteenth century.

The reviewer also criticises me for pointing out the necessity to counterbalance sudden decreases of infantile mortality by family planning which she feels is 'really asking rather much'. I have in this respect not been concerned with the past but the present situation in which the Governments of Japan and India do not seem to think that attempts at family planning are asked rather too much.

Finally the reviewer implies that I tried to give the impression to have been the first anthropologist '. . . concerned about situations where desirable and even necessary technical improvements have been misunderstood and rejected'. Quite apart from the controversial nature of judgements on the desirability and necessity of technical improvements, the learned reviewer here again seems to have criticised views allegedly but not actually contained in my book. She gives neither reference pages nor any other hint to which part of the work she refers. However, its central theme is concern over hastily accepting rather than rejecting technical skills—or their prestige symbols. This much every other reviewer of the book so far has grasped.

Adverse criticism when made objectively may help clarifications and is therefore welcome, but unsubstantiated accusations based on either misunderstood or intentionally distorted rendering of the original can only mislead.

U. R. Ehrenfels

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

The New Negro. By Mathew H. Ahmann (Editor). New York, National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, 1961. $3.50.

The Black Man's Portion: Xhosa in Town I. By D. H. Reader. London, Oxford University Press for Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, 1962. 40s.

The Story of Nigeria. By Michael Crowder. London, Faber, 1962. 21s.

Indians in a Plural Society: a report on Mauritius. By Burton Benedict. London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Colonial Research Studies 34, 1961. 25s.

White Settlers in Tropical Africa. By L. H. Gann and P. Duignan. Harmondsworth, Penguin African Series, 1962. 3s. 6d.

Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia. By Charles Frantz and Cyril A. Rogers. London, Yale University Press, 1962. 54s.

Apartheid and Race Relations in the Union of South Africa. By A. K. Datta. New Delhi, Indian Council for Africa, 1961.

The Tribe and its Successors: an account of African traditional life and of European settlement in Southern Rhodesia. By William Rayner. London, Faber, 1962. 30s.

The Lost World of the Kalahari. By Laurens van der Post. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1962. 3s. 6d.

Race Relations: Problems and Theory. Edited by Jitsuichi Masuoka and Preston Valien. North Carolina University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 290 pp. 48s.

The Nyasaland Elections of 1961. By Lucy Mair. London, Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1962. 87 pp. 18s.

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

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